'Statement [on the expedition to Mesopotamia] by Political Secretary, India Office' [‎1v] (2/6)

revolution largely cauped by liis friendly relations with ns—would have gone under.
In short, we should have had to anticipate a solid Arab hloc against us on the one
side, and on the other the defection of the powerful Persian tribes adjoining
Mohammerah- such as the Lurs and Bakhtiaris—the effect of which would have been
felt throughout the length and breadth of Persia. In such conditions not only would
British prestige have suffered irretrievably, while the Gulf itself would have been a
serious embarrassment to the Government of India, but the declaration of jehad would
hardly have failed—as'in the event it did fail—to bring all islam into the Held from
Egypt to the North-AVest Frontier of India.
Such were the political considerations in the mind of J lis Majesty s Government
when they decided to send the expedition to Basra, thus driving into Islamic territory a
wedge which is holding to this day. The question of protecting the oilfields lias
already been dealt with by Sir E. Barrow.
II. —TV/c Iniporlaucc of Bacjdad.
Bagdad is strategically and politically the capital of Turkish Irak. I had noted, in
connection with Sir P. Cox's telegram of 23rd November 1014 {Precis, page 10),
that, from the point of view of the Political Department, "the eventual occupa
tion of Bagdad is so desirable as to be practically essential" {ib., page 11), and a
further careful study of the question in the spring of 1915, in connection with the
problem of the future of Asiatic Turkey, confirmed me in this opinion. It seemed
clear that there is no point south of it at which it is possible to stop, without
leaving the advantage, political and military, in the hands of the enemy, lo stop
short of it would be interpreted by our friends, and still more by the doubtful and
hostile tribes, as failure, with the probable result, not on]y of embarrassing the
local operations, but also of endangering the main purpose of the expedition.
With Bagdad as a Turkish base for concentrating troops and for intriguing with the
tribes, Basra, it seemed, would eventually become untenable ; deprived of Bagdad, the
Turks would have no nearer bases than Mosul and Aleppo, with a desert in between.
Moreover—and this was a point the importance of which became cleaier in the
course of 1915—only Bagdad (or, more accurately, Samarra, which in this connection
must be included in the idea) sulficiently commands the approaches to Persia to
ensure the security of that country from serious Turkish aggression south of the
Wazna Pass.
The entry of Turkey into the war had had an immediate effect upon the situation
in Persia. The Turks lost little time in violating the Persian frontier (the presence
of Russian troops on Persian soil affording them a ready excuse), and in January
1915 occupied Tabriz, where, according to the
' . i own Kv to foreign fiicc, ]\ii n i s ter at Teheran, 1 they were''welcomed
dated 10th January l91o. , J • , t- i x r s- ♦ i . .t
by two-thirds ot the population. ' About the
same time German intrigues began to make themselves felt in various parts of the
country, and it became evident that German agents in Persia were acting in close
co-operation with the Turkish invading force, and were consequently directly
concerned in the violation of Persian neutrality. The events which led, in March
I9I5,to the arrest of the German Consul and other Germans by the British authorities
at Bus-hire have been made the subject of a published statement, and need not be
recapitulated here ; but it may be mentioned that intercepted telegrams indicated a
scheme that was to involve the whole of Persia in the spring.
On the 4th May 191') the British Minister at Teheran 2 reported that the situation
- T was not improving; that anti-Russian sentiment
2 Mr. Marlingr toForejora Onice, No. loU, .i • -\r t i i i
i f A1 - " in tlie Persian Meiliss and general populace was
dated 4tli .May iblo, . i i i r i i
being sedulously exploited by the Germans ; and
that the German Minister was endeavouring to enlist men by bribery, and had
introduced a considerable quantity of arms. He added, on the 8th May, that the
position, always precarious, had become critical, and that the Germans were " completely
masters of the situation at Teheran." In the same month reports reached His Majesty's
Government from various sources that parties of Turks and Germans were on their
way to Afghanistan.
The situation at Teheran was saved by the approach of a small Russian force from
the north ; but the Germans, though their efforts at the capital were checked, continued
to intrigue actively in the interior. Mr. Marling reported as follows on the
,,, Ar . no. v on 24th June 3 ;—" German activitvin the provinces
3 Mr. Marlmer to Foreign Othce. No. 214, ^ , 1 .
d-ifpd 24th Juno 1915 - 1S increasing. \\ assmuss is endeavouring to
" organise an attack by local tribes on Bushire;