'Persia and the Persian Question by the Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P.' [‎579] (646/714)

THE ARMY
579
lacking in stability of character or purpose, began to lose interest
in army reform, and even treated his English officers with some
suspicion. In 1815, in consequence of a dispute between Persia
and England about the continuance of the subsidy, all English non
commissioned officers in the Persian service were ordered by the
British Minister to leave the country, and here, accordingly, though
some commissioned officers, e.g.. Hart and D'Arcy, remained, the
first period of British military tuition may be considered to have
come to an end.
Nothing showed the meanness of Path Ali Shah more clearly
than his insistence, in the face of national danger, that the defence
h { of Azerbaijan, which was the theatre of war, should be
fhePersian confined to Azerbaijan troops. Sooner than incur the
army expense of raising and disciplining a national army, he
preferred to see his prestige shattered, and his kingdom dis
membered. The army of Abbas Mirza, of which I have been
speaking, consisted of 12,000 men, raised in corps of 1,000 each
from different tribes or localities in the province. These were
known as the serhaz, i.e. those who staked or played with their
heads, a charming euphemism for the profession at that time of a
Persian soldier. In addition, Abbas Mirza had a regular brigade
of cavalry, 1,200 strong, and a corps of horse artillery (Lindsay's
command) with 20 field-pieces. The Persian army consisted, in
addition, of a force of 8,000—9,000 janbaz, i.e. those who staked
or played with their lives, who were attached to the king, and
were inferior to the serbaz, both in pay, clothing, and discipline.
These were recruited from the outlying districts and tribes, and
included two Bakhtiari regiments, who were reported as very
tractable by their English officers. How great a difference existed
between the army thus composed, and that of the preceding cen
tury, will have been made evident by the details and figures which
I have given of its organisation.
It might be thought that by the institution of a regular army
on the European plan, and by the employment of European officers,
Effects of armaments, ammunition, discipline, and skill, Persia would
peaif Ur0 " have gained considerably in military strength. Such was
system not the case. The English officers found the men docile
and intelligent; but the Persian officers could not be otherwise
described than as the greatest rascals in the world. Led by such
superiors, what could be expected of a force brought lace to face