Typescript and printed cabinet papers and parliamentary papers on events in Egypt [‎18v] (36/520)

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9. As regards Foreign Relations (sub-head (ii) paragraph r >) we have not yet
received the written observations of the delegation, but from their attitude at the
conferences so far held, the arguments would seem to be:—
(a.) Representation abroad is enjoyed by every independent country, and
consequently it is the very symbol of the independence which the
delegation are pledged to secure.
(b.) Fgypt has need to be kept in touch with modern developments in civilised
countries and such touch can only be maintained by means of diplomatic
representatives.
(c.) In negotiations or transactions with foreign Powers, the Egyptian case has
hitherto had to be stated to the foreign diplomatic representative in Cairo,
who in turn reports it to his own Government, which thus learns the
Egyptian view at second hand and robbed of much of its cogency.
(d.) The presence of Egyptian diplomatic representatives in foreign countries will
tend to prevent clandestine anti-British intrigue on the part of Egyptian
anglophobes, whilst if an Egyptian diplomat were to countenance such
intrigue, he would involve his Government in a breach of the treaty.
10. All of these arguments have a certain weight. Apart from this any attempt
to circumscribe Egypt’s liberty in regard to foreign relations can only be represented
as an attempt to safeguard a purely British as opposed to a foreign interest. In
insisting on limitations therefore in this matter we cannot count on enjoying foreign
sympathy.
11. Those of the British advisers whom Lord Allenby has consulted on the
question are unanimous in believing that in regard to foreign relations His Majesty’s
Government can afford to meet Egyptian aspirations to the fullest extent, and in all
the circumstances it would not appear to be a point on which we could well let the
negotiations break down.
12. There remains the question of the appointment of foreign non-British officials
in Egyptian service. This is a point of fundamental importance, but from their
attitude at the first conference the delegation would seem prepared to accept our point
of view that such appointments should only be made with the concurrence of the High
Commissioner.
13. As regards the extent to which it is necessary for His Majesty’s Government
to maintain a control over*financial and judicial matters^ the situation is no longer the
same as it was when the Milner memorandum was conceived.
14. It has proved impossible up till now to conclude conventions with more than
five of the Capitulatory Powers for their cession to us of the ex-territorial privileges
which they enjoy in Egypt. Until the remaining six Powers come into line it will be
impossible to hand over to a British official the functions now performed by the
commissioners of the debt. If, therefore, we assume that the commission of the debt
will continue to exist for some years to come, it falls to be considered what essential
functions must be vested in the financial commissioner.
15. The delegation take the line that the special resp msibilities, viz., payment of
budget of Mixed Courts and of himself and judicial commissioner, and payment of
foreigners’ pensions imposed upon him by the formula proposed by the Secretary
of State, are ex hypothesi treaty obligations on the Egyptian Government.
If the delegation accept our eventual proposals in regard to compensating British
officials who may be retired from the service, their argument would appear to have
considerable force, and if the delegation were prepared to accept the further obligation
of meeting the service of the loans secured upon the Turkish tribute, the treaty itself
would constitute a guarantee that essential payments would be made. Any attempt
to starve the Mixed Courts would unite the Capitulatory Powers against Egypt, and
would produce pressure which no Egyptian Government could sustain.
1G. It would, however, appear essential that in foreign quite as much as British
interests His Majesty’s Government should be in a position to receive ample warning
before any financial crisis occurred, or, indeed, of any serious degeneration in the
financial and administrative standards of the Government. It is suggested that such
warning would be obtained by the Egyptian Government recognising the right of the
High Commissioner to send an officer responsible to himself, to whom all information
concerning the financial administration of the country would at all times be made
available.
17. This officer would neither interfere with the administration of the country nor