'Summary of the Hejaz Revolt' [‎86v] (24/30)

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gMEniNA.
The following summary of messages shows a ponslsteiit attitnde of despondency on the port of I'akhri
Ta^lta crtmjMAftdifig at Medina since ihe autumn of liHZ. It is pro Liable that he has sometimes exag<vwaU$
his troubles, as th.- vilality of liis garrison lias proved, but it is obvious that he can have little hope of
relieved in the absi -in -e. of some ^jr^tic riian^e in the siliiaiio;i.
1. Ou the 1th Octnber, 1017., Kakhri jnfurined tiie (ieneral Officer Commanding: Syria and VYeatcra
Arabia that Ins wheal and food supplies were all but eXmmsled. Applications to the lines of communicaUon
hau not been replied to and he state.l he eouhi not rely on the lleja/ railway. Owing 1 tp.the approach of
w inter he considered his situation serious, and uuh-ss considerable quantities of stores were sent him forth
with would become dangvrous.
In i;e[>ly I 1 " was told he was responsible for the fuel in his area and in case of necessity authorised to
demolish the buildinus in Medina, with the exception of the lloly buildings. On tbe 2')rh October Fakhri
re,peMed he had unlv one mouth's food left in Medina, and that the date crop, on which his hopes for
supplier wfcre basen, had been destroyed by a storm.
2. About the same time Kaknri despatched a message to the Line Commissaire General at Damascus
pointing out how the arrang-emenis for feeding Medina had broken down ; and that the reserve of bread at
de .ima timshed on the 2'cth October. He despaired of ever receiving enough supplies at Medina, and put
tiie whole moral respgnsibiliry tor the fall ot Medina (if it did fall) on the lines of communication and the
Une ('ommissaiie Ueueral. .
& About the b.-rinniiig of. November Fakhri pointed out to the Turkish Higher Command the futility
of sending him anything by rail and declared himseit besieged.
4. On the Mkh N'ovo;= ber .b tnal I. informefl I'akhiiof the Turkish deieat on the Gaz%—Hir Saba line
and that in the event, of the fall Of Jerusa,lem it waA intended to evacuate the liejaz Expeditionary Force
from Aluvium. On the lith a further messaue was sent him asking how long lie could hold out should the
Me !ina force be aUin.loued. Fnkhri rephed somewhat acridly, asking whetner the decision for evacuating
Medina rested with him or the Khalif.
4. At this time there was a good, deal of bit terness in the correspondence betwedto Fakhri. and Jemal I.
About the end ot Octolier takhri inlormed Jemal that it was no good sending food to Medina unless the
Aiaba were k'pt otf i lie line; demai later refilled that FakHfi was responsible for ttds, to which Fakhri
replied bitterly, that it he had suflicieni force left, to keep the line clear he would not have sent his original
message.
About the niiddle of November Fakhri was informed that the decision had been taken to evacuate
the f!e a/, Kxp 'di:a n oy 1 orce with the exception of a small garrison in jMedina, and shortly afterwards he
was intormed ot the i rogt mime for cewjyin ; out the evacuation.
7. In a message oait-d the 25th Nov«iidn-r Fakhri protested his inability to comply with orders issued
frOm Damascus foi the withdrawal of ids mom.ted troops, lb-piaved that Jemal I. "will not deprive him
ol bis n.eaUS 01 defence, as he has already deprived lum of his.power to take the offensive, and so let the
Medina garrison be trampled under the feet of the enemy."
S In the raiddie ot December, 10r /,the heavy troop movements from Damascus to Deraa dislocated the
llejaz piogrannoae. On the -Uib December Colonel t > faneustfHl, director of railways, arrived at Medina,
^akhn deeply impressed with the sympathetic liearing he received from his gu-st, who •'unlike the
lui s and losem. listened to my worries with great attention." Damascus resented this message, and
replied th.t 1L was due to the " Turks and Mo^ms" that Ctancnsteil was sent to Medina "for the sole
pur| o.-e of enquinng into t;;e n' e>is of the llejaz Expeditionary Force in his capacity as highest authoriiy in
matters of railwav i:aioporT. r * e, j
9. tii January, lU^.'according'to information obtained from the French Mission in the Heiaa, peace
"»*****"& Composite Fo.ce. and addressed to Sherd"
! IS-tesSS BE»s»«a!fa!aa: eassr ^ as
[i -m w;
acti n iVy l L ' Tbdi/Vx >e'it i 'i ^' 1 r ^ a i S a!sCt ' rta ^ ne< l 'l^t it had been intended to combine offensive
11. In th.e middle of Februar
lines of
Ftikbri a [J |')ealed to Us Uu^ of J " r ." f " d ® er " feh (north of Maan >'» 1
oilers ^omtJie Uijjfujr ObiiniiiiiiHl to tli,. coiiiiiu v. osf.au. i good? consigned to Medina in spite of
necessary to maintain for one
year
place
liVOn tiie bull March, Fa .khri e timated that 5,600 tons of food would be
! " it was proposed to leave in Medina if and when ibo
if and when the evacuation of the JJe.iaz toolc
: ^i; ; /Zud lOpposite .K.^cos,' ^v]u^'were X ordl l .IlI\ I 'T,r!rth L 0 T d . ere<1 ^ ^ diatficts of the iHt
equivalent of pr^'ntihg th :i liejaz Kailwa ' i .o the'^rab^ r^hed that such a move would be the
11. On the •') <1 May, F<ikhri io'ic-o-k i tf\ i.iii ■ i ' i
Force and the ilt-juz Kxpeditiouarv Fo^-e h id I i ' "f 1 ' ,0 . g riiv e situation in which the 2,nd Composite
area. He averred, the posita if ^^ ^ cu,ti ^ 01 the railway in the Maan
treated by hjs superiors to whom he had -ca n anH WaS dt ; i, P , ' rato » ^nd resented the way he had been
On the 8th May. Fakfci wL inc2w1v appealed lor reinforcements.
reserve of. wheat and tri.'v, wete almost exh-m : r j 'l SSI ( ' <) " , "''rning his situation, lie reported that his
damaged line. He stated he had clea,ly «xplai^ tS ll! . ul l no troo l >s to for the repair of the
must now Uc with the IVth Army authorities^ ' P0Slt,Ou uud the responsibility for any future disaster
In. On tlie Istii May, 1 akhri w is it t • > l K
piacod nnd«;r ^ elderem and ord<-red to hold Nlpdm-i a ^ la that the Hejaz Expeditionary Force was
tepau and proieciion ol the liejaz Kailvvay as well • -i 1 ' Cu>ts ' ^ ''ile Vdderem were responsible for the
J waj a S wtil as the provisioning of Medina.