Miscellaneous correspondence, reports, maps and other papers concerning the Middle East [‎17v] (35/220)

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On the 1st February, 1915, the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , with the concurrence of the Foreign
Office, instructed the Viceroy, in the sense of the above letter, as follows (11837/15 ;
14168/15) :—
“ Your proposals are approved subject to following remarks :—
“ 1. In dynastic guarantee condition of acceptance of tribesmen should be
secured if possible, but you will remember difficulty which this caused
in case of Mohammerah, and negotiations should not be allowed to
break down over this point.
“ 2. You are presumably prepared for Sheikh of Koweit to ask for similar
guarantee when both Bin Saud and Sheikh of Mohammerah have it.
“3. Pledge against unprovoked aggression should be so worded as to make
His Majesty’s Government sole judges of nature and extent of
assistance.
“ 4. Please consider whether this treaty should not contain clause binding
Bin Saud, subject to eventual definition of boundaries, not to interfere
with Koweit, Bahrein, al Katar, and Trucial Chiefs. But I leave this to
your discretion.”
On the 6th February, 1915, the Government of India communicated these
instructions to Sir P. Cox (30472/15 : No. 6), and authorised him to enter into
negotiations with Bin Saud on the lines laid down, “ on the clear understanding that
anv treaty agreed upon is subject to the confirmation of the Government of India.”
Accordingly, Sir P. Cox drafted a treaty in seven articles, the terms of which
(see 111069/15) may be summarised at this point:—
Article 1.—His Majesty’s Government recognise Bin Saud as independent ruler of
Nejd, al Hasa, Qatif, and their ports on the Gulf Coast, and his descendants after him,
“ but the selection of the individual shall be subject to the approval of His Majesty’s
Government.”
Article 2.—His Majesty’s Government shall aid Bin Saud at their discretion in case
of unprovoked aggression against him by a foreign Power.
Article 3.—Bin Saud renounces diplomatic relations with any foreign Power other
than His Majesty’s Government.
Article 4.—Bin Saud will not cede, sell, or mortgage territory, or grant concessions
to any foreign Power or its subjects, without the consent of His Majesty’s Government
Article 5.—Bin Saud will keep open the pilgrimage routes through his territory to
the Holy Places, and will protect pilgrims.
Article 6.—Bin Saud will refrain from interference with Koweit, Bahrain, Qatar,
and the Oman Coast, and any other tribes and chiefs under His Majesty’s Government’s
protection.
Article 7.—A further detailed treaty shall be concluded later.
About the same time (43530/15: No. 14) Bin Saud wrote to Sir P. Cox, asking,
in view of Captain Shakespear’s death, either that another officer should be deputed,
or that negotiations should be continued by correspondence direct from Basra, and not
vi5, Koweit.
On the 24th February, 1915, in reporting this request to the Government of India,
Sir P. Cox made the following proposal :—
“ I would propose now to send him draft treaty which was awaiting despatch
through Shakespear, together with Viceroy’s letter. In doing so I would advise
him to sign it without delay, and say that, as soon as it is completed, an officer can
then be deputed to discuss details of second treaty.”
The Government of India instructed Sir P. Cox to act as he proposed, and on the
28th February, 1915, this was reported by the Viceroy to the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. (24119/15).
Sir P. Cox’s draft and the Viceroy’s letter were accordingly forwarded to Bin
Saud, and two letters, both dated the 24th April, 1915, and addressed respectively
to the Viceroy and Sir P. Cox, were eventually received in reply from Bin Saud
(111069/15).
In his letter to Sir P. Cox, Bin Saud enclosed a signed copy oi the Arabic version
of the treaty. But, to quote his words—
“ Certain modifications (which are not important) were found necessary for
cogent reasons, necessitated by local conditions, the need to reassure the inhabi-