'F 83 File 82/27-II QATAR OIL' [‎267r] (549/630)

3.
question, and prima, facie it would seem very doubtful
whsther Ton 3aud would, unless some quite radical change
takes place in the general situation, he disposed to
face the very serious consequences of the breach with
H.M.G. which a flagrant disregard of his treaty
obligations would involve, m these circumstances it
does not seem necessary to regard very seriously the
probability of a formal attempt at absorption.
5. The possihility of an attempt hy Ihn Saud to grant
"protection" to an oil concessionnaire in the hinterland
jpggggggflHMIIIIIMII niilliwm
of Qatar is to some extent connected with the difficult
question of what eastern limits H.M.G. recognise to Ihn
Spud's authority. The question of the boundaries of
Qatar is being dealt with in a separate Note. But it
appears probable that the sheikh recognises as his
western and southern boundary line a line running south-
south-east across the base of the Qjatar peninsula from a
point about 12 miles north of Dohat-as-3alwa to a point
some 10 or 12 miles north of the Khor-al-Odeid. Ton
Saud's eastern boundary has not formally been defined in
any Treaty engagement with H.M.G. But the eastern
boundary of the Turkish Sanjaq of Nejd as constituted by
title Blue Line of the unratified Anglo-Turkish convention
of 1913 lies well to the west of the boundary of Qata,r
suggested above by the Sheikh. While It is common
knowledge that Ibn saud exercises a strong and even
preponderant influence of an unofficial character to the
east of the Blue Line, possibly so far to the east as the
Barelmi Oasis, it is suggested that any effort on his
P^rt to exert or extend an off1cial influence or formally
grant protection east of that line to oil companies oi
others, should be strongly resisted, and that if the
question/