'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎45v] (95/424)

70
tng to control them. They are true sons of Ishmael, and pillage the los
ing side impartially. They were out for loot, not for glory. The Turk,
however, had the advantage over us of having been the man in posses
ion and therefore having more chance of influencing them. A large pro
portion of them were mounted, and though their ponies are small they
;are very active and could make rings round our heavily burdened cava
lry. They never risked a fight with any considerable body, but would
hang round in crowds at long ranges discharging their rifles from the
saddle at our close formations and looking out for any opportunity of
cutting off small parties. They are expert thieves, and can get through
.any form of obstacle unobserved at night. Their exploits in this direc
tion outdo even the bestknown instances of Pathan achievements on the
frontier of India. Being out for plunder they naturally had no hesita-
ition in dispoiling our dead, and used to dig up corpses for the sake of
their clothing and boots. This necessitated careful concealment of the
places of burial. They had a disproportionate influence on the campaign,
at any rate during the early months of the year. Had it been possible
to take vigorous offensive action against them, it is probable that the
nuisance would have been greatly abated; but lack of good cavalry lead
ership, the political situation, and the hopeless shortage of transport
precluded this. In January and February the troops on the right bank
at Ora were even confined within a perimeter camp though within
range of Turk artillery. Throughout the operations the fear of Arab
action had a considerable effect on the dispositions of troops and re
duced the sum of effectives owing to the number of guards that had to be
found, and to the precautions considered necessary for protecting the
flanks of any operation.
To sum up:
The material difficulties under which this campaign was undertaken
could hardly have been worse. There was a shortage of almost every
thing necessary for its prosecution. Under the circumstances, so far
from its being surprising that the relief of Kut was never achieved, the
more the facts are studied the more astonishing do the achievements
of the troops appear. This may be put down mainly to two factors.
Firstly, the great energy and determination of the commanders of the
Tigris Corps, Generals Aylmer and Gorringe, their superhuman efforts
to overcome insuperable obstacles with inadequate means, their great
personal activity, and their unwavering resolution to rescue the garri
son in Kut, are writ large in these four black months. The second
factor was the excellent quality and extraordinarily high morale of the
troops, particularly those who came from Egypt, and most of all the
Indian Corps from France. These two latter Divisions were of course
seasoned troops, who had been through much hard fighting in the mud
of Flanders. In spite of the fact that casualties had been very heavy