'A strategical study of Persia and the Persian Gulf' [‎64] (72/150)

64
(it) to accept the logic of changed circumstances, and, in
agreement with other nations concerned, to take over
such territory as our strategical and economical in
terests may render desirable.
Though military considerations, especially the defence of India,
will be of the first importance in arriving at a decision between the
above courses, it is beyond the scope of this work to attempt to
indicate the lines on which the decision should be based.
As regards our position in Gulf waters and vzs-a-vis Turkey
there is no indication that we intend at present to abandon our tra
ditional policy, nor is there any reason why we should not be succes-
ful in maintaining it, though it is possible we may have to make
some concession to Turkish sentiment, if matters are to be
amicably adjusted, when negociations are resumed.
Should the Trans-Persian Eailway materialize, however, we
shall have to reconsider the question of a port on the Persian shore
of the Grulf; the question which will naturally arise being, whether
we wish, and are able to ensure, that the port at which the railway
first touches the coast is under our control or internationalized.
1 he latter contingency is obviously against our interests as the
establishment of any international port in the Gulf would materially
alter the " status quo " to our disadvantage.
24. Turkish policy towards Persia may be regarded as negative
(e) Turkish policy. f" ^ ch f racter - Thou g h
m her own interests it is natural that
she would view with concern the partition of Persia among European
Powers, especially Kussia, there seem no indications to point to the
likelihood of her taking active measures to prevent such a consum
mation. The sentiment which might have been anticipated on
behalf of a neighbouring Muhammadan nation appears non-existent
or at any rate has not been prominently manifested up to date.
25. The relations between the two countries of late years have been
confined to an apparent desire on the part of Turkey to prey on her
weaker neighbour by encroachments along the Turko-Persian frontier.
The most important of these encroachments was in the country
between Kurdistan and Lake Urumieh. The reason attributed for
this encroachment is the desire of the Turks to strengthen their
position in Asia vis-a-vis Russia, by occupying the exit between
Lake Van and Lake Urumieh. This would have enabled them
to threaten the Russian communications through the Caucasus.
The import of tfiia move did not, however, escape the notice of the