'Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853' [‎65r] (129/344)

Part V-Chap. XXVII.
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is efficient in their estimation ; and that they are consequently desirous of uniting with ua
lo inforce its observance by others who have subscribed to it.
23. Sheikhbooth the Chief of Boothabee arrived in my camp on the 11th instant, and
expressed a great desire to enter into friendly and strict relations with the British Govern
ment. I have accordingly made with him the accompanying preliminary engagement and
admitted him to subscribe the General Treaty.
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25. It will be apparent to the Honourable the Governor in Council that I have eagerly
seized what I considered a most favourable moment for the conclusion of these engagements
lest in the fluctuations of human affairs, and in the time required for previous sanction, it
should have been lost for ever. These were indeed opportunities not to be overlooked for
confirming and perpetuating the effects of our previous military operations, and for executing
the spirit and letter of my instructions to suppress piracy. The state of affairs on this
coast called for some decided demonstration of what was likely to be our future wishes, since
we had shewn our power to accomplish them, and all who had been made sensible of this,
awaited with much anxiety, a pledge that would set at rest all their apprehensions, and I
humbly conceive that any delay in granting this would not have been becoming, particu
larly as the annulment of all that has been executed under these ideas could not occasion
greater perplexity than before existed.
26. Then as to the omission of any mention of British allies in the treaty. Sir W. Grant
observes : The distinct introduction into the General Treaty of any of out former allies has
been avoided from the belief that their religious and personal animosities added to their
habits of indecision and procrastination, mi^ht prove a bar to the conclusion, and afterwards
the due observance of any compact with which they might be directly connected with us,
and these reasons for their omission will probably appear stranger; when it is recollected,
how liable their interests are to fluctuation, and that a change in the views of any one Power,
would interfere with the operation of the whole system, and consequently thwart the inten
tions of the British Government in entering into such arrangements j at the same time it is
apparent that all the advantages which the allies could derive from the introduction of their
names into the General Treaty might be secured to them by their entering through the
mediation of the British Government into special treaties, generally, or individually, with
the Arab tribes, recognising at the same time that which has now been concluded. This
wouM leave the British Government perfectly unembarrassed in the pursuit of its own views,
an object which must be at all times desirable.
27. Under this conviction I have transmitted to Muscat to His Highness the Imaum
who had proceeded towards that place previous to the conclusion of the General Treaty, a
communication intimating my belief that the British Government would most readily
recognise by a special treaty, that acts of piracy committed against His Highness, or his
subjects, should be looked upon in the same light as committed against its own, and would
guarantee free admission of His Highnesses subjects and vessels into the port of the Arabs,
understanding that a reciprocal admission shall be given to them into the ports of His
Highness.
28. I have likewise intimated that His Highness's formal recognition to Bombay of the
treaty now entered into would probably be very acceptable to the Britibh Government, as
would an offer on his part to act against the Arabs, in the event of their committing any
breach of it. To prevent mistakes or misrepresentations I have transmitted for His Highness's
information copies of all the engagements into which I have entered with the Arabs, from the
conviction that such public proceedings which must be matters of notoriety, although not
yet ratified by the Governor in Council would be transmitted with great advantage in a
complete form.
29. His Highness had been made acquainted previous to his leaving Rassul-Khima, that
these treaties were in progress, and should have been put in possession of the whole, had it
been possible to complete them before his departure, the day previous to which Captain
Thompson, my interpreter, waited upon His Highness to communicate the substance of the
foregoing proposals, which seemed to be received with great satisfaction.
80. Shortly after the transmission of my despatch of the 6th instant the Imaum intimated
during an interview with me his desire to return to Muekat, and directly avowed that his
intention in proceeding there was to make preparations for an independent attack on Bahrein,
as adverted to in the Slst paragraph of my despatch of the 6th. His Highness at the same
time begged to know whether I had any objections to his doing so now, as he considered the
service in which he had been engaged with us to be at an end, and pressed me to inform him
whether his proceeding to Bahrein would be disagreeable to the British Government. I replied
that His Highness being an independent Prince must at all times be at liberty to act in con
formity to his ideas of what was safe; with regard to his proceeding to Bahrein, it was impossible.
I could give him any opinion, and as my instructions did not relate to that point, I could not
form any judgment of what the views of my Government might be, but if the Imaum
would commit to writing any proposals he had to make or questions he wished to ask in the
event of my not being able to give an immediate reply, I should forthwith forward his
communication to Bombay. His Highness intimated that this should be done in the evening,
and statjed that he should proceed to Maskat next day. In the evening I received a message
from His Highness, stating that he did not intend writing to me on the subject that he had
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