'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎71v] (147/424)

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if the dykes controlling the canals above Baghdad were cut, large areas
would be inundated, and movement miglit be rendered impracticable
in many places. „ ,
Time, as is usual in war, was therefore again a decisive factor, and
the British had again to decide whether to endeavour to gain time by
continuing the operations, rather than to await the arrival of reinforce
ments. The principal points now for consideration were whether the
supplies possessed by the garrison of Kut-al-Amara were sufficient to
enable it to hold out if the relief were postponed ; and if so whether
it would now be judicious for the British to pause, complete the organi
sation of their force, and bring up reinforcements ; the obvious dis
advantage of delay being that the enemy would be given the oppor
tunity both of strengthening their positions at Hanna and elsewhere,
and also of hurrying forward troops with whom either to overwhelm
Townshend or to oppose the relieving army.
In the article dealing with the battle of Shaikh Saad the opinion
has been hazarded that, in principle, the farther that the battles for
the possession of Kut-al-Amara were fought from this place, the more
advantageous would it be for the British. It is suggested, therefore,
that unless reports were received from Townshend that the garrison
was in danger of starvation, or that the place was likely to fall to an
assault. General Aylmer should have made a pause in his advance and,
while gathering reinforcements, should have tried to induce the Turks
again to advance to meet him. The British leaders, as will be seen,
however, took the opposite view, and they decided that time would
best be gained by continuing the operations.
On the 11th January, General Aylmer telegraphed at 1300 to
Sir John Nixon a full statement in regard to the situation as follows r
44 1 have been forced to remain here to await the 2nd Eajputs and 61st
Howitzer Battery, which have just arrived and to evacuate as many
sick and wounded as possible in their ships. I advance to-morrow
morning to the Umm-al-Hanna bend with General Kemball's (28th)
Brigade, one field battery, the 23rd Mountain Battery, and the 33rd
Cavalry on the right bank, and the remainder on the left. I have^
established a post here on the right bank with a garrison of one wing
of the 2nd Eajputs, a few cavalry, and a gunboat. The sick and wounded
who cannot be evacuated before we leave will remain here. After
consulting Generals Younghusband (commanding 7th Division) and
Kemball, I determined to continue the advance on Kut; but it is my
distinct duty to point out that it is a most precarious undertaking, for
which T of course accept full responsibility, as I consider that the situa
tion demands a supreme effort to relieve Townshend. The Army
Commander has full figures of the enemy's strength, and possibly 4,000-
may be allowed for his losses and desertions at Shaikh Saad. My fighting