File 4345/1912 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎78r] (160/330)

^ • I'Lg
This document is the property of the Secretary of State for India m Council.
Secret.
Trans-Persian Railway.
It is understood that the British group of the Societe d’Etudes are not
prepared to go on unless His Majesty’s Government give more decided
support than they have yet given. The moment is therefore critical, since it
is thus in the poAver of His Majesty’s Government to wreck the scheme for
the time being.
We have to consider, then, Avhether the scheme is one Avith which it
is desirable to go on, regard being had to all the interests iirvolved. The
official vIcav of the Secretary of State for India was stated in our letter
of 6th April 1911, in which British participation Avas justified on the
ground that it might be argued that the geographical isolation of India Avas
necessarily doomed, “ and that it behoA r es those who are responsible for her
“ interests to be foremost in the race for concessions, so as to ensure that such
“ at least as may be strategically and politically essential to her security shall
“ be in her oavii hands. One or more of these concessions avouM be for railway
“ lines, which, though their immediate purpose would be different, might,
“ without disadA r antage, form connecting links in a Trans-Persian railway.”
Lord Morley had already concurred in the Government of India’s opinion
that there was no prospect of such a railway being a commercial success,
and it is evident from the whole tone of the letter that the Trans-Persian
railway as such was disliked here, but that means were being sought of
enabling the Foreign Office to meet as far as possible the wishes of the
Russian Government. It Avas thought that there Avas no harm in accepting
in principle a scheme which Avas certain to prove impracticable.
The question is should Ave now go beyond that attitude ? There can
be no doubt that neither the Government of India, nor the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
nor the Foreign Office, nor any responsible business man would ever have
spontaneously proposed a Trans-Persian railway for the sake of through
connexion Avith Europe. There can be very little doubt that nobody likes
the proposal, and that everybody would gladly see it dropped. But we are
implicated in it for two reasons. (1) From a desire to please the Russian
Government, and especially the Emperor, avIio is understood to press it
strongly. (2) From an apprehension that if we do not agree to it now,
Ayhen Ave can more or less make our own terms, it may some day be forced
upon us by others on terms that may be very unfavourable. Now, there are
obvious limits beyond Avhich the first of these reasons cannot be pressed.
“ Why,” it was asked in India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. letter of 6th April 1911, “ why should
“ India sacrifice all the strategical advantages of her geographical isolation
“ in order to encourage a scheme Avhich, Avhatever prospect of profit it may
offer to her commercial rival, offers none to herself?” The answer, if
there is one, lies, from the Indian point of view, in the second reason,
Avhich therefore deserves closer examination than it has yet received.
The argument is this. Raihvay construction in Persia is inevitable.
Persia cannot be “ sterilised ” as the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. wished (letter of 23rd
December 1909)—and either Russia or some other Power will sooner or later
build railways in the direction of India, the alignment of, or rates charged
on, Avhich may be very inconvenient. The only safe course, therefore, is to
make the best terms Ave can noAV, while Russia is friendly.
From their letters of 17th December 1909 and 19th January 1910 it
would appear that this is the Foreign Office view. But since the latter
date (which was prior to the formal Russian proposal), no reasoned statement
of their views has been received. Reserving for further consideration
later the question whether through railway connection is inevitable, the
points to be examined are the supposed commercial and strategical
(including political) disadvantages of standing aloof.
S. 192. A