'Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the Years 1911-1914' [‎80r] (164/488)

POIl THE TEAR 1912.
21
Traffic, and would lend weight to our communications to the Persian Govern
ment, whilst if further pressure were needed, it could be conveniently applied
by the occupation by the same force of the Kishm position.
His Majesty's Minister considered this scheme so greatly preferable to the
alternative of evacuation as to be well worth a trial and expressed the hope
that effect should be given to them at once.
These proposals were further developed by the Government of India in a
telegram, dated 5th February, to the Home Government, which had up to that
date come to no decision regarding the despatch of troops to the Gulf, which
was an essential preliminary to the inception of the proposed negotiations. It
was represented that our objects were threefold :—
(1) To get the individual or individuals responsible for the attack on
Mr. Smart to settle accounts with us.
(2) To induce the headmen who exercise control on the road to come to
an agreement with us for the maintenance of order thereon.
(3) To discount the risk of dangerous tribal fighting in the spring in the
neighbourhood of Shiraz.
The Khan of Borasjun having been first dealt with, it was proposed, as soon
as troops embarked from India, to issue a full press communique both in
London and Calcutta, and to make a communication through the Resident at
Baghdad to the Ulema of Mesopotamia to induce them to exert their influence
in order to allay apprehensions of Great Britain's intentions: the advisability of
pressing the Persian Government to telegraph in the same sense was suggested
for consideration, and it was further proposed that a brief exposition of
British intentions and policy should be issued from Bushire in Persian under
the signature of His Majesty's Oonsul-General to the principal headmen.
The ground being prepared as above, His Majesty's Oonsul-General would
then address the headmen concerned in the attack on Mr. Smart, and those
interested in the road, explaining our intentions and inviting them to meet his
representatives at a given rendezvous if they wished for a peaceful settlement.
If the headmen responded, negotiations were contemplated on the following
lines:—
(1) Each individual would be required to undertake to co-operate
generally for the maintenance of order on the road.
(2) To make himself responsible to us for a particular section of road
and to supply a certain number of guards of good character on
monthly pay to be paid under supervision of our own Superin
tending Officer.
(3) To pay compensation for all British goods robbed within their
section.
(4) To sell supplies at fair rates to be arranged in consultation with our
Superintending Officer and to abstain absolutely from the levy of
transit dues. «
On our part we should guarantee, as long as they fulfilled their obligations,
a regular subsidy and the monthly pay of the guards, and we should give the
headmen an assurance in some form of our good offices against extortion by
the Persian authorities except in the case of proved misconduct.
The cost estimated at £10,000 per annum, might ultimately be made a
charge on the Customs or recovered from the next loan to the Persian Govern
ment.
The reply of His Majesty's Government to these representations not having
by them been received, the Resident telegraphed on 10th March urging an
early announcement of our intentions, pacific or otherwise, in as full a manner
as possible, and suggesting the following specific measures by the Persian
Government:—
(1) To induce the Ulema of ISajaf to send telegrams on the lines already
advocated to tribal chiefs and headmen.
(2) To appoint at once a responsible and independent Governor -General
for Pars.