'A strategical study of Persia and the Persian Gulf' [‎99] (107/150)

tfs soon as 2 brigades were complete, SMraz might be occupied
about the 50th day and the division complete be concentrated
in the Shiraz valley by the 55th to 60th day. Further development
of force would depend on improvement to communications, but
it is improbable that any material addition could be made for at
least a month. (See Appendix 10.) - »
108. A force in occupation of Shiraz would dominate the
province of Fars. Movement to the north as far as Deh Bid, 106
miles would present no difficulty, but thence to Isfahan, 172
miles,' and to Yazd, 133 miles, lack of supplies would limit the
movement of troops to small detachments unless considerable
preparations in the way of stocking depots were undertaken. As
supplies for 12,000 men are reported as available at Isfahan, troops
in small echelons might be pushed on to that place, with supply
columns carrying 7 days' supplies and provided no opposition
was anticipated on arrival. By this means, provided further
troops were available to replace the troops as they advanced from
Shiraz, the leading detachment might arrive at Isfahan in about 100
days from the date of taking up shipping and 12,000 men concentrate
in some 110 days. {See Appendix 11.) Owing to the length (480 miles
from Bushire) and difficult nature of communications, however, the
operation would be a very risky one, unless undertaken with the
absolute certainty of forestalling a possible opponent. In this
connection a comparison should be made with the estimated rate
of a Russian advance in paragraph 85.
As the local resources of Yazd are said to be insufficient to
provide for the needs of the population an advance on that place
could not be undertaken until a line of supply could be
organised from Deh Bid. Should the necessity for the occupation
of Yazd occur it might be occupied by 1 Brigade about the
85th day from the date of taking up shipping. (See Appendix
12.)
109. The question of the occupation of 'Arabistan would depend
on the attitude of the Shaikh of Mu-
Occupation of Shushtar and hammareh. To overcome opposition
Dizftl. , by his followers it is probable that a
force of a division would be necessary. It might well be, however,
that if he were threatened by the Turks from the west or by the
Bakhtiari from the north he would not oppose and might even assist
British operations. Owing to the possibility of using water transport
for the greater part of the way and to the open nature of the country
an advance into North 'Arabistan would not present the same