'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎7v] (14/136)

2
In my opinion, we should start on the control and development of Mesopotamia
from an entirely different point of view. We should hand the country over
immediately to a Department of State which has a real knowledge and
experience of the administration and development of these wild countries,
which is accustomed to improvisations and makeshifts, w r hich is accustomed
to measure the territory it occupies by the amount of force at its disposal, and to
measure the amount of the force at its disposal by the exiguous funds entrusted to it.
The extreme dissatisfaction which the Foreign Office administration of the protectorates
of East Africa, Uganda and Somaliland caused both in peace and war ten or twelve
years ago led to their being placed under the Colonial Office, since which time, although
development has been very slow because of want of money, it has been extraordinarily
cheap and extremely successful. It is really marvellous how these enormous regions
in East Africa have been held and are being developed without a single battalion of
white troops, the whole of German East Africa, for example, has been taken over
and is being administered without a single white unit being demanded from the War
Office; yet German East Africa, as we know to our cost, contains large quantities of
natives who were formidable fighters under the Germans. In Somaliland, again, a
patient policy of waiting for opportunities, of knowing how and when to take
appropriate action, and, above all, a frugal policy, has kept us out of any trouble or
expense in this protectorate, and will in time secure its complete control and pacification.
It is no reproach to the Foreign Office to say that they know nothing about administration.
It is not their business. Moreover, as they have not got to get the estimates through,
the financial aspect cannot be expected to weigh duly with them. The Foreign
Office is the great Department of State the whole <>f whose experience and special
aptitudes is devoted to the conduct of the relations of this country with foreign States,
and to mix up with this the administration of provinces is to impair the discharge of
both functions.
I hope, therefore, that Mesopotamia may be handed over immediately to the
Colonial Office. Secondly, that a grant-in-aid may be fixed year by year after discussion
between the Colonial Office and the Treasury. In my judgment, this grant-in-aid
should not exceed, even in the early years, 5,000,000/. for military expendi
ture, and 2,000,000/. for civil expenditure, or 7,000,000/. in all. It should
be possible to make substantial reductions upon this at an early date. Within this
limit the. Colonial Office should be the judge of the whole administrative policy. It
will, for instance, be for them to decide whether it is better to occupy more distant
districts and thus raise their military expenditure, or to develop the nearer more
peaceful districts and so reduce the military charges. But anyhow, they should know
that there is a fixed limit beyond which they are not entitled to draw upon the
resources of this country, and that they must do the best thev can within the bounds
assigned to them. 1 his may well mean that large areas of which we have become
mandatory will not be occupied for many years, and that the reduction of the
country to order will be partial and gradual. This is onlv what we did in the
Sudan, where one British battalion is the maximum garrison that has been • allowed
all these years. It is exactly the policy we have pursued in the Nigerias. I have
always regretted that more money has not been available for the commercial
de\elopinent of these teeming fertile lands in East and West Africa, which are capable
of supplying the industries of this country with almost every conceivable tropical raw
material they require in limitless abundance. I am profoundly disturbed to see
colossal sums of money, which, invested in East or West Africa, would have
produced a five-fold return in a few years, being poured out in sterile military
occupation of comparatively barren regions in Mesopotamia.
The sole line of argument on which it is safe to proceed is, first, to fix the amount
that may he spent. Secondly, to give the administering department the pow r er of
choosing the policy within those limits. And, thirdly, having chosen its policy, to
indent upon the War Office or the Air Ministry for the military force required. Of
this force the War Office or the Air Ministry must be the judge. ~ We must be entitled
to say, do hold this district will require these troops and will cost you so much.” We
must also be entitled to say, “ These forces must be so disposed as to be militarily safe
and not liable to be overwhelmed or surrounded.” As a result of such a consultation
between the two departments concerned, it will often happen that political officers will
be forbidden to go into large districts for several years to come because the troops are
not a,\ ailable within the limits of the grant-in-aid, instead of as at present these officers
pushing out wherever they will and drawing a blank cheque upon our resources in
money and men.