'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎50r] (99/248)

PART XI—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT 97
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.
A. Division of Responsibility for Campaign.
of expanding a sma'.i army into one of national dimensions, and at the same time of
organising a senes of expeditions abroad, towards which the Indian Military Autliontiea
were compelled to contribute largely both in the shape of personnel and material. Simla
had. in addition to the task of providing these Oversea Expeditions, to guard against the
ever-present danger of attacks on the North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. and a recrudescence of disaffec
tion instigated by German agents and money in parts of India. It was only in September, j
1914, after the contributions of India to the expeditions to France, Egypt and East Africa
had been settled, and their military establishments thus depleted, that the Secretary
of State for India directed from Whitehall the Indian Government to send a brigade to
the head of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
6. The subsequent correspondence clearly shows that the Indian Government was at
first lukewarm on a proposition which it did not originate. The scope of the expedition 1
grew, and its numbers increased, continuing to make a constant drain upon Indian
resources. So reluctant were the Government of India to comply with these increased
demands that in March, 1915, it was only under compulsion of a most imperative order from
Whitehall that the reinforcements necessary to bring up the force to a strength of two
Divisions were sent. This reinforcement secured victory and firmly established the
expeditionary force. Sir John Nixon assumed command in April, 1915, and took out with
him the Orders previously referred to, which included instructions to prepare (1) A plan
for the effective occupation of Basra Vilayet, and (2) A plan for the subsequent advance on
Baghdad.
7. The objects of the expedition up to this time had been defined to be (1) that it
would checkmate Turkish intrigues, (2) that it would encourage the Arabs to rally round
us and confirm the Sheiks of Muhammerah and Koweit in their allegiance, and (3) that it
would protect the oil installation at Abadan. But these objects were not so precisely
limited that they could not be expanded, so as to cover operations much more extensive
than were originally contemplated by the Home Government. Almost from the very
outset of the expedition, the political importance of occupying Baghdad was urged by Sir
Percy Cox, the Indian Government’s agent in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . The political officers on
the spot, in Simla and in Whitehall, both at the Foreign Office and the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , all at
various times gave expression to a similar view, and it may be that the successive advances
from Basra to Kurna, Kurna to Amarah, and Amarah to Kut, though put forward as
necessary defensive operations, were partially prompted by this ambition. During the
later of these advances, the attitude of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. was one of reluctant acceptance of
the forward movements advocated by Simla. Simla and Whitehall were not pulling well
together. Up to this date no full and frank exchange of opinion seems to have taken
place either as to the scope and aim of the expedition, or as to the preparation and expendi
ture necessary to ensure its success.
8. During the first months of this campaign the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. was stimulating the Indian
Government to greater exertion by ordering them to send out additional troops. So soon
as the troops sent out amounted to two Divisions, then the role was reversed, and it was
the Indian Government who were constantly pressing upon the Home Authorities the
necessity of advance. Sir John Nixon in his evidence before us criticised—and we think
with justice—^the discrepancy between his Orders of March 24th, 1915,* and the telegraphic
criticism of his operations sent him a month later by the Secretary of State.
9. The Mesopotamian Expedition was one which during the early operations required
the closest attention. It was only by a careful study of the abnormal nature of the con
ditions, under which any lengthened campaign would have to be carried on, that the in
herent difficulty of establishing a reliable base at Basra could be overcome. Even if the
base had been consolidated and made effective, there still remained the difficulty of
providing steamer transport of a special character and if sufficient steamer transport could
not be obtained in a given time, then railroads became a necessity. But the improvement
of the harbour and the building of railroads meant permanent, and possibly unremunerative,
outlay, and no matter what the outlay might be, it could not give an immediate response
in the shape of improved communication. Makeshifts and hand-to-mouth contrivances
therefore became the order of the day, as they gave at a less immediate expenditure a
quicker though ephemeral return.
(C 48—176)
See Part IV., para. 2>
If