Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎59v] (118/544)

4
Our Policy in
Persia.
money as well as arms of all kinds. Incidentally he stated that
certain Englishmen who had recently returned from Afghanistan to
India had said that, when they left, the situation was quite normal.
The Committee decided—
To ask Mr. Montagu to amend his draft in the sense of the above
discussion, and submit it to the Chairman for his approval
before despatch.
2. The Chairman referred to Teheran telegram No. 593 of the
1st July (E.C.-691) (which he himself did not regard as a very
helpful message), in which Sir C. Marling had said that the change
of policy suggested by the Committee was not likely to be successful
at present. Marling harped, as usual, on our announcement last
March of the despatch of troops and the promise of more to North-
West Persia, and the failure of that promise to materialise. This,
however, was not the fault of the Committee ; it was due to the fact
that General Marshall had not fully realised the importance of
pushing forward in strength from liaghdad towards the North-East.
Marling seemed to think that we proposed to withdraw from Resht
and Enzeli, for which there was no foundation, and he also had a
tilt against the levies being raised by Dunsterville in Azerbaijan.
When the enemy raised levies it was always cited as a proof of his
influence with the native populations. 11 we raised them, it vas
denounced by our Minister as bad policy.
Mr. Montagu thought that what was in Marling s mind was
“ your original policy was to go to I\asvin so as to be within reach
of Teheran ; instead of staying at Kasvin you push on to Kesht,
and you leave nothing at Kasvin to support Vossugh in case he
comes into power.” We had no doubt changed our polic\, and
Marling, who constantly harped on the necessity of strengthening
Kasvin, felt that at present we were much too weak there.
Lord Robert Cecil said that Marling wanted a force at Kasvin,
not to go to Teheran, but m order to support A ossugh if necessary.
Marling feared that we did not realise the importance, for this
purpose, of using regular troops instead of levies.
General Macdonogh said that General Marshall had not yet
replied to the strong telegram which the Committee had authorised
the War Office to send him on the 28th June (E.C.-653) as regards
strengthening the Hamadan cordon and getting more troops up the
road. This all depended on the question of supply, which again
was mainly a matter of petiol, which could not be obtained locally.
The infantry brigade at Kasvin, asked for by Marling, would require
a verv considerable number of lorries. 1 he Committee had agreed
that a mobile motor-car column on the road would be of much
greater value than a much larger force of infantry of low mobility.
General Marshall had plenty of men whom he could easily send up,
as the enemy’s position in Mesopotamia was very weak, if only he
could supply them. We had informed General Marshall that we
were sendiug out more Ford vans, &c. In reply to a question from
General Smuts, General Macdonogh explained that two Turkish
divisions were moving from Latum to Julfa, probabl3 r with the
intention of advancing along the River Araxes to Laku, concen
trating at that place from Elizabetopol, Alexandropol, and Julfa.
The Turks had also 2,000 men at Tabriz. It appeared that relations
between the Turks and the Germans were becoming strained, as
we had information that the former had destroyed two bridges north
of Kara Kliss in order to break the connection between themselves
and the Germans. In reply to a further question about disquieting
new r s that had been received about the Jangalis, General Alacdonogh
said that reinforcements, e.g., the remainder of 14th Hussars and a
field battery, were moving up the Hamadan road.
Mr. Montagu said that he thought it quite right that we should
maintain a mobile column on the road. As regards increasing