'Précis of correspondence regarding the affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-1853' [‎68r] (135/344)

Part V-Chap. XXVII.
115
success; I consequently followed what appeared to me to be the best course, and released hun
and his followers. Had Hassan-bin-Ali been retained, and another person set up in his stead
by the British authority, the Chief so created would naturally have looked to us for support
and protection ; we should have put him up for our own benefit; but as that advantage would
have been immediately lost had any Chief in whom we had no trut-t been pleased to remove him,
we should have felt it incumbent upon us to support the person who was in our own interests;
any person set up in the room of Hassan-bin-Ali would have been a solitary instance of our
interference in the internal affairs of the Arab tribes. If the influence of the person so situ
ated had been powerful, he would still have looked to our countenance, if it had been weak he
would have required our active support, he would have been our man, and our character would
have been committed had we abandoned hira, nor could we have had any further security from
him than his promises, but that is of little consequence, as the security remains with ourselves.
Hassan-bin-Ali hud promised not to practice plunder and piracy, but he is aware that there is
a British force in the Gulfc' for maintaining- this promise in its fullest extent. Our own
Chief wmld have promised the same things, but 1 submit that we could not on that account
have diminished the force to retain one man. As affairs now stand when our garrison shall
be withdrawn from Russulkhiyma^ our political connection with Arabia may cease from that
moment, and this I have ever considered to be very great advantage.
(14) Had I known any person, or had there been any person in Hassan-bin-Ali's tribe
nearly equal in power to that Chieftain and who in the natural course of eveut had succeeded
to the Government of the tribe, from Hassan-bin-\li'8 cotifinement, advantage might have
been desired from permitting the person who had thus succeeded without our interference,
to remain in power, but as far as my information goes no such person appeared. I had one
other political inducement to release Hassan-bin-Ali, which was that at the time this measure
was carried into effect, he was the person most able as well as willing to maintain some
balance in the authority on the coast agains-t Sultan-bin-Sugger.
(15) Hassan bin All's followers wore released as I have before observed, under the idea
that even their enmity can be productive of no bad consequences at this period, they were
suffering much from disease, audi verily believe that we should not have been long burthened
with the care of many of them, their deaths whilst under confinement by us would not have
created a favourable political impression, which 1 trust their release has. I did not look to
their deserts, but I looked to placing the British character in the most advantageous point of
view ; this of course not to be done without some sacrificei, if not in reality, at least of opinionj
I cannot regret any that 1 have incurred, excepting being deprived of the approbation of the
Governor in Council to a measure which appeared to me one that could be pursued with the
greatest advantage.
(16) I did not prohibit the fitting out of armed vessels of every description at ports
that have been accustomed to the practice of piracy as we considered that we always maintain
the power of doing so ; which I did not conceive that it was the desire or policy of the
British Government to prohibit the use, but only the abuse of such vessels. In disarming a
people or in preventing them from defending their persons and property whether hy sea or
land, toe may fairly I think be said to charge ourselves with their protection against all who
shall attack them unjustly. We are not the sole p >wer in the Gulf of Persia and oar entire
repugnance to involve ourselves in the politics of the Gulf is, I believe, maintained, and made
still more apparent by our not interfering directly with the quarrels and wars that may arise
in it • it was this idea that caused me to discourage the Imaum only by arguments and
remonstrances against his attack on Bahrein. I did not mean to interfere actively in this
or any other acknowledged war, which was defined in the General Treaty to he that which is
proclaimed, avowed, and ordered by Government against Government.
(17) I felt disinclined to limit the size of vessels allowed for commercial purposes as
understood that the largest were not by any means the most frequently used piratically ;
and as the introduction of commercial habits and ideas much to be desired I was willing to
impose as few impediments to their ad-.ption as a sense of safety would permit whilst I hav«
everv confidence in the efficacy and practicabiluy of a strict maritime superintendence. The
Gulf of Persia is a very small and confined sea, through which information will circulate
ranidlv and no act of piracy can in future be committed without early intelligence being
received at the British settlement, of where, and by whom, it may have been perpetrated,
when immediate steps may be taken to inflict the necessary punishment on such as may
offend. # > .
(18) The right of search I conceive to be recognized in the obligation to have particular
papers. , i. i i •
qqx A g any restraint on the exportation from India of timber for building large ships
could not be imposed by me, I do not trouble the Government with any observations on that
head. • ,i
(20) For the reasons given in the 7th paragraph of this letter I conceive that we
have everv rieht to prohibit the Arabs from rebuilding their forts, as well as of landing an.,
destroying any works they may attempt to raise for the purpose of enabling them to carry on
^ (21) The Hon'ble the Governor in Council conceives that a breach of the present
freatv exposes him (any Arab Chief) to no consequences which would not have resulted from
his niracv had that agreement (the General Treaty) never been entered into. The commis-
gion of an act of piracy would place the persons committing it beyond the pale of any treaty,
8 ' Q