'Despatch from Sir M. Durand respecting appointment of Additional Consular Officers in Persia' [‎106v] (16/18)

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Persia, and that consequently we can with ease make our wishes respected. The
reason why the Persians often disregard them is what I have mentioned before, that
they think our forbearance is practically unlimited. But whenever they see that we
are in earnest, and that Her Majesty’s Government is interested in a ease, the Shah
and his Ministers speedily became convinced of the necessity for meeting our wishes.
I would ask Her Majesty’s Government to believe that we have still great power and
reputation in Persia.
Having such power we can afford both to be decided in insisting upon our
legitimate interests and to be sympathetic and easy in our terms if the Persians ask
us for help, pecuniary or other.
We can also do something to check Russian encroachments. In my Memo
randum of 1895 I suggested our letting it be understood that aggressive action by
Russia in the north of Persia would immediately result in decided action by us in the
south. I still think that this is our proper policy. I do not mean that we should
bully or unduly threaten the Persian Government, but I would let them understand
that we cannot regard without concern any such action as, for example, the pushing
down of the Russian sanitary w r edge towards Seistan, and that we shall, if these things
happen, ask for compensations which the Persian Government may dislike. It is
easy to do this, and it may help the Persian Government to resist demands which
otherwise they would find it difficult to avoid accepting. I think they should realize
that any serious concession made in the north is likely to involve an equivalent
concession in the south. Hitherto they have realized only the converse of the pro
position. I fully recognize that it may be embarrassing for us to commit ourselves
beforehand to any particular method of action, but the principle should be under
stood. If Her Majesty’s Government do not give me orders to the contrary, this is
the line I propose to take jn the future.
Similarly, to turn to another clause of my recommendations of 1895, if Her
Majesty’s Government do not give me orders to the contrary I propose, in the event
of the Shah’s death, to recognize provisionally the succession of the Valiahd, as I did
three years ago.
I may now perhaps usefully recapitulate what I have written regarding the
state of Persia in 1899, and the steps which should be taken to improve our position
in the country.
The internal condition of Persia is exceedingly bad, worse in some respects than
in 1895. The finances are in greater disorder, the troops and civil establishments are
unpaid, food is dear, the Shah is a weak Ruler who maintains no discipline, and his
Prime Minister has no powers, so that there is practically no Government. The
Russians have shown considerable activity in the northern provinces, pushing on
roads, and energetically encouraging their trade, and making use of their missionaries
among the Christian populations. They have put “ sanitary ” posts along the Afghan
border, and have tried to establish their trade and influence in Seistan. They have
also established a Consulate at Ispahan. Nevertheless, the internal condition of
Persia is by no means hopeless, her debt being practically nothing, and her resources
considerable; and although Russia has been active in some respects we still hold a
strong position. Our trade and our influence are completely dominant up to the
Khanikin-Seistan line; and though our trade has suffered in the north it is still
alive Our bank does business all over Persia, and is the only bank that can legally
issue notes. Our Telegraph Department controls a large part of the Persian telegraph
system. Our political influence is still great, even in the north, and our power is
much feared. Still it cannot he denied that our position is threatened.
To maintain and improve it we should increase by five or six the number of our
English Consular officers, and should encourage them all to travel and know their
districts. We should also improve the condition of our Consulates at Tabreez and
Ispahan. We should try to open out new trade routes, and to make those which exist
a little better than they are. Possibly, we might prospect for a railway. We should
also make more use of our Telegraph Department, trying to get into our hands as much
of the Persian telegraph system as possible, and to have all our Consular posts in
effective communication with Tehran. We should insist upon our interests being
specially considered within our zone—that is, up to the Khanikin—Seistan line.
Amongst other things, we should exercise some unofficial control over the appoint
ment and dismissal of the Persian Governors. We should be strict in keeping the
Persians to their engagements, and resisting injustice; but, on the other hand, having
the power to coerce Persia very easily, we should be considerate in our dealings with
her if she wants help, and, under certain circumstances, we should guarantee a loan