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‘Policy in the Middle East. I. Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes.’ [‎101v] (4/14)

The record is made up of 1 file (7 folios). It was created in 1915. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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4
POLITICAL SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA.
The political situation in Mesopotamia is influenced to our detriment by
the element of doubt which subsists in the minds of the people as to our
actual intentions.
Xotahles. —I have interviewed several notables ol Hasra, namely, the
brother of the Nakib, several senior members of the Bashayan lamily, the
Shaykh of Zabevr, and the notable Shaykh Abu Talib. One and all
obviouslv desire certainty, and particularly that we should occupy Baghdad.
The fear in their minds is that we should retire or let the Turks in
again.
People.—The people, whether nomads, cultivators, or semi-nomads,
Sunnis or Shias, are ready to accept our rule, but equally ready to turn
against us in event of any mishap. In many villages between Amara and
Kurna demonstrations of sympathy are made by the Arab women \\li('n
barge loads of Turkish prisoners pass by, villages it ma\ be said whose
inhabitants did not hesitate to plunder the Turks in their retreat. This
should be a sufficient indication of what We ourselves might expect under
similar circumstances.
The Shia shrines require especial consideration and treatment, but it is
not necessary to make a great parade of the matter. Again, with the
people as with the notables, it is desirable that there should be some certainty
as to their future.
Future Policy.—There is one point which I feel requires careful con
sideration, and that is the connection between India and Mesopotamia.
Indian and Arab civilisation and mentality are poles asunder, and I am of
opinion that the introduction of Indian methods and Indian personnel
should be merely temporary, and should form no part of our future scheme.
Indian administration has grown up in the course of years and is based
on traditions and social customs which have no counterpart in Irak. The
introduction of Anglo-Indian and native Indian officials directed from India,
will mean inevitably that Irak will develop on Indian lines.
There can be no doubt that the native social standards of Egypt and
Syria are far higher than those of India, and owing to language and racial
affinity it is from those regions that the civilisation of Irak would naturally
be drawn. I feel it is my duty to say therefore that in my opinion it would
be a i ;?eat mishap it at the outset any action of ours should do anything to
impose artilicially an alien and lower grade of civilisation upon a people who
have a natural tendency to a higher and more progressive social state.
The Indian currency, Indian officials in the police, the posts, telegraphs,
and clerical bureaus, and the introduction of Indian law, Indian money
lenders and merchants, will influence the whole country and set a permanent
barrier of alien administration between ourselves and the people. Doubtless
we shall sooner or later begin to employ natives of the country ; but as the tirst
traditions will be moulded on Indian lines, with the result that we shall not
be able at a later date to develop the spiritual and national mental resources
of the urban and rural population to such advantage as we otln nvise might.
Colonisation. —In saying this, I am raising no objection to hond fide
colonisation by Indians, provided that the administrative personnel is purely
British and Arab. There can be no objection to the allotment of lands to
Indian cultivators in districts (where local inhabitants are insufficient, and
where there is no prospect of nomads being induced to settle) to develop the
country, provided that lhe colonists will not have the pull of the administra
tion. ' They will, under such circumstances, either remain in separate
communities or mingle with the people, and so become a part of Irak. If,
however, the Indian peoples permeate the administrative personnel and the
mercantile and financial classes, the colonists will only be another element
in the Indianisation of the country. The ludianisation of Irak is not only to
be avoided for the above reasons, but also because, as time goes on and
intercommunication grows easy between Irak and Syria, we shall be
confronted with the tendency of the Arab to reassert himself once more, and
in that tendency we shall find the seeds of much political difficulty.

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Secret memorandum, prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes. The report is preceded by a letter from Sykes to Major-General Charles Edward Callwell, Director of Military Operations, War Office, London, dated 15 November 1915, which includes Sykes’s opinion on the occupation of Ahwaz, and an assessment of the Turkish forces outside Aden.

The memorandum, dated 28 October 1915, is divided into the following sections:

  • (i) military situation in Mesopotamia: the relative weakness of troop numbers in Mesopotamia; implications of taking and holding Baghdad; supply of gunboats and ammunition. The political situation in Mesopotamia: the opinions of the notables of Basra, and of the general population; future policy, particularly in relation to the connection between India and Mesopotamia; colonisation by Indians, and the risks associated with the ‘Indianisation’ of Mesopotamia;
  • (ii) Indian Moslems [Muslims] and the War, including: Sykes’s assessment of the ‘extreme ignorance’ of Indian Muslims of Islamic theological doctrine; sympathy of Indian Muslims with the Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress; British educational policy towards Islam in India;
  • (iii) General situation: the political situation in India, Persia, Egypt and Arabia, and three proposed lines of action in order to defeat the Ottoman Empire. Military situation, identifying the regions and fronts critical to the region. Final observation on ‘certain psychological idiosyncrasies’ of the Ottoman armies.
Extent and format
1 file (7 folios)
Physical characteristics

Foliation: The foliation for this description commences at f 100, and terminates at f 106, as it is part of a larger physical volume; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is also present in parallel between ff 100-106; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled, and won't be found in the same position as the main sequence.

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‘Policy in the Middle East. I. Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes.’ [‎101v] (4/14), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/18/B217, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023608675.0x000005> [accessed 29 April 2024]

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