'Relations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Sheikh of Koweit' [‎1v] (2/20)

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observed that one of the main points to be borne in mnul was ihe fact that Koweit
was not naturally independent from either the geographical or the economic point
of view. It was a port without a hinterland, cut off at present by the Iraqi and
Saudi frontiers from the territory which it would naturally feed, and at present
denied free communication with the country behind it. Moreover, even its present
trade might be jeopardised by the development of the Saudi port at Ras Tanura
under the auspices of the American oil concessionaires on the Hasa coast. What
was even more important was that its fresh-water supply was not derived from
its own territory, but had to be imported from Iraq. It was for consideration,
therefore, whether it would, in fact, be practicable for His Majesty's Government
to maintain the independence of Koweit as against its neighbours, at any rate on
the present basis of a rather loose and ill-defined dependence on His Majesty's
Government.
Colonel Fowls concurred generally in Mr. Rendel's description of the
economic position of the sheikhdom. He pointed out, however, that Koweit haa
always been the port of the deserts of northern Arabia, as Bahrein was the port
of Central Arabia. In regard to the position of Koweit vis-a-vis of Iraq, he added
that beside the influence which Iraq could exert by controlling Koweit's fresh-
Avater supply, it was also powerful enough to bring pressure to bear upon Koweit
over, for instance, the question of smuggling.
Mr. Rendel agreed that both Iraq and Saudi Arabia were in a position to
exert strong pressure on Koweit. This being so, the rivalry between them over
Koweit was likely to increase, unless, of course, Saudi Arabia disintegrated. The
present position of Koweit between these two States was weak, and
Sir Andrew Ryan's note showed how powerful an attraction Ibn Saud could exert.
The question, therefore, was whether His Majesty's Government would not be well
advised to develop and tighten up their own relations with Koweit in order to
strengthen its position. It had, in fact, been suggested that it might be more
advantageous to convert our present treaty relationship into a definite protectorate,
on, for instance, the analogy of the Hadramaut, which was now regarded as part
of the Aden Protectorate, but where our treaty relationship w T ith the local rulers
and obligations to afford them protection had been if anytiiing looser than those
we had towards Koweit. Would not a protectorate ensure Koweit more effectively
against absorption than the present attempt to maintain the sheikhdom as a kind
of political vacuum in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
Mr. Laithwaite drew attention to three points :—
[a) At present the obligations of His Majesty's Government to Koweit were
represented by their undertaking to grant " good offices " in respect of
Koweit under the 1899 agreement, by their promise of 1907 that "the
town of Koweit and its boundaries belong to Sheikh Mobarak-us-Suba,
Ruler of Koweit, and to his heirs after him,'' and their undertaking
of the 3rd November, 1914. that Koweit, in the event of a victory
over the Turks, would be recognised by us as an independent princi
pality under British protection. They were thus very general in
terms, and, in accordance with our normal policy on the Arab littoral,
which dated from a period in which it was possible to protect a sea
port by action from the sea, but not to afford effective help inland, we
had consistently endeavoured to limit our obligations, save as regards
"good offices" to Koweit town and the immediately adjoining area.
Recent experience had, however, shown that in cases of intervention
from outside it was in fact necessary to give the Sheikh, at our
discretion, and on our own terms, a measure of active assistance up
to the limit of his frontiers and with the development of aircraft the
problem of inland defence was now less difficult. This was to some
extent a strengthening of his strict treaty position, as also possibly
an extension of our strict treaty obligations.
(h) With regard to the suggested establishment of a protectorate, it was
necessary to consider what the reactions of the Sheikh would be, and
also what effect the proclamation of a protectorate might have on the
other Arab rulers of the Gulf. It would in any case be wiser not
to make an overt proclamation of this nature, since both in Bahrein
and in Qatar and along the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. it would probably rouse