'File 9/50 (B 16) The Debai Incident' [‎47v] (105/492)

48
I
Betty shopkeepers hailing from Lingah, Lar and Bastak, whom we are indebted
to for the present troublesome traffic in small consignments of arms from the
Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. . It did not seem an onerous condition to ask the Shaikh to
levy a fine of a rifle from a very small proportion of those who had so freely
used them against our men. As a matter of fact, however, the Shaikh s autho
rity was not sufficient to enable him to confiscate more than 300 weapon
and for the rest he substituted cash at the rate of 100 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. per n e.
The sum of 50,000 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. was suggested by me to the Admiral as a suit
able figure with full knowledge of the Shaikh's financial position and of the
extent to which he would be able to levy contribution from his notables and
subiects. The Shaikh accepted this condition so promptly that I was rather
inclined to think that he was prepared for a higher figure.
In any case it will be realised from the terms of my letters to the Shaikh
that Government are not committed in regard to the disposal of this amount,
and I may add that it was my hope that Government would decide to authorise
me to tell the Shaikh that they felt it necessary to press the installation of
a British Aeent and a Post Office and to add that if he met their wishes, which
were for the good of his town and himself, in a tractable way, the money fine
would be refunded to him.
4 The CrovcTTiyyiC'Ht of Xvidict shou
ditions of the ultimatum. —I have the honour to explain that His Excellency the
Commander -in-Chief and I left for Debai at very short notice, and that it
was only on the way thither that we learnt the details of what had taken place.
On arrival we found that the populace had all sent their women and children
out of the town into the hinterland and that the Shaikh feared to come off, as
usual on seeing my flag, until he he had received a safe conduct in writing
from me. It was clear in fact from the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. Agent's report that they had
anticipated immediate hostilities and were pleasantly surprised at not getting
them. These people do not understand deliberate methods of justice and it
would have been difficult to prolong such a situation as existed while we
attempted to exchange telegraphic communications with Government by wire
less, which was liable to interruption from atmospherics at any moment, in the
most uncertain weather which prevailed at the time.
As to whether the conditions we imposed were suitable or the reverse the
Government of India must decide, but I cannot think that the situation was
one which could have been delayed without prejudice while we made references
to Calcutta and awaited replies.
5. The idea or installing a British Agent hy bombardment, —This
is not quite what His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and I contem
plated, and I think it is perhaps a case in which telegraphic brevity or
faulty expression has conveyed a wrong impression. We had no primary
wish to install an Agent by bombardment, indeed we were greatly averse to
any bombardment at all, as calculated to cripple the port from a trade point of
view for some time to come. We had every hope that the action taken in the
present connection would demonstrate to the Shaikh and his people that they
must make up their minds to fall in with the reasonable requirements of the
protecting Power, and both the Eesidency Agent and the Shaikhs of Shargah
and Umm-el-Kawain were enjoined, and undertook, to endeavour, pending
reply from Government, to influence the Shaikh and his notables in the right
direction in this connection. We hoped good counsels would prevail, but we
thought it conceivable that the Shaikh might be put up by his reactionary
adviser to oppose the British Agent and the Post Office and that in that even
tuality, in order to bring him and the intractable section of his followers to
their knees, it might be necessary to occupy the town for a short period after
first dominating it by bombardment. As it was probable that most of the
Arabs would bolt to the desert very shortly after the fire commenced from the
ships, we had to consider the question of dealing with some 2000 well -armed
men, and for that reason it was considered necessary to have sufficient force at
hand in case the worst happened. It was thought probable that the majority
of them could be withdrawn after a very short occupation.