File 4673/1919 Pt 3 ‘Persian Gulf: Bahrein Mission to England 1919. Political business of Mission’ [‎345v] (78/164)

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to them in suitable terms
for apprehension that any
otherwise than transitory.
through our officers, and there seems no reason
uneasiness they may feel at the change will be
1° A. more important consideration is the need for ensuring that the
division of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. into an Arabian and a Persian sphere, each
under a separate control, will involve no loss of co-ordination m our 1 ers.au
Gulf police. These are two main aspects in which this consideration
presses itself insistently to notice. There is first the possibility, indeed the
probability of a serious attempt on the part of Japan to secure a commercial
and thereby a political foothold in the Gulf. With the disappearance of
Turkey from the Gulf, and .with it the elimination of German ambitions,
coupled with that better understanding with Russia to which we may
perhaps look forward, the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. might have been expected to drop out
finally from the region of high politics. Japan’s designs in this direction,
however, of which we have had more than one indication, threaten to
introduce a new element into the case, which, unless carefully handled from
the outset on both sides of the Gulf in strict accordance with one uniform
policy, may lead on to far-reaching consequences. In the second place,
there is the imperative need for perfect co-ordination of policy on both sides
of the Gulf and in both spheres on land, with regard to the arms traffic,
which, though dead for the moment, is likely to revive in a more threatening
shape after the war, when all the belligerent powers will find themselves in
possession of large stocks of surplus arms of which they would gladly
dispose. And in general, it will doubtless be recognised that it is essential
for us to be kept fully informed of all important developments not only in
the Gulf but also in Mesopotamia and the other areas now to be transferred
from our administration, in order that we may be able to gauge the political
situation in the Middle East.
13. As regards Southern Persia we are quite ready to accept an extension
of our responsibilities, provided our position is clearly defined. For we are
very conscious of the awkwardness and general inadequacy of the existing
arrangements under which the Government of India has, as it were, been for
many years past but a fifth wheel in the Persian coach, exercising responsi
bility without authority, and providing troops without an adequate voice in
the direction of the policy. We beg therefore that before a final decision is
made, we may be informed what the exact status of the Government of India,
is to be in the extended sphere to be assigned to them.
14. Finally, we will deal briefly with the more important financial aspects
of the case. We must postulate that, as the Government of India are to
have no share in the eventual administration of Mesopotamia, they will not
be called upon to make any contribution whatever towards either tbe civil
or military expenditure of Irak. We must similarly postulate that the
Government of India will lie relieved of all expenditure now borne by them
in the Agencies on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. which it is proposed
to transfer to the authority administering the Basrah Vilayet.
W e also consider that, when once the control of Aden and its appanages
is transferred to the foreign Office, the whole charges, both civil and
military, of these areas should be borne by His Majesty’s Government. We
have not overlooked the fact that Ford Curzon’s Government, in their
Despatch No. 66 (becret) of the 14th May 1903, offered, in consideration
of being relieved of the Administration of Aden, to continue a contribution
of 77,0000 a year to His Majesty s Government, i.e.. the average cost of the
Aden Administration minus 100,0000 contributed by His Majesty’s Govern
ment. This offer appears, however, to have been prompted mainly by a
desire to be rid ol Aden in circumstances quite different from those at
present under discussion, and we do not consider that, having regard to
the interests of the Indian taxpayer, we should now be justified in repeating
it. II India is to be absolved from all administrative responsibility at Aden,
she cannot, in our opinion, equitably be called upon to bear any share of the
cost.