'Report by Sir Gilbert Clayton, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., C.B., on his Mission to the King of Hejaz and of Najd and its Dependencies, for the purpose of negotiating a settlement of outstanding questions. (April-June, 1928)' [‎9] (11/96)

9
20. I have hitherto confined myself to those representations of
Ibn Sa'ud which relate to Article 3 of the Protocol of Uqair. There
were two other points which he put forward as being essential to any-
lasting settlement, and to which I have already referred in para
graphs 12 and 13 above. The first, which relates to the definition of
Article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, presents no difficulty. It was
generally understood, at the time of the conclusion of the Bahra
Agreement, that the term " forces " which occurs in Article 6 applied
to all the regular forces of either Government. Ibn Sa'ud's request
for an assurance that the term must be held, as far as 'Iraq is con
cerned, to include Imperial as well as 'Iraqi forces is, therefore, a
proper one. But I venture to recommend, since the question has
arisen in this form, that the opportunity be seized of obtaining a
similar assurance on Ibn Sa'ud's part as to the precise meaning of
the term when applied to the forces of Najd. It is a matter of
common knowledge that Ibn Sa'ud does not maintain a regular
standing army, and that he relies, for the purposes of military action,
on the armed contingents of Ikhwan which his tribes are able from
time to time to supply. I think it advisable, in order to preclude
the possibility of equivocation on his part in the future, to obtain
from him an acceptable definition of what must be held to constitute
the " forces " of Najd, similar to that which he asks for from 'Iraq.
21. A clear understanding on this point is the more desirable in
view of the attitude which I took up when replying to Ibn Sa'ud's
protest against the violation of his frontier by aeroplanes and
armoured cars. In this connection, I refused to recognise the affair
at Busaiya as a raid within the meaning of the Bahra Agreement, but
maintained that it was a premeditated attack by armed tribesmen
who belonged to the very elements which constituted the fighting
forces of Najd, on an official post within the territory of a friendly
State; and that this attack amounted in itself to a violation of the
provisions of Article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, and had led to a
situation in which His Majesty's Government were forced to take
adequate measures for the defence of 'Iraq.
22. The other point {see paragraph 13 above) relates to the sur
render of refugee offenders. This is not a new theme, and reference
to my Report* on the negotiations at Bahra will show that Ibn Sa'ud's
request had been rejected in deference to the views of the 'Iraq
Government. I have been given to understand, however, that the
'Iraq Government would be willing to reconsider their attitude on
this matter.
23. The exchange of notes laying down the agreed terms of
suspension of conversations was nearly prevented by an unfortunate
development four days previous to my departure. Draft notes had
been agreed upon in conversation, and Ibn Sa'ud had left for Mecca,
but before they could be officially exchanged I received an indignant
* Middle East, No. 7.