Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎101v] (202/544)

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the Caspian, and Trans-Caspia. H.Q. Mesopotamia have many
other divergent problems to deal with. I therefore suggest
your thinking over means whereby greater accuracy ol control
and more complete information could be secured, such as the
appointment of a special G.O.C. and Staff to control Malleson
and Dunsterville,”
General Macdonogh explained that the delay in circulating
copies of the above telegram was due to the fact that it \\a> a
personal message from Sir Charles Monro to General Wilson, am
that it referred to a telegram which was under consideration the
Government of India, and which had been daily expected. ^ ^J ns
telegram had not arrived, the Chief of the Imperial General l tali
had decided to circulate copies of the personal message.
The Committee had before them a draft of a telegram which
the War Office proposed, with their approval, to send to the G.O.C.
in C. Mesopotamia, the terms of which were as follows.
“The present and prospective situation in Xorth-V\ast
Persia, the Caucasus, the Caspian, and Irans-Caspia, appears
to us to necessitate the institution of special organisation for
the satisfactory control anti co-ordination of the various pioblems
involved. We therefore suggest that a Corps Commander and
Staff should be detailed by the G.O.C. Mesopotamia to take
command under him of all troops, and to control opeiations m
the area Khanikin-Baku-Krasnovodsk—Caspian littoral, thence
to Enzeli-Kasvin-Hamadan-Kermanshah, all inclusive; this
area to be designated Caspian command, and to include
Dunsterville. Krasnovodsk would include as much of the
Trans-Caspian Railway as may be occupied by troops of
Marshall’s forces. India would retain control of all operations
in Trans-Caspia by troops based at Meshed and the Persian
Cordon. To facilitate co-operation between Dunsterville and
Malleson, the Caspian Commander to have the power to com
municate his wishes direct to Malleson, who will comply with
them, unless such action would directly conflict with instructions
he had received from India. We suggest General Cobbe as
suitable for the Caspian command, and should be glad to have
your views on this proposal.”
General Macdonogh, who informed the Committee that General
Cobbe had now returned to Mesopotamia, explained that the sugges
tion put forward in the above telegram seemed to his department
to be, on the wffiole, the best in the circumstances, and it w'ould get
over the Secretary of State for India’s difficulty regarding different
spheres of control. On the one hand, General Marshall’s task was
to arrest the German-Turkish advance in Persia and beyond the
Caspian ; on the other, India was concerned with the Persian-Seistan
Cordon and the Afghanistan frontier. This arrangement would not
be upset by the present proposal.
General Cox pointed out that General Malleson might sometimes
be faced with the difficulty of deciding between conflicting demands
from India and from the new' Corps Commander. He suggested,
therefore, that it might be preferable that the onus of decision should
rest with the latter, who, in General Cox’s opinion, ought to be
under the India Government.
General Macdonogh replied that the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff could not assent to this last proposition. The
Commander-in-Chief in India could always communicate his wishes
to General Cobbe (if he w r ere the officer selected for the new com
mand) through General Marshall. The draft clearly laid down that
General Cobbe would deal with operations in those parts of Trans-
Caspia only where General Marshall’s troops were, and it had,
moreover, the advantage of drawing no hard and fast line, but
giving sufficient latitude to both parties. As an instance of a case