'Travels from India to England : comprehending a visit to the Burman Empire, and a journey through Persia, Asia Minor, European Turkey, &c., in the years 1825-26, by James Edward Alexander' [‎288] (383/412)

288 APPENDIX.
fare, yet the bulk of her population consists of warlike tribes, who, if a proper
impulse were given to them, would furnish a more effectual defence to Persia
than if the country were studded with fortresses. Nor is such an impulse
wanting in the present contest, which has arisen from a belief that the Russians
have insulted the Moslem religion. The war is regarded by the Persians as a
holy war: they are persuaded by their Moollahs that their religion has been
invaded; and no motive is so well calculated to excite all the energies of a
Mahomedan population as a belief that their faith is menaced by an infidel
power.
Should the Russians, therefore, continue the war, and march their heavy
dragoons and infantry into Persia, the Persians need only remove the
provisions, forage, &c. from their line of march, and harass the invaders
with their numerous and superior cavalry, in order to impede effectually the
enemy's advance across barren plains.
If Persia had a chief like Nadir Shah, the event would be easily calculated.
But a great obstacle to the exertions of the Persians, and a drawback to their
success, is the excessive parsimony of the Shah, who, though possessed of
immense wealth, is unconquerably averse to opening his treasury. For this
very reason he has no army of reserve; although he could assemble without
difficulty (if he would pay them) ten thousand robust troopers, mounted on
strong and active horses, from Khorasan and Kerman, and a like number from
Ispahan, Kermanshah, Hamadan, from the Bucktiaris, and the wandering
tribes of Louristan; besides at least three thousand from the towns and Illiauts
of Fars.
The successes of the Persians at the commencement of the present war shew
that there is less inequality than might be expected between the respective
forces; and the result of the last war, in which, after ten or twelve years' ex
ertion, Russia was unable to push her boundaries to the Araxes, affords a strong
proof of the same fact. In the present war the Russians labour under greater
disadvantages than during the last; they have to convey their munitions of
war over an immense tract of country, in which they must leave strong posts,
not