'Eastern Committee. The future of Mesopotamia. (Note by Sir Percy Cox.)' [‎2r] (3/6)

3
justilication or necessily for intro.luciuR one of the family of the Shent of Mecca lo
play (his role. I have always ventured to deplore the fact that the discussion of the
future of Iraq with the Sherif, as one of the pawns in the negotiations with him, was
ever permitted I have also expressed my views plainly on the political and practical
obiections to recognising him as King of Arabia and Sovereign of a group ol Con
federate Slates. In my opinion a more reasonable solution would be that he should
remain King of Ilejaz, and, if desired, have his own representative with Foreign
Powers, while the foreign relations of the Iraq State, and ol the other contederate
Aral) Potentates or States, should lie in our hands. For the Aral) liuler ol the Iraq
State a title might be devised conveying something less than King, c 3., Sultan or
Ilakim (liuler), and all (he Confederate Rnlers would nndoubtedly pay appropriate
deference to Kine: Hussein as iSherif of the Holy Places in ihe Hejaz. If con&idoied
essential in view ot" their commitments to the Sheril, His Majesty s bovcrnmmt mioht
even decide to guarantee the payment to him of an annual snbsidv in some 101m iiom
the revenues of Iraq, as recognition of his services to the cause of Arab independence
during the war ; or, as a religious contribution towards the upkeep of the -Holy
Places.
II.
Obseuvatioks on the more Detailed Issues.
11. Can any Arah authority, dynastic or representative, he discovered that will
command the necessary moral sanction in the country as a uhole 9 11 hat ncKjht dots
King llu ssein or his family carry ivitli the local Arabs ?
In my opinion, we liave in the Wicjib of 1 Baghdad and his familv a dvnastic element
which would carry tlie necessary moral sanction, in the Baghdad \ ilayet undoul)tedly,
and, in my opinion, in Iraq as a whole. I believe they could be brought to identify
themselves with British interests. Ihe present Naqdj himself possesses a \ei\ gie.il
prestige and influence not only in Mesopotamia but among the Mohammedans of
India,"and I feel sure his selection as Head of the State would be regarded as an
appropriate solution, and be received with favour throughout India as \\oll as
Mesopotamia. The Naqib considers himseli superior, in purity of descent and
nobility, to the Sherif, and no less important, and the jntioduction <>1 a iclati\e of tlu
Sherif of Mecca as head of the State of Iraq would, in my opinion, be greatly
misunderstood and resented by the Naqib and his family, and thus tend to alienate
our most potent element ol inlluence over the Arabs of Iraq, l^ing Hussein and his
family carry no weight in Iiaq, where only the most distant interest is taken in iiim.
In the early days of the Sherifs entry into the lists, when the question of giving him
military help was being discussed, the General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, wan
asked by the War Office whether the failure or collapse of the Sherif would prejudice
our military or political interests in Mesopotamia. W e leplied altei delibeiate
consideration that the inhabitants had not been at all moved bv his successes, and
would, in our opinion, regard his failure with complete indifference.
12. What materials exist for setting up a Local Administration or Administrations
of a suitable character ?
There is adequate Arab or local material available or in the makhig for the sub
ordinate services of the administration. The dilliculty we are confronted with at present,
and must be for some time to come, is to find individuals suitable for higher posts in the
administration, e.g., Mutessarifs, Qaimaqams, such as would be tilled m the Indian
administration by gazetted officers—Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners.
The reason is that under the Turkish regime almost all these posts were filled by pure
Turks; these have been eliminated, and there is at present no one to lill their place.
Wherever we have tried ex-officers of the late Administration they have almost
invariably proved unsatisfactory ; they are in fact saturated with the evil traditions of
the regime in which they have been brought up and trained. Until we can create
this element, enlisting as far as we are able the assistance of the Egyptian and
Soudan Administrations, we must rely mainly on young British officers. 1 may
mention here that whereas I have done my utmost to employ experimentally any
inhabitants of the country at all likely to be suitable, this laudable endeavour tinds no
favour with the local inhabitants concerned. I am continually appealed to by them
not to place the conduct of their affairs in the hands of ex-officials of the late regime,
s 4 a 2