'File 73/7 I (D 19) Status of Kuwait & Baghdad Railway, and Anglo-Turkish negotiations 1911' [‎23v] (64/631)

j - u a «/ • t-p -araw fr> hp civpii affQiin, it woulu. vcl^ j
existing con^on^Wit^.^ _ ^ ^ it was , and it could not bo
Tnkld But the Turkish Empire was large, and there was room lor v eiy
many other enterprises which were open not only to German capital, but to
British capital; and British capital would be heartily welcomed.
T said that I did not think that this erroneous view was held by anyone
who was well informed. It was undoubtedly true that the Baghdad question had
St importance in the relations between England, Turkey and
Germany' both in itself and also in relation to the position in Mesopotamia
and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. generally. If the Baghdad question could he settled m
a satisfactory manner, I was convinced that it would have an admirable effect
on tlie relations of the three countries.
Hakki Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. said that the question of Koweit was at the root of the
Turkish feeling about British action in that part of the worJd. On this subject
he spoke strongly. He said that he regarded it as beyond doubt that British
action in relation to Koweit had been unjust. Lnder British protection,
although there was not a protectorate in the technical sense of the word,
Koweit was the centre of the contraband arms traffic, and a source of continual
conflict with its neighbours. So long as this anomalous state of affairs existed,
it was impossible to restore peace and order in thai part ol the world. Koweit
was like a thorn stuck in the side of Turkey ; and it^ was British action there
more than anywhere else that had created suspicions oj British aims in
Mesopotamia.
T said that I was not acquainted with the details of the question, but
whatever the rights or wrongs of the matter, His Highness knew perfectly well
that British action regarding Koweit was not directed against Turkey, but
against the possibility of Koweit falling into other hands. The Grand Vizier
said that he quite realised this, but that practically the action taken by way of
defence against another Power operated as against Turkey, ft was not in any
way Turkey's interest or desire to permit any other Power to establish itself
there. Even under the old regime, Abdul Hamid had not permitted the
Germans to acquire a coaling station in the Red Sea. The new regime would
be even more strongly opposed to any such acquisition. If there were any
doubt as to this, Turkey would be willing to take formal engagements as to the
use of Koweit as a naval station. He said that, in his opinion, the matter was
one that ought to be capable of settlement if there was good-will on both sides ;
but he complained that he had been unable to obtain a frank and full discus
sion of the question, which was the first condition of an understanding.
i said that the matter was not one in which i was entitled to express an
opinion, but that i saw with great regret the extreme sensitiveness of Turkish
opinion as regards the most innocent and legitimate activities of British
shippmg and commerce in the Gulf. T referred to a recent article by Ismail
Hakki Babanzade, in which the presence of British shipping at Bussorah and
the extent of British trade there were treated as matters of offence and
indications ol sinister intentions; whereas it was clearly essential to the
prosperity of the country to welcome all the shipping and trade that could
come, whatever the nationality.
^ Hakki Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. replied that articles in the press must not be taken too
Bussorah • and^ l Bj } ban 1 zad(S had i ust returned from Baghdad and
was the question of KoweH n,0le ,m P reSsion on llim than anything else
Ho th0n ret "r ned 1 . t0 the q ues tion of the Baghdad Railway.
tW -t Germans must be allowed to complete the line to Baghdad but
a™.r f Tf 1Sed that Baghdad it was necessary to Ind some
preferW he tou W To?^ tlSf T| En r and ' P™ 0 ! 86 soill tion was to be
Clearly any arra^ement S he? H "T d,foits ilC< l ,,isan(l
interests coneprnBrit r must he a matter for negotiation ; and it was for the
be verj anxious t^Mrive'at 1 i proposals. The Turkish Government would
i. e at a settlement, and would be prepared to brm^