'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎25v] (55/294)

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undertake them rather than the civil authorities and the police who
will have to live on in the country afterwards.
In Palestine there is little doubt that any prestige which the
civil power might have lost in giving way to military control would
have been infinitely Less than that occasioned by the^ continued failure
to bring the rebellion to an end. The Royal Commission Report
plainly recognises this - "Our chief recorore relation i,^_ti^t^jiQuld
d isorders break out again there should oe no hesitation in en foroing
martial law throughout the country under undivuded military contro l",
(iv) Can the needs of the situation not be met, even at thi s
junction, by closer co-operation between the military command and
the~~civil officials particularly the p olice?'
The attitude of the Arab officials has already been described,
and since they comprised the greater part of the administration and
the police there can have been little hesitation in answering .:o' to
this question.
(v) Is the military commander in a position to un der take the
burdenwhich supersession of the civil government involves - a re
his forces and staff adequate or capable of being quickl y"
expanded?
Martial law was first mooted in Ihlestine on the 23rd May.
At that time affairs around Nablus were so bad that the civil power
had virtually lost all semblance of control, and it seemed that
nothing short of an immediate application of martial law to that area
at least could prevent further deterioration. Under such circum
stances the military commander was prepared to accept the responsi
bilities, There might have been difficulties at first in its
practical application, but there was a large force of potential
reinforcements close at hand in Egypt - due to the ’’Italian
Emergency” then nearing its end - which certainly fulfilled the
provision of a capacity for quick expansion. Prom the beginning
of June onwards adequate forces and staff were available and the
military commander was in a position to assume control at any time.
There is one lesson which may be stressed in this connection.
The effect of martial law is greatly enhanced if its fullest powers
can be exerted immediately on its introduction. Otherwise there will
be an interval when the rebels will gain heart from a discovery that
it does not appear nearly so formidable as it sounds. To make its full
effect felt at once requires long and detailed preparations. The
meticulous wording and subsequent printing of innumerable "forms”
alone takes time, and in any Command where martial lav/ is a possi
bility it is necessary to maintain in peace a comprehensive scheme
for the assumption by the military commander of the burden which may
be involved by supersession of the civil government. In Palestine
this had to be prepared in great haste and under the stress of a
rapidly changing situation.
A study of the five considerations which have been discussed
must show beyond doubt that martial law would have done a great deal
to facilitate military operations. In its absence they were con
ducted with crippling restrictions on the use of force, with a serious
lack of secrecy, with no tangible military object, and on a purely
defensive basis. These last two factors may repay further examination.