Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎24v] (48/544)

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General Wilson undertook —
(1.) To enquire from Sir Percy Sykes if the Bushire route teas
open and practicable ;
(2.) To ascertain from Sijkes exactly what reinforcements he
needed;
(3.) To find out from India if reinforcements could be tent to
Sykes from that country via Bushire.
(At this point Mr. Balfour, Mr. Montagu, Lord R. Cecil, and
General Wilson withdrew from the meeting.)
('auensus.
General
Runsterville.
3. The Cha irman said that a novel situation had arisen as
regards General Dunsterville. The Committee’s policy had been to
try and build up the Kerman-Hamadan-Kasvin line. They had
pointed out the importance of this theatre to General Marshall,
whose reply had not been entirely satisfactory, in the view of the
Committee and the War Office. Then, at this stage, General
Dunsterville telegraphed on the 24th May through the G.O.C.
Mesopotamia the surprising news that Bicharakof was moving
North to the Caspian and that General Dunsterville proposed to
accompany him in order to try and carry out his own plans in the
Caucasus. Sir Charles Marling had pointed out what a dislocation
of our general policy this departure involved. The Chairman said
that, after consultation with Lord Hardingeand General Macdonogh,
he had authorised the latter to draw General Marshall’s attention to
the fact that this new departuie meant a complete reversal of our
policy. General Marshall, in his reply, explained: (a) that the
mission was a very small one ; (l>) that in authorising it to proceed
he was only carrying out the instructions of His Majesty’s Govern
ment at the end of March, that the G.O.C., Mesopotamia, should bear
in mind the possibilities of the Caucasus. Since then, however, the
Chairman pointed out, the situation had changed and, naturally,
former suggestions had gone by the board. The Chairman assumed
that the Committee still adhered to their policy of concentrating all
our energies on the line Kerman-Hamadan-Kasvin. He confessed
his surprise at the proposal that Bicharakof should be allowed to go
and leave the line from Kerman to Kasvin open and to let General
Dunsterville—the only man who could possibly fill up the gap—go
with him.
General Macdonogh said that the War Office had received no hint
of General Dunsterville’s proposed move. Dunsterville had intended
to make a tour about the middle of the month and had suddenly
wired that he wished to take with him a f*quadron of the 14th
Hussars and a Company of the Hampshire Regiment to Baku, but
General Marshall had refused to give him the troops. General
Dunsterville had also communicated his intentions to Sir Charles
Marling, who was impressed with the importance of holding Kasvin
even at the risk of reducing the forces at Hamadan. The War
Office had then wired to Mesopotamia to the effect that the British
Government had decided that General Dunsterville should on no
account be allowed to proceed to the Caucasus.
The Chairman thought that these orders were absolutely sound.
Now that General Dun^terville had been stopped there was nothing
further to be done for the present. He would ask the Foreign Office,
however, to communicate the views of the Committee to Sir Charles
Marling.
General Macdonogh referred to a telegram from General
Marshall dated the 27th May, outlining a scheme to maintain a
mobile motor column to keep the Kerman-Kasvin line open.
Colonel Rowlandson had said that, in his opinion, 5,000 troops could
easily be supplied in Hamadan.
General Smuts thought there was a good deal to be said for
the establishment of such a force. The prospects of the approaching
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