Coll 28/112A ‘Persia. Tabriz – Monthly despatches of internal situation in Azerbaijan & misc. reports.’ [‎556v] (1115/1237)

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specimen, morally and physically, probably an opium smoker, and abject coward
unless he is overwhelmingly strong, and then he shows all the violent brutality
of the coward. If he is a Christian, whether, A^fnenian or Assyrian, he has
behind him three or four generations of *th§ decline of his people in this regiom^
of suffering and massacre at the hands of Turks,-Kurds and Persians. If he
a Kurd, he knows that his people cannot stand up to the Mustapha Kemals and
the Reza Shahs, that, though the present offers a chance for some to wipe off old
scores with the gendarmes, to pillage, and even to talk insolently to the Persian
officials in the jargon which some of them have learned at Baku, the future is
very uncertain. Indeed, all of them see the future as uncertain and dangerous
because all of them think there is a strong chance that the Germans will break
through on the Caucasus front, that the Russians will have to leave and that
there will be a period when anything might happen before the Persians, with
German help, get firm control and put the Kurds and Christians back where they
were, under the gendarmes.
5. It only made matters worse that many civilians were able to acquire
Persian army rifles and ammunition. Althougtn no doubt the Kurds are better
armed than the others, all of them have weapons and all of them consider that
what is a measure of prudent precaution for their sect is an act of aggression
when others do likewise; this is particularly the case as between the Kurds and
the Shiahs, who circulate, and end by believing, very exaggerated tales about
the arsenals held by the other.
6. In these circumstances the recent Kurdish outbreak has had an emotional
effect out of proportion with the number of Kurds involved, the numbers killed
and the damage done. They are circumstances in which it is difficult to form
a sane and balanced judgment, hence, I think, the extravagance of my Turkish
colleagues and the violent folly of Persian officers like Serhang Hashimi. Indeed,
almost any foolishness can be expected from Rezaieh unless the Persian officers
now r going there are exceptional men; at the best of times they are poorly
equipped to resist suspicion, rumour and intrigue and they must, being frustrated
men, be expected now to have less sense of balance than ever.
7. I now r summarise briefly the results of my observations :—
Origins of the Outbreak .— The hand of Reza Shah was firm, but it was not
just. It weighed heavily on the Kurds, less heavily on the Assyrians, while still
making it plain that they had no hope of equal treatment with the Shiahs. Its
instrument was the gendarmerie. When the firm hand was lifted the gendarmerie
disappeared and the Kurds dug up their hidden rifles. More than that, they
acquired rifles and ammunition from the disbanded Persian troops. Then came
General Cupal and later Serhang Hashimi, literally shouting aloud their intention
to disarm the Kurds, to re-establish the status quo. When Hashimi began to
recruit gendarmes from among the local Shiah population and to give arms to
others so as to build up a numerous force, and when these undisciplined men
began by killing the first Kurds they tried to disarm-—two men travelling to
Mehabad to buy goods—the tribes concerned were stung into action.
That is the Russian version, and. even if it is not perhaps all the story, I
accept it as substantially correct. The Persians, on the other hand, say that the
Russians have since their arrival made a definite attempt to seduce the people
from its loyalty to the Shah, that the Shiahs did not respond, and that the
Russians accordingly made up their minds to get rid of them, using the Kurds
for the purpose. There are grains of truth in this, but I feel perfectly sure that,
while they have shown regard for the Kurds and others who are well disposed
to the Soviet, the Russians never planned the expulsioji of the Shiahs from their
villages. I have no doubt that they were astonished by the extent of the panic
whidh follow^ed the attack of the Kurds on the gendarmes. It is most regrettable
that the men on the spot have remained inactive; most probably they are under
remote control from Kuibyshev, which failed to realise what was happening either
from lack of information or from incredulity. But the Persian Government has
little right to complain. At a moment when it ought to have had its best men on
the spot and to have shown zeal and leadership it remained silent and the post
of Governor-Genera! stood empty because no one could be persuaded to fill it
willingly.
As regards the accusation that the Russians gave the Kurds ammunition,
I confess I am in doubt, but quite definitely the verdict must be “not proven.”