Bagdad [Baghdad] - Basra Railway [‎10v] (8/10)

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It is submitted that we may then fairly expect a full satisfaction of the demands
made in the memorandum of 29th July 1911 without the necessity of
contemplating any further concessions.
But it is at least open to argument that the Turks will not carry their
objection to the 50 per cent, arrangement to the point of letting the
negotiations break down :—
(1.) As has been urged above, it is important to them that the railway
should be made.
(2.) They know that, whatever may be the value to us of Turkish friend
ship, the value to themselves of our friendship is much greater,
and if brought gently but firmly up to the point, it is likely that
they will think twice before sacrificing it.
VII. The procedure to he adopted now. —If the above views, which are
only a development of those expressed in India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. letters of 3rd and 29th
March 1911, are accepted, the doubt arises whether it is worth while to press
for the 50 per cent, at all; whether it is not better to abandon the railway
altogether, and devote ourselves entirely to the river and the Gulf, on the
lines suggested above.
l)ut jf it be decided that an attempt should be made to secure 50 percent.,
the next question is how. This is really a question for the Foreign Office.
The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. have suggested that we should go direct to the German
Government, and the Board of Trade in their letter of 7th April 1911
recommended that a confidential conference should be held with the
authorities of the Bagdad Railway as a preliminary to further negotiations
with Turkey.
If it is held to be impossible to go to Germany independently of Turkey,
the only course is apparently to inform the Turks that their own proposals
being quite inacceptable, we find ourselves unable to negotiate on the basis
of the German declaration of 7th March 1911, but that if they choose to
approach Germany with a view to modifying this declaration so as to give us
50 per cent, and the casting vote, we will use our good offices with Germany
and be willing to discuss with her the terms of a settlement on those lines,
on the understanding that Turkey concludes an entirely satisfactory arrange
ment with us in the river and Gulf.
VIII. The alternative—It is necessary to consider the possibility that if
we take either of the lines suggested, the Turks will break off the negotiations
altogether, as regards both the railway and the Gulf. It is not thought
likely, for the reasons suggested under head VL that this will happen, though
they may hint at it by way of bluff. But ii they did, it would seem that we
should be morally in a very strong position if we could come before the
public and say. " We have made every effort to meet the Turks over the
question of this railway, but without success. But we do not wish to block
''it if we can get a settlement of vexatious questions in the Gulf. We have
" accordingly offered them a free hand for the railway as far as Basra
*' (beyond which, if it is ever made, it will never pay) and the increased
^ customs duties in return for a recognition de jure of the position in the
Gulf which we have held de facto for a century ; and they have refused."
Our polic} would then be the maintenance, by force if necessary, of that
position. We should have to reckon with Turkish hostility both to ourselves