Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎226r] (452/540)

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160. The movement of shipping
at Jedda in 1931
was as
follows
With Cargoes.
In Ballast.
Entered—
No.
Tonnage.
No.
Tonnage.
British
140
188,330
8
20,378
Other flags
111
243,462
17
72,607
Cleared—
British
91
97,174
57
111,534
Other flags
60
74,288
68
241,781
161. The question of a commercial treaty between Great Britain and
Hejaz-Nejd (see paragraph 129 of the annual report for 1931) was not pursued
in 1931. Ibn Saud’s proposal that His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom should act as his intermediaries for purchases also disappeared from
the scene as a result of the negative attitude taken up by His Majesty’s
Government, who, on the 15th January, furnished the Legation in Jedda with
the material for a considered reply. They could not, they explained, act as
buyers on behalf of the King, although they would be willing to give advice in
connexion with particular transactions of importance, as they had done in the
case of the Marconi wireless contract. They drew attention to the desirability
of doing business through established houses (e.g., Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and
Co., whom Sir A. Ryan was given discretion to name specifically, if he thought
it well to do so) and the importance of following sound methods as regards
punctual payment, &c.
V.— Military Organisation.
162. Little can be added to what was said on this subject in
paragraph 133 ff. of the annual report for 1930, in which, inter alia, some account
was given of the embryo regular army. Unfortunately for that experiment,
the Director-General of Military Organisation, Faudhi Bey Kawokji, fell
into disfavour for some obscure reason, possibly connected with Shereefian
sympathies or personal ambition, about the middle of May, when he either
resigned or was dismissed. Ibn Saud found no one better to replace him than a
certain Hamdi Bey, previously commanding officer of the Jedda garrison, this
man is a Kurd, who is understood to have risen from the ranks to the post of
lieutenant in the Turkish army, the type of person who would be useful in a
scrap, but with neither the knowledge nor the experience required for
organisation; an intriguer to boot. The bulk of the army was removed later
from Jedda to Mecca. It was no longer possible to watch its evolution, but it
may safely be assumed that no progress of importance had been made with the
scheme up to the end of the year. Ibn Saud must still rely on the retainers of
himself and his Amirs and on tribal levies for any important military purpose.
VI.— Aviation and Connected Matters.
163. Nothing happened in 1931 to repair the lamentable state into which
the Hejazi Air Force had fallen by the end of 1930, when all the mechanics
resigned, and two of the remaining British pilots, Messrs. Morris and North,
were at daggers drawn with the third, Mr. Lowe. In January the last of the
mechanics were filling in their time pending their departure, which took place on
the 11th February. Mr. Lowe was intriguing behind the chief pilot’s back with
certain local officers. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom were
concerned over the situation. They still hoped that the elimination of Mr. Lowe
might do good. His Majesty’s Minister, acting on their instructions, strongly
advocated this in a conversation with Sheikh Yussuf Yasin on the 2nd February.
His advice was not taken then or later, although Messrs. Morris and North had
threatened to resign if Mr. Lowe were not removed. The King’s only idea was
that he wanted to be quit of all three, but without dismissing them, and to obtain
the assistance of His Majesty’s Government in recruiting a new staff of pilots and
mechanics. So far as the remnant of the original force is concerned, it is not
worth while to recapitulate in detail the story of hesitancy and intrigue, which
ended in Messrs. Morris and North tendering their resignations early in April.