'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎12v] (29/424)

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crossed to the right bank. It was too late to advance on Qurna : so the
force bivouacked close to the bank.
No further operations were needed : for at mid-night a steamer
blazing with lights was observed coming down stream. A messenger
from Colonel Subhi Bey , the Commander of the 38th Division, was on
board, and brought an offer of surrender. Next day at 1300 the
Turkish force surrendered numbering 45 officers, 1,000 men and 7 guns.
A number of the Turks including the Osmanjik battalion escaped.
These small operations provide us with the first example during the
Mesopotamian Campaign of a faulty system of command and breaking of
organization which were very common during the earlier stages of the
campaign.
A small mixed force was considered necessary to capture Qurna. This
force had to co-operate with the Navy. Instead of sending in the first
instance 2 battalions from one brigade under the command of the
Brigadier, 2 battalions from different brigades were chosen under the
command of the senior battalion commander, who was allotted no staff.
This ends the first phase of the Mesopotamian Campaign. Hitherto
it had been entirely successful at slight cost to ourselves. The greater
part of the 38th division has been destroyed : about 1,200 prisoners and
21 guns had been captured: the port of Mesopotamia secured: and
the oil refineries at Abadan were safe.
By the first week in December the 17th Infantry Brigade and the
remainder of the divisional troops had disembarked at Basra. The
6th (Poona) Division was now complete as regards its combatant personnel.
The transport situation is now interesting. By the middle of Decem
ber there were 5 Mule Corps with the Force totalling 3,220 mules. In
addition there was the Jaipur Cart Transport Train , an Imperial Service
unit with 360 carts. As regards camels there were about 1,625 from the
52nd Camel Corps, the Kalat State Camel Corps and other Indian State
Camel Corps.
An Indian Division in those days required as ec attached transport " :•—
274 A. T. Carts 3,115 mules and 3,125 camels.
On the 2nd December 1914 General Barrett telegraphed to India
for permission to return all the camels except 300 with the force. The
camels were apparently not found satisfactory in Basra. It was diffi
cult to find grazing ground.
In the same telegram General Barrett mentioned that it was improb
able that his force would make large movements by land. Permission to
return the camels was given. The 6th Division accordingly became
immobile for operations on land as there was a deficiency of over 2,800
camels The shortage of land transport existed up till the attempts to
relieve Kut and as we will see later seriously handicapped our tactical
operations.