Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎103r] (205/544)

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Arabia:
Affairs of Ibn Saud.
Persian Policy.
. D ' reference to E.C. 26th Meeting (Minute 1), the
( hamnan read a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt
iE.C -i21()) which deprecated any further issue of arms to Ihn
baud, lest lurther complications should arise in Central Arabia
between the latter and King Hussein, which complication would
lave the effect of diverting forces from Sherif Feisal, thereby
reducing the^ support which he could give to General Allenby’s
operations. I he telegram further deprecated any attack upon Ibn
Rashid, with whom it was alleged Sherif Abdullah was now
negotiating.
General Macdonogh read a telegram upon the same subject,
dated August 20th, from the Commander-in-Chief in India, and
stated that there was a practical point upon which he would like a
decision of the Committee, namely, a proposal by Mr. Philby asking
for permission to issue 100 rifles to Ibn Saud.
The Committee decided—
1 hat the matter could he left to the War Office for decision.
f).— (a) The Chairman stated that the Committee had before
them two groups of telegrams, one from the Government of India,
and the other from General Sir P. Cox, at Bushire, concerning the
situation at Shiraz. The former (E.C.-1233) set forth at length a
series of proposals regarding our future policy in Persia. The
Chairman thought that it would be unfair upon Sir P. Cox, as well
as undesirable, to arrive at a definite policy until Sir P. Cox had
reached leheran, and had an opportunity of placing his views before
the Persian Government.
Mr. Montagu shared the view expressed by the Chairman, and
suggested that a telegram should be sent to Sir P. Cox, informing
him that his general views in regard to Bushire and Shiraz were
approved, and drawing his attention to the telegram from the
Government of India, and asking him to report upon it.
Lord Robert Cecil thought that any delay in arriving at a
decision in regard to the South Persia Rifles might prejudice the
position of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh. He took the view that by far the
most important point of our policy in Persia at the present moment
was to ensure the maintenance in power of the present Persian
Government. It might be a month or six weeks before Sir P. Cox
could reach r l eheran, and he took the view that in the meantime
Sir P. Cox’s proposals in regard to Bushire should be communicated
to the Persian Government by Sir C. Marling, and it should be
made clear to Vossugh-ed-Dowleh that while we were anxious to
meet him in regard to the question of the South Persia Rifles in the
most friendly way, we could not entertain the idea which he
entertained, namely, the return of the Swedish officers. He sug
gested that French-Swiss officers might be suggested to the Persian
Government in lieu of Swedish officers, reserving to ourselves the
power to veto the selection of any particular officer. It was most
important to make some attempt to meet Vossugh’s wishes, in order
that he might have a reply to give to his political opponents.
General Macdonogh thought that Norwegian officers could be
found to replace Swedish officers.
The Chairman stated that he was most anxious to avoid a
precipitate decision in regard to the future of the South Persia
Rifles Any agreement to appoint neutral officers of whatever
nationality might commit us to the future maintenance in peace as
well as in war of a force of 5,000 or 6,000 men of doubtful military
value and loyalty at a considerable cost to ourselves. This raised
a large question of policy which the Committee had never even
discussed, and which it was most undesirable to prejudice by any
premature undertaking now. His experience of foreign officers in
Persia, whether Swedes, Belgians, or of other nationalities led him