File E/8 I Ibn Sa‘ud [‎194r] (410/606)

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To a Certain extent this is true, but at the present moment years of falsehood, intrigue and op
pression on the part of Turkish officials combined with the disastrous loss of Turkish prestige
resulting from the Tripoli and Balkan wars have had their effect. Moreover, the Arabs have
now found a leader (Bin Saud) who stands head and shouldeis above any other Chief and in
whose star all have implicit faith. The other Shaikhs of the Arab alliance refer all kinds of
matters to Bin Saud for his advice, more especially those affecting their relations with the Porte.
I am convinced that present Turkish methods in Arabia, if peisisted in, will end in disaster—
Turkey has not the power to coerce Arabia and should matters, with Bin Saud in regard to the
Hasa province for instance, come to a head, the probable result will be a combination of all
the Arab tribes, the expulsion of Turkish troops and officials from the Hedjaz, Yemen and Asir
and the establishment of an independent Arabia with a loose form of confederation of which Bin
Saud will be the head, while the holy cities of Mecca and Medina will pass under the absolute
rule of the Sharif's family with the consent of Bin Saud, I admit that it is always rash to pro
phesy ^ but I have heard the subject discussed so often in Arabia on these lines and by so many
widely separated Chiefs that I cannot avoid the conclusion that the Turkish Government is at
present riding for a very bad fall in its present Arabian policy.
If the British policy of a strong Turkey is ever to be realised in Asia the Porte must be
convinced oi its mistake, however unpalatable the process may be. The only solution which
I can see is a radical change on the part of the Port^ towards a more straight-forward
and honest policy with the important Shaikhs. Most of them are quite willing to accept Turkish
sitzerainty so long as it is one only in name and does not import meddling in their affairs
In the case of Bin Saud for instance—all he desires is to be left alone as the ruler of Nejd, which
he is now in fact, allowed to collect his own taxes and customs and to administer the Shara's
Law in the old time-honoured way. If the Porte would nominate him Mutaserif or Vali of
Nejd on these conditions he would be willing to pay it a nominal tribute in a lump sum per
annum, and I feel sure would loyally keep his part of the bargain as a Turkish vassal. He has
no ambitions to become the Khalif of Arabia, and though his commanding influence will no doubt
lead a)i the other Chiefs more or less during his lifetime, I do not think he would ever embark
on a campaign to set himself up as Sultan of all Arabia.
It may be said that any solution on the lines suggested above will leave the whole of Arabia
open to the exploitation of Foreign Powers, Great and otherwise. At present no Great Power
lias any real interests in Arabia with the exception of Great Britain, whose interests are confined
to the coast-line, though I believe Italy is said to be trying to develope interests in Asir or Yemen,
The discussion of this aspect of the subject requires more accurate and more extensive knowledge
of recent events than is available to me ; therefore it is with diffidence that I venture to suggest
for consideration that with the Porte recognized and supported by His Majesty's Government as
the Suzerain Power in Arabia and provided that the Turkish Government dealt frankly with His
Majesty's Government in matters regarding Arabia no Foreign Power would find it an easy pro
position to make good a footing in the country, apart from the fact that along nearly the whole
littoral British influence is paramount and of very considerable account even in those portions
actually administered at the moment by Turkey.
To sum up, the difficulties of the problem in Arabia are :—
(a) The utter inability of the Porte to coerce Arabia at present or for many years to
come.
(h) The strong position in a military and geographical sense with which Nature has
endowed the Arabs.
(c) The probable coalition of all Arab tribes in the event of attempted coercion.
(d) The desire of His Majesty's Government to promote a strong Turkey in Asia without
detriment to legitimate British interests.
The remedies, so far as I can venture to suggest them, seem to be :—
(1) The acceptance by the Porte of the de facto independent status of the great Shaikhs
whilst maintaining a nominal suzerainty.
(2) A franker and more honest attitude by the Porte towards the great Shaikhs.
(3) Less suspicion on the part of the Porte towards British policy in Arabia with recog-
' nition of the special position which Great Britain there enjoys.;
(4) A frank invitation by the Porte for British co-operation in Arabian affairs.