Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎60r] (119/544)

5
The Situation in
South Persia.
Our Policy in
Persia. •
this force there appeared, owing to the difficulty of supply, to be
only two alternatives ; either to have no more troops there, or to
have a comparatively immobile force which would not be dependent
upon petrol.
General Smuts agreed that the line should be strengthened.
Marling was in a difficult position, as the Persian Government knew
our weakness and could afford, at present, to laugh at him.
General Cox said that a mobile force on the road was most
essential if we intended to try and watch the capital 100 miles away.
It was, however, quite right that our first objective should be the
Caspian.
The Chairman said he agreed with Mr. Montagu, and thought
that General Marshall should be instructed to push up an infantry
force, even if it were only a battalion, either to Kernianshah or
llamadan in order to steady the situation.
The Committee agreed that it was desirable to strengthen, without
delay, the llamadan cordon, but decided that Ceneral Mar
shall's reply to War Office telegram 61196 MX).2 of the
2Xth June (E.C. 653) should be awaited before instructions
in regard to this should be sent to the G.O.C., Mesopotamia.
General Macdonogh referred to the last paragraph of Sir C.
Marling’s telegram of the 1st July (E C.-691) which said that as
regards the possibility of making an advance from Bushire, the
forcing of passes on the Shiraz road is, according to all military
opinion, a very formidable undertaking, and while Marling recognised
the full importance of doing anything to relieve Sir P. Sykes at
Shiraz, on the possibility of which the military authorities would
pronounce, he (Marling) would prefer to see the troops available for
the purpose sent to Bundar Abbas rather than run undue risk of
failure. This was the view which had been taken from the start by the
War Office and by the Eastern Committee. It was the Commander-
in-Chief in India who had insisted on sending the force to Bushire.
The Committee decided that—
The Commander-in-Chief in India should be ashed his views as
to Sir C. Marling's recommendation, and the War Office
should take the necessary action to obtain them.
Mr. Montagu confessed that Marling’s telegram of the 1st July
left him rather pessimistic. The message was not hopeful in tone,
nor did it disclose the right spirit. Marling evidently lacked
enthusiasm to carry out successfully the policy which the Committee
advised.
Lord Robert Cecil said that the line taken by Marling was that
nothing could be done, that no policy could be carried out without
a strong military force to back it, and that concessions were of no
use at all.
The Chairman pointed out that Marling had only lately adopted
this view ; earlier in the day he had advocated diplomatic measures
and even an alliance. He agreed with Mr. Montagu that Marling
appeared to have turned down the Committee’s policy without giving
it due consideration.
General Macdonogh said that Sir C. Marling was never satisfied
with what we were doing and was always altering his mind. He
himself suggested that it would be wise to withdraw him and send
another man. He felt that our policy should be unified as far as
possible and that we should have one man to control our military
policy throughout Persia. Military operations in Mesopotamia
were conducted by General Marshall, who, in turn, was guided in
matters of policy, by Sir P. Cox. General Macdonogh thought that
the sphere of this latter officer might well be extended to include
Persia, and that Sir P. Cox might be sent to replace the Minister at
Teheran.
[365—17] C
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