'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎72r] (148/294)

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the Army had its proper complement of signals. The unsuitability of
their organization has been discussed in detail in a previous chapter.
The bulk of the work fell upon the infantry brigade sections which
had never sufficient personnel or equipment for maintaining communica
tions in the large areas over which their brigades were spread. A
brigade section had sometimes to provide for an area headquarters and an
operational headquarters in the field with four or more mobile units
working under its control: it had therefore two tasks to perform each
one of which was practically equivalent to what it would normally have
to undertake in war. Fortunately this type of operations made few
calls on Divisional Signals, Y/hich could safely be drawn upon to supple
ment Brigade Sections. The solution therefore appeared to be to
utilize the Divisional Signals for area work and to leave the Brigade
Sections free for their more normal functions. This redistribution
of duties vrould have been facilitated had-a signal park been available
upon which the Divisional ..Signals could draw as required.
AIRCPAFT
The following chapter is devoted to the work of aircraft in co
operation with troops in the field in Palestine. It is therefore
only necessary here to record the units which were available, and
certain general points regarding the organization of air co-operation.
For the first five v/eeks of the rebellion the only aircraft
operating in Palestine v/ero those of the flight of No.6 (Bomber)
Squadron at Ramleh and two aircraft of No.14 (Bomber) Squadron detached
to Jisr A1 Majami at the disposal of the O.G. Jordan Area, though the
remainder of 14 Squadron from Amman carried^ out constant reconnaissances
of the Jordan Valley and the approaches to it from Trans-Jordan. By
the end of May the rest of No.6 Squadron, which was normally l 11 ^' 01 - ,l
in Egypt for convenience of accommodation, moved up into Palestine,
and was followed in July by No. 33 (Bomber) Squadron. No. 203 (Army
Co-operation) Squadron, which arrived in September, completed the Air
Contingent; -while No.14 Squadron continued throughout to deal with
Trans-Jordan and contribute aircraft as required for operating m the
neighbourhood of the Jordan Valley.
In the allotment of aixorart a fair measure of decentralisation
was plainly demanded to ensure that immediate air action took plac
whenever contact 'was made with the enemy and to provi e ...
possible co-operation between air and land toices. i addition each
Force was therefore distributed on a sons basis, *ip^f^hts ?or
of the principal military' areas had a call upon allotted flights for
reconnaissance duties and close co-operation with troops. It was_ ^
frequently necessary to empioy bomter aircr on t ^ themselves
and at a later stage Divisional Commanders occasion y
with both Army co-operation and bomber uni s a. -necific”task,
there 'were often doubts as to which to employ 10 . _ ^ ° no1; equipped
An added complication was the fact that some squa J ^
for night flying- Confusion regarding the allotment of tasks was apt
to lead to the employment of an unnecessary ^Zfc.fZTvilotl
operation, which was not only uneconomioa ^u^ ^ attentions
during low-flying attacks by cceipel- ^ ^ ^ ^ allotted flights -
in order to avoid collision. Ao an a. nri oh+ have been
other than those of army co-operation squa 1 na ke calls direct
better had subordinate arny commanders wou!d
to an R.A.F. "Control", where the actua! detailing of^ireraft^^ ^
have been done by the R.A.F. Commander con ^ * ensured, tho correct
base. By this method speed in e “ c ^Sency maximum economy
type of aircraft would be employed on each task, nn
in aircraft obtained.