'Seistan' [‎381v] (764/782)

4. It does not perhaps behove us to comment at any length upon the
several propositions which have been laid down by Your 01( ^ 11 P* ^ ar( {
ourselves far from admitting that the position gamec
enables her as yet “ to dominate and threaten almost the whole ot lersia .
We think that the extent to which she is permitted to do so still depends even
more upon the action of Her Majesty’s Government than it does upon her owm
Neither do we recognise any reflection of our own views or utterances in the
remark that “ it can hardly he maintained that, in view of foreign competition^
civilised Powers can he permanently denied the benefit of access to the ports or
Persia, because their admission will infringe upon a monopoly which we have
hitherto enjoyed If the reference is to access by sea, clearly such approach
never has been or would ever be likely to be denied by Great Pntam. It t ic
reference is to access by land, we have never said anything to deprecate the con
nection of the Persian ports by railway with the interior, and the free use ot such
ports by the subjects or merchandise of foreign Powers. hat we ha've all along
deprecated and must continue to deprecate is that any such railways leading
to ports within a sphere in which Pritish interests are unquestionably predomi
nant, and in which it cannot be alleged that any other foreign Power possesses
any interest comparable with our own—should be constructed as the instruments
of political or military ambition, and should terminate in maritime exits,
which might before long be converted into the coaling stations or the navul
bases of foreign fleets. We have no objection whatever to the construction of
railways in the south or in any other part of Persia, though we entertain tho
liveliest doubt as to whether in a country so backward and so mountainous they
would ever repay the expense of construction. All that we maintain is that,
if Persia decides to construct railways in the south, she should not do so
except with our consent, and, if possible, with our co-operation; and that the
so-called development of the country should not be made an excuse for open
and flagrant detriment to British interests.
5. We rejoice to think that on this point we share the views that are
apparently held by Her Majesty’s Government. At least this is the inference
that we draw from the intimation that was authorised by the Marquess of
Salisbury to the Persian Government on the 4th April last, in which the
present Shah was reminded of the promise of his father, the late Shah, “ that
no southern railway concession shall be granted to any foreign company with
out consultation with Her Majesty’s Government ”. We confess, however, to
a doubt whether the general character or the particular terms of this pledge
are such as altogether to preclude the Persian Government from entering
into engagements, even with regard to railway matters in Southern Persia,
with a foreign Power or Powers, which might violate the spirit, even while
observing the letter of the late Shah’s promise, and which might be
extremely injurious to the interests which it is our duty to defend. We
are fortified in this view by the fact that, in the few months that have elapsed
since the present Shah was reminded of this promise, parties of Bussian
Engineers, with Persian passports, Persian escorts, and Persian official encourage
ment, have been openly travelling about Southern Persia, inspecting and
surveying the lines of possible railways, and concluding their studies by a close
investigation of the character and capabilities of the terminal ports on the Persian
Gulf. These proceedings appear to us to reflect no small suspicion upon
the attitude of the Persian Government, and do not encourage us to look
with great hopefulness to the future.
6. We are also gratified to hear that the Persian Government has been
reminded, both of another written engagement, entered into by the late Shah, to
the effect that “ the customs of Southern Persia shall never be placed under
foreign supervision and control”, and of Lord Salisbury’s intimation of April
1899, that “it would not be compatible with the interests of the British Empire
that any European Power should exercise control or jurisdiction over the ports
of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ”. The value of these guarantees appears to us to depend
entirely upon the manner in which they continue to be interpreted by the Persian,
and to be defended by Her Majesty’s Government. If faithfully observed and