'Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917: Part I - Report' [‎170r] (344/424)

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line from Old Pump House to Atab, protecting the scene of operations
trom Arab activities and any raid by Turks.
The actual crossing was to be carried out by the 37th Brigade who
supplied their own covering party. The Norforks were to cross at
No. 1 Ferry, the 2-9th Gurkhas at No. 2 and the l-2nd Gurkhas at No. 3.
As soon as a bridgehead was established the 36th Brigade followed
by the 35th Brigade were to cross by ferry, or by the bridge if the latter
had been completed.
Meanwhile the I Corps were preparing to renew the attack on
.Sannaiyat 6 hours before the crossing at Shumran.
Sannaiyat was bombarded daily to reduce the alertness of the enemy
with false alarms. These bombardments showed that the position was
.still held in strength.
The Corps Commander thought the enemy might be made to feel
•anxious about his left flank on the marsh, so he brought up 2 battalions
in broad daylight and proceeded to advance the strong points on his
northern flank to convey the impression of an impending attack.
This manoeuvre hardly seems subtle enough.
The 7th Division now had the 19th Brigade in the forward zone, the
^Sth in the central zone and the 21st in Eeserve.
To distract attention from the main crossing the 3rd Division were to
carry out a raid across the river at Maqasi; aftel 1900 on the evening
before the real affair.
This was a most interesting and successful little operation extremely
well planned and executed.
20 pontoons and a complement of rowers from No. 1 Bridging Train
were allotted. These with the selected party of the 27th Punjabis
practised crossing lower down the Tigris. They found it took 15 minutes
to do the round trip across 330 yards of river, which was approximately
the distance at the main crossing point. On the night of the 22nd the
crossing was effected, Turk trenches on the far bank rushed, their
occupants killed or captured, and the return journey with prisoners,
•captured machine guns, etc., successfully concluded at a very small cost
in casualties.
It was found on the 21st February that the river was still too high
und the 14th Division were not ready.
Thereupon General Cobbe wrote to General Maude suggesting he
should attack at Sannaiyat thirty hours before the crossing to give
more time to draw enemy troops from the main enterprise. The
•General Officer Commanding concurred and the Sannaiyat attack was
timed for 0600 on the 22nd February followed by the Maqasis raid
during the 22nd-23rd February.