'Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the Years 1915-1919' [‎120v] (247/396)

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PERSIAN GULF The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. POLITICAL RESIDENCY An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India.
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principal supporter of Nasir i-Dewan, but when the actual attack was made he
was not found present, and the enemy were led by Mullah Ewaz, Nasir-i.
Dewan's nominee as headman of Kamarij. The attack was well covered by th«
mountain guns, and most of the enemy ran away Ijetore the attack \vas fully
developed. A few men, however, held their ground wuh great pertinacity till
the 55tli Coke's Rifles effected an ascent of an almost precipitous side path, ami
appeared on the summit, at which point they lost one man killed and one
wounded.
Kamari] was then occupied, and entrusted to Mulla Quli, a^ guardian of
the infant son of Haidar lihan, the last headman of Kamaiij v\ho was success
ful in maintaining good order in the \alley, ilic capture of t^e Kamavij Pass
ended auv possibility of resistance to the progiess ot our tioops to Shiraz, and
the military problems confronting the force were hencefoith confined to admin
istrative matters, roadmaking, the saieguarding of the Lines of Communica
tion, and such subsidiary measures as were from time to ime found necessary
to keep the rebel leaders well out of reach of the road. At the close of the year
the Governor was engaged in organising an attack by local riflemen on Zair
Khidar's position at Khawiz.
Thus the year closed with the hostile organisation completely broken as
far as Kazerun, and the town open to occupation at any moment. From
Bushire to the foot of the Kamarij Pass a good camel road had been construct
ed ; and the hostile chiefs were fugitives in the bills with only a petty follow-
ing. The political 2Kobiems presented by the situation were even at
thfs stage complicated and embarrassing, the Political officers being
confronted at every turn with questions of an administrative charac
ter, and being obliged by their instructions to avoid the assumption
or any powers beyond those immediately necessary for the purposes
of the force, and to evade all commitments which would place difficulties in
the way of a return to Persian administration. It will readily be imagined
that this task was not an easy one in a tract where no settled government had
been seen for years, and where the keenest desire of the inhabitants was to see a
strong authority established to decide all their vexed questions. A feature
of the expedition, whielvof incalculable value on the political side, was its
remarkable degree of incfependence of local resources in the matter of supply
and transport The Persians early realised that neither they, their animals,
nor their supplies were in any sense indispensable to the expedition, and
this feeling naturally made them far more confident, and at the same time less
grasping, in their dealings with the force, than would otherwise have been the
case. As a result of this and of tactful handling by Political and Supply
officers, local supply was effectively organised, and provided the following
totals to the end of the vear : —
Sheep and goals
Camels .
Bhoosa
Firewood
Barley
Wheat
Dates
2,515
82
6,652 maunds,
6,412 „
103 „
120 „
101
The total British casualties to the end of the vear were as follows :—
British officers
British other ranks
Indian officers x
Indian other ranks
Followers
Total
Killed. Wounded. Died of wouuds.
17
17
1
56
5S
Died of disease.
1
1
.1
275
120
400