Coll 28/130 ‘Persia. Tribal situation and recommended policy.’ [‎12r] (23/190)

- 2 -
where....-
rele^sed> -evaded control and returned to their tribes to remain
as potential trouble-makers* This combination of causes began to
produce its effect almost at once. Disturbance manifested itself
in Fars (tho Shiraz province)* in the Dashti and Tangistan areas
bordering on the Gulf ports, and' above all in Southern Kurdistan,
whe*e th$ Persian offiohal^ fled or ■ were-eyected and the Kurds
in possessions
3i The question of public order was of immediate concern
to His Majesty’s Government because of the decision to send Aid to
Russia through Persia* British railway experts became responsible
for the running of the railway from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. to Tehran,
and although this duty was handed over to Americans of the Persian
Gulf Command a year or so later, British troops remained responsible
for the security of communications as far as Tehran - not only of
the railway, but also of the roads along which the convoys to Russia
ran. Thus the security essential to the regular provision of Aid
to Russia and to the war effort in general v/as exposed to danger fro-,
all three of the areas which have been indicated above. The Kurds
might threaten the road communications in the west; the Arab tribe^
in Khuzistan were all round what eventually became important Britis.
and American bases; and the tribes of Pars touched on one side the
Bushire road, and on the other the oilfields which are essential to
the pro section of the war, especially in the Par East.
Gov ernm en J '
4. The first area to claim the attention of the iersian /
Southern Kurdistan, where a Kurdish leader named Hama Rashid was
giving serious trouble. The movement demanded the attention of the
British military authorities in Persia also, because of the risk
its spreading to tribes on the Allied communications and its threat
to stability in general - a stability which was essential to the
prosecution of the Aid to Russia programme. It affected His Majesty
Government in a much wider way also because of their interest in oh .
maintenance of a string, stable and independent Persia. Moreover
unrest among the Persian Kurds might disturb the Kurdish minorities
in the neighbouring territories of Turkey and Iraq.. To remain silent
was impossible because Hama Rashid was trying, with some success,
secure support by claiming that he had the backing of the British.
Accordingly a statement was printed in Persian and eventually droppe _
over the disturbed ansa by Persian aeroplanes, stating that the
policy of His Majesty’s Government was to encourage the Persian
Government to restore their authority in Kurdistan while at the same
time redressing the legitimate grievances of the population, and
specifically denying that any support was being given to the rebel
leader, Hama Rashid. The British military authorities helped by
releasing the Persian troops who had been taken prisoner during the
operations of August 1941 and by handing over to the Persian Army
a large stock of rifles which they had taken from the local
population, who had acquired them from the Persian troops by various
means at the time of the entry of the British forces.
5. It is not unreasonable to see a connection between the
statement in the declaration dropped among tM tribes, about the
policy of His Majesty's Government towards the tribes, and a state
ment made in the Persian Majlis in March 1942, in which the irirne
Minister stated that the Persian Government were firmly resolved
to compensate tribal individuals for genuine injustices and announce
the formation of a commission to examine grievances without delay -
a statement v/hich was also distributed among the tribes of Southern
Kurdistan. The trouble there simmered down into a compromise by
which Hama Rashid was made ruler of Bon eh and other Kurdish Chiefs^
held similar positions elsewhere, each receiving a subsidy from tho
Persian Government in return for the maintenance of order. Even
this, however, did not satisfy Hama RaBhid, who took arms again
against the Persian Government in September 1944. Being forced to
abandon Baneh he burned every building there except the mosque.
Under pressure from the Persian troops he retreated into Iraq,