'A strategical study of Persia and the Persian Gulf' [‎114] (122/150)

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be provisioned throughout for 1 division to advance to Tehran by,
at latest, the 38th day fr. m the date of orders to mobilize. The lead
ing division should be concentrating at Kazvin between the 34th and
44th day of Russian mobilization, so that one division could be
concentrated at Tehran and 1 division at Kazvin by the 50th day
of Russian mobilization, allowing for some expedition in the
rear division moving on Kazvin.
5. Advance on Hamadan. —Part II, paragraph 81.
The preceding Appendix shows the possibility of concentratin *
50,000 men in Kazvin by the 50th day from the date of orders to
mobilize. Should the objective of the Russian forces be Hamadan
and Kirmanshah a further advance might be made as follows :—
Kazvin to Hamadan is 8 long marches along a good road with an
estimated supply capacity of 1 brigade. It should be possible to
move from Kazvin before the whole of the above force is collected,
say, soon after the leading division commences to concentrate there
i.e., on the 36th day from the date of < rders to mobilize. The
opposition is not likely to be great, so the leading brigade
of the division should occupy Hamadan by the 45th day from
the date of orders to mobilize. Subsequently detachments
carrying 10 days' food and grain supplies could be passed along
the road, though fodder depots would have to be formed. Owing
to the larger quantities of supplies available along the route
an average of 50 lbs. forage per animal would probably suffice
to supplement local resources. Thus, for the 15,000 animals of
a Russian Army Corps 15,000 x 50 = 750,000 lbs. = 350 tons
would be wanted, spread out along the road i.e., over an average
of 5 marches. Using table G, 2,551 five-maund animals or their
equivalent could deliver this in 10 days. Allowing them 5 days for
his transport getting into position, the collection would be finished
within 15 days of the leading brigade starting from Kazvin i.e., by
50th day from the date of orders to mobilize. Subsequently the
remainder of the 50,000 men could march in detachments of 5,000
each day and be concentrated at Hamad in in 8 + 9 = 17 days i.e.,
on 68th day from the date of orders to mobilize.
Though considerable quantities of supplies are available at
Hamadan the amount would probably not suffice for this number,
so troops would have to be pushed on to Kirmanshah to subsist.
As the road, 103 miles in 6 stages, passes through a well-supplied
country, detachments of 3,000 — 4,000 men might push on after
halting at Hamadan to replenish supplies and thus the leading
division might be at Kirmanshah and the remainder of the Army
Corps at Hamadan by the 70th day from the date of orders to mobilize.