'A strategical study of Persia and the Persian Gulf' [‎53] (61/150)

53
PAKT II.
Strategical Conditions.
Policy.
1. Owing to the somewhat unusual circumstances of the case
policy, as affecting strategical conditions in Persia, may more con
veniently be discussed in the light of the political aspirations of
her powerful neighbours, than in relation to the desires of the Per
sian Grovernment and people, whose present impotence renders
it unlikely that they will be able materially to influence the course
of events in the near future.
The question of policy may thus be discussed under the follow
ing headings-
(а) Russian policy.
(б) British policy including the interests of India
(c) Turkish policy.
(d) Persian policy.
(e) Other factors which may affect the future, e. g., German
influence, the interests of other nations and the effect
in Afghanistan of a change in the existing regime
2. It is somewhat difficult to sum up impartially the policy
(a) The policy of Russia. To^loZo^n eSpeClall f. a . rival Power.
, , ., 10 do 60 ' in an y particular case, we
have for guidance t —
(i) The historic^record of the policy of the Power in question;
(») The declared policy aa shown by the treaty en»a!»e
ments, as far as made public, and the recent declara-
tions of responsible'statesmen.
(m) The significance of current events and recent action
as evidence in support or otherwise of the dechr P ,l
policy as outlined in (n) above.
3. The historical record of Russia in Asia during the nast inn
years is one of steady and continued expansion and algrandisemenf
at the expense of semi-ciyilized nationalities, but as has frequenttv
been urged by Russian statesmen, such expansion is the naturl?
result of the existence of semi-savage and ill-controlled states on
the border of a civilized power; and in view of our own «W™*-
of the Indian Empire, it is difficult for us to
fides of such a declaration. The fact remains, however tW
Russian expansion has been consistent, and has never in the
been brought to a halt except in the face of force majeure-Zd
there are indications to show that when thwarted in one d4c
tion, the tendency of her policy has always been to seek a line of