'Historical Summary of Events in Territories of the Ottoman Empire, Persia and Arabia affecting the British Position in the Persian Gulf, 1907-1928' [‎37r] (80/188)

71
relations with the territories of . . . Bahrein . . There is no evidence at
the moment of a more positive interest in Bahrein on the part of Ibn Saud ;
but there is little question that he and the Wahabi movement, and not Persia,
is the real danger; that as matters stand he is our natural successor if we
abandon our present position in Bahrein, that his power is appreciated and
feared by the Sheikhs, and that an active development of Wahabism on the
North Arabian coast, coupled with bad relations with the King of the Hejaz
and Nejd, might react embarrassingly on our position in Bahrein. The
remarks of Sheikh Hamad in April 1927, that "Ibn Saud was the one big-
Arab Ruler, and it was natural for all the smaller Sheikhs such as himself * ^terfro™p.a.,Bahrein,
to look up to him and try to please him,"" :i: * are symptomatic. 1927°?. 3334/27. pn *
E.—Summary,
40. Internally, the last 20 years have seen the consolidation of British
influence in Bahrein. The Sheikh has agreed to grant neither oil nor
pearling concessions without the sanction of His Majesty's Government;
jurisdiction over foreigners in the islands has passed from the Ruler to the
Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. ; internal misrule has been checked by the deposition of
Sheikh Isa, the substitution of Sheikh Hamad, and the provision for the new
Sheikh of competent and disinterested European advisers under his orders.
41. Externally, the claim to suzerainty of Turkey has lapsed.
The claims of Persia have constantly been reasserted, and as constantly
repudiated by His Majesty's Government, over the period now in question. ,
They are at the moment under argument, and have acquired a new
importance by their reference to the League of Nations. Present indications
are that Persia is likely to press them, and the desirability, in the interests
of the Sheikhs, who have appointed His Majesty's Government their agents
in the matter, and on whom a compromise with Persia on the basis of the
■status quo would, according to the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. , have a very unsettling
effect of securing a decision which will finally dispose of them inter
nationally, is for the consideration of His Majesty's Government.
The rise of Ibn Saud is, however, the development most pregnant with
possibility in the external relations of Bahrein. The King of the Hejaz and
Nejd has not so far actively interested himself in the islands ; and the fact
that the power w T hich he has built up may not survive his death cannot be
ignored. But, on the assumption of the survival of the existing state of
things in Nejd, the present Memorandum (para. 39) makes the suggestion
that it is Ibn Saud and the Wahabi movement, rather than Persia, that
represent the real danger from a practical standpoint, and that were His
Majesty's Government for any reason to abandon their present position in
Bahrein, Ibn Saud would, as matters stand, be their natural successor.
Position in Bahrein of His Majesty's Government.
42. While, however, His Majesty's Government, as stated above, have
over the past 20 years established ade facto control of the Islands of Bahrein,
de jure their position is no stronger than before. At the same time, the
importance of establishing that position on a stable basis has very greatly
increased since 1908. From the naval standpoint, Bahrein, although it has
been suggested, as a pis alter, as a naval base or a coaling depot, has the
•disadvantage of unhealthy climate and relative remoteness from the exit of
the Gulf and so from the probable scene of naval operations in the event
of war.' :i: " The Air Ministryf regard it, however, as of great potential
importance from the standpoint of British air interests—not only because of + A M to c ' 0 Dec gg
its geographical position on the route to India, but because the isolation 1927, p . 5 /28.
of the islands from the mainland, and the long-established influence in them
of His Majesty's Government render them less likely to be disturbed by
anti-British rumours than other places on the Arabian coast. The
Government of India (substantial Indian commercial interests in Bahrein
apart) take the view that Bahrein as a central air base and political centre
for the control of the increasingly important Arab littoral may be regarded
as a key position inside the Gulf of an importance at least equal to that of
Muscat at its mouth. The probability that Persia will press her efforts to
terminate British influence on the south Persian coast, the necessity, should