'Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the Years 1915-1919' [‎53r] (112/396)

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| for the teae 19i6. 27
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H to be friendly during the passage of the troops, and this service was satisfac-
M torily rendered by the Khurasani and Luri headmen. Meanwhile Captain
mil "Wagstaff with his 95 rifles had reached Eaft on 4th September and, though
^ much disappointed at finding that Eraser's party had gone on to Kerman,
N he did not hesitate to direct his march straight on Saidabad. On the way he
learned that Hussain Khan and the ey-prisoners were on the move from the
^ Chahargumaz Mountains to the Kuh-i-Khajui (" Khavich" on the maps)
and would cross his line of march. No genuine assistance, however, could
be obtained from the Afshar or local inhabitants either in the way of infor-
J. 511 mation or armed forces, as their object appears to have been to acquire merit
l " b y pretended services and misleading information which would at the same
^ time ensure Hussain Khan an unimpeded line of flight. They succeeded in
■ the latter aim, and the fugitive party got through. Captain Wagstaff followed
iefi | hard on their heels on the 10th and was eventually seconded by Lieutentant
Eraser who left Saidabad at 1 a.m . on the 11th with his 30 sowars and some
^ Sirjan levies, but his own Infantry could not hope to overtake mounted men and
U-t Lieutenant Eraser was too late. The pursuit was maintained as far as Zavaru
by Lieutenant Eraser and up to Aval Chahquli by Captain Wagstaff, places
er fc which lie to the south-west and south-east respectively of the Kuh-i-Khajui.
eot, 1
y On the 13th September the forces concentrated, and took up their quar-
)Ta i r ters, in Saidabad. Active reconnaissance work was kept up but nothing of
importance occurred until the 27th September. Rumours were heard that
Hussain Khan was collecting men in Ears territory and intended to make an
attack on the British Eorce in Sirjan, but on the evening of the 27th it was
>5 reported that he was far off at Qala Ghaibi. The detail of what happened as
K;:;: learned from different suurces are rather confused. The Adl-us-Sultan makes out
that he warned the British officers of the probability of Hussain Khan's attacking
iw that night and that it was arranged that he was to withdraw his men from cer
tain burjs which were to be occupied by Indian troops, that it was their failure
aini; to occupy these forts that enabled Hussain Khan with his men to slip into
qIi the town at night. Captain Wagstaff, however, says that the Adl had given
him definite information that Hussain Khan was far off, and he is certain
j that the Adl knew of, and was privy to, Hussain Khan's attempt. In any
case, early next morning, Hussain Khan was in. possession of certain burjs
"J; and houses in the town from which he opened fire on the Indian troops.
! Eighting went on all day and it was estimated that the enemy, who consisted
J largely of townspeople, numbered the best part of 300. They were all behind
S8! ' walls, while the Indians were more or less in the open, and it was only owing
? e : [t to the bad shooting of the Persians that our casualties amounted to only about
half a dozen Indians. It had been taken for granted that the Indian troops
could not and would not fight and when evening came and it had been proved
that quite the reverse was the case Hussain Khan, realising that his coup had
failed, broke out of the town with a party of 20 or 30 sowars. He was heavily
fired on but without effect. Some, however, say that Hussian Khan himself
stayed in the town over the night. The Austrian Lorenz was almost cer
tainly present during the attack, and according to some Bruggmann was also
there. It is said that communication went on between Agha Murad Khan
the " loyal ''Buchaqchi, the Adl-us-Sultan and Hussain Khan. No effective
assistance was received from Agha Murad's men nor from the local levies who
had been raided by Captain Merrill to the number of 300 or 400. Eew of the
latter were even seen during the day, but it does not appear that they actually
joined the enemy. This small action may be regarded in the light of
a British victory. It convinced the local inhabitants that Indians led by
British officers would fight as no rabble of their own much-vaunted tribal
warriors would, and that their own marksmanship was unequal to picking
off British officers even at short ranges : and it must have convinced the ex-
prisoners and Hussain Khan that even with the advantage of cover and an
assisting population the possession of Saidabad was not to be won even by
a coup de main from a handful of Indian troops, with one small obsolete M.
L. Mountain gun, operating more or less in the open.
After the fight the policy of active reconnaissances in force was continued
by Captain Wagstaff, but the enemy was careful to keep well out of danger's
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