Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [12r] (24/312)
The record is made up of 1 volume (150 folios). It was created in 07 Sep 1878-19 Oct 1878. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
' The Mission mil be now withdrawn. In view of
the long continued ungracious and hostile conduct
of the existing ruler of Afghanistan, aggravated as
it is by the present contemptuous slight offered to
our national dignity, all possibility of renewing
friendly relations with this uncompromising and
morose barbarian is utterly hopeless; and
oven if the prospects were still hopeful, their
realization could only be accomplished at the
complete Facrifice of proper self-respect, and
at the grave risk of very considerable loss
of presUge in the eyes of our Indian subjects
and of our feudatory Princes. In consequence,
therefore, of the present conduct of Russia, and the
future policy for us which this conduct now de
cisively indicates, and against which, fortunately
for India, the Government and the English people
arft most fully and completely warned, this im
portant question of frontier policy will hence
forward cease to be treated from a merely Indian
standpoint. It at once travels out of the domain
of provincial into that of Imperial considerations,
and those of the very highest magnitude. No one
is more keenly alive than the Viceroy to this new
development of the question, and he clearly |
discerns that it is only by the united I
efforts and energetic co-operation of the j
English and Indian Foreign Offices that this j
dangerously complex state of matter can be finally
brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The Indian
Government are backed by ample military
resources to enable them promptly and severely to
punish the Ameer for his insulting attitude of dis
respect, but the significant fact is fully recognized
that the Ameer is but the puppet, while Russia
stands behind as the deus ex machind. The measures,
therefore, to be adopted in view of the Ameer's
conduct cease to bo a question of Indian policy,
but are at once resolved into a very serious
problem of English foreign politics, which can only
be dealt with in strict accordance with the settled
principles of the English Cabinet. Meanwhile, the
immediate object of the Viceroy is to endeavour to
make it clearly understood that we have no cause
of quarrel with the Afghan people, and to en
deavour to win over and secure all the border
tribes. The Khyberries have on the present occa
sion behaved well,and have shown every disposition
to remain friendly.
LONDON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 187a
It is impossible to be blind to the serious
nature of the intelligence which reaches us from
Calcutta this morning. Sir Keville Chamber
lain's mission to Cabul has been recalled by
the Vicekov in consequence of the refusal
of the Ameer's officers to allow it to pass the
frontier. The mission left Peshawur yesterday
and proceeded towards Jumrood, a point in British
territory close to the Afghan frontier. Previously
to the arrival of the mission at Jumrood,
Major Cavagnari , one of its leading mem
bers, had ridden forward to Ali Musjid, a
station in Afghan territory, with an escort
of Khyberees, in order to ask for a safe pass
age from the Ameer's officer. He was met at once
by a decided and unhesitating refusal, accompanied
by threats of resistance and by a display of armed
force on the surrounding heights. Three hours
were occupied in fruitless attempts at negotiation,
but, as the responsible officer of the Ameer ex
pressed throughout his firm determination to resist
the passage of the mission by force, Major Cavag
nari returned to Jumrood, and the mission
withdrew to Peshawur in obedience to di
rect instructions telegraphed from the Vice
roy at Simla. It would be some satisfaction, in
the face of this serious rebuff, if we were able to see
in the conduct of the Ameer's officer at Ali Musjid
only the insolent and unwarranted act of a subor
dinate official. But we are, unfortunately, denied
even this satisfaction. Within the last few days
two responsible officers of the Ameer, Mufti
Shah and Akhor , have, it seems, been de
spatched from Cabul to Ali Musjid. It may be
presumed, therefore, that the conduct of the officer
"who returned so discourteous and peremptory
an answer to Major Cavagnari was sanctioned,
if not dictated, by these latest emissaries of the
Ameer ; and it is, to say the least, unsatisfactory
to learn that both Mufii Shah and Akhor are
reported to be favourably disposed towards the
Russian mission to Cabul,and to have lately been in
direct communication with its chiefs.
This recall of Sir Neville Chamberlain's
mission almost before it had started amounts
to an affront, inflicted before the eyes of all
India. Its effect will be felt in every bazaar
throughout the Peninsula, the more because two
native Princes attached to the mission were wit
nesses of the slight offered to Major Cavagnari,
and were cognizant of the determined show of re
sistance with which the advance of the mission was
met. If the effect of this discourteous repulse is not
promptly effaced by a disavowal of his subordinate's
conduct on the part of the Ameer himself, it may
be followed by the gravest consequences. The
purpose of the m s ;ion was e/sentially one of
peace and amity. We have no quarrel with
the Amebr , but we are naturally anxious to
know whether he is ready to live with us in friend
ship and tranquillity as we are with him, or whe
ther he has already determined to cast in his lot
with a Power which, whether we will or not, we
are forced to regard as a rival quite as much as a
neighbour. If, as there is too much reason to be
lieve, the Ameer's officer at Ali Musjid has acted
under direct instructions from Cabul, the question
to which Sir N kville Chamberlain was directed to
seek an answer has unexpectedly received one in the
most uncompromising form. It would still be
premature, in spite of appearances, to conclude that
this is certainly the case, and in a matter of such
grave moment it will be as well that the public
should suspend its judgment until further informa
tion is forthcoming. But, if the news which
reaches us this morning from Constantinople is
correct, we have a corroborative proof that Shere
Ali has determined to accept the alliance of Russia
and to give the rein to his declared animosity towards
England. An envoy from Afghanistan has lately
arrived at Constantinople, and has been received
by the Sultan ; it is now reported that his
object is to induce the Porte to conclude
an alliance with Russia. The two items of
intelligence from Constantinople and Peshawur
corroborate each other, and leave very little room
for doubting Shere Ali's real intentions. Thus a
question which has hitherto been chiefly an Indian
and local one becomes immediately an Imperial
one. We had hoped for the friendship of
Shere Ali , or, at least, for his independent
neutrality as between ourselvesgand Russia. It was
disquieting enough to a Power like ourselves with
so much at stake that he should receive an Embassy
from Russia, and we had at least a right to expect
that he would extend the same courtesy towards
ourselves. But a Prince who rejects our envoys in
no friendly fashion while he receives those
of a powerful neighbour and rival must bo held to
have made bis choice of the alliance which suits
him best, and to have given us warning that he has
done so.
In default, then, of prompt explanation and of
reparation for a grave affront we must assume that
we are now as well acquainted with Shere Ali's in
tentions towards ourselves as if Sir Neville Cham
berlain's mission had penetrated to Cabul and had
returned without accomplishing its purpose. We
cannot suppose that the mission was refused an
entrance on account of its size, though Lord Car
narvon criticized it from that point of view in
his speech at Teversall on Saturday. *' It was too
u large for a mission," he said, repeating an objec
tion already made byMr. Gladstone , " and too small
** for an army." For the latter it was manifestly
never meant, and as to its size as a mission, we
may recall that the successful mission of
Major Sandeman despatched by Lord North-
brook to Khelat in the autumn of 1875 was ac
companied by an escort of 1,000 men. We may
fairly assume that if Shere Ali had been disposed
to receive Sir Neville Chamberlain he would have
madft no oblection to the escort which it was
I 'jeqijinj 'ptre i jpasai qv op j ejora sgoiofa
jo quo jco uiooj sfqq ut treiu on puis i Qoved 9 xb om 'p
jpreqi; 'ptnqSug; spjuSai sy •ao'sad on si pac
oa si ojaqa stq^ flu m ' moti •aid
-sod sb qs-ej sb saoaid o^ Sai]qninao J9q ni ni
-uiboi o^ paiisap iC^mioo siq^ uioqAV oas qm
'pire f noiqsod jaq ^suikS b adoang; jo saaMOj aqa jpj f
-jBaddB put? ^TiacaaStrejxB aq^ q-jm pa^na^noosip 'pa^oadj
aq o^ jcjuo sum sb 'aas aM aoaaif)' -snisiib s-toav J9q;.i
pire sa^qnoiq jaq^nj aas bav uiireq^y jo ^ou^sip Sai.in
-qSiau aq^ iq •uoi^oaiansni aq^ OMop ipid oq asotrqn j
o} paxtsq. 'sdooj^ ooo'osi qtnos q^tav '^uamnjaao^)
aq!> jo q^gaajqs 9joqM. eq^ aas a^ !, Biasog jo aoniA<
^nt^jodtm puB aSxtq aq^ nt naas ^uaoaj aABq bm. !p;q; q
c^BqAV joj • aoimdo !jBq^ paqt^snf'pmjB arc j'.ifpio SBq
euo§ SBq !jt?q} anoq £t9\a ' mo ^j •panjaouoa sbav adoi
sb jbj sb s^uaaa |[b 'aouaTmnaad pj9.t jo s ^nacaaia
tiib^uoo goa pip pajbaj i ipjq^ jCbs o ^ pajn^uaA j ^
guissnosip ajaM awv TiaqA\—mpag; jo A^ajj] aq; pajpo ik
aABq o; ;qSno ^qSia a.ioni qoiqM. 'aotjad jo
(
// The Mission will be now withdrawn. In view of
the long continued ungracious and hostile conduct
of the existing ruler of Afghanistan, aggravated as
it is by the present contemptuous slight offered to
our national dignity, all possibility of renewing
friendly relations with this uncompromising and
morose barbarian is utterly hopeless; and
oven if the prospects were still hopeful, their
realization could only be accomplished at the
complete racrifice of proper self-respect, and
at the grave risk of very considerable loss
of presUjt in the eyes of our Indian subjects
and of our feudatory Princes. In consequence,
therefore, of the present conduct of Russia, and the
future policy for us which this conduct now de
cisively indicates, and against which, fortunately
for India, the Government and the English people
are most fully and completely warned, this im
portant question of frontier policy will hence
forward cease co be treated from a merely Indian
standpoint. It at once travels out of the domain
of provincial into that of Imperial considerations,
and those of the very highest magnitude. No one
is more keenly alive than the Viceroy to this new
development of the question, and he cleorly ;
discerns that it is only by the united
efforts and onergetio co-operation of the
English and Indian Foreign Offices that this
dangerously complex state of matter can be finally
brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The Indian
Government are backed by ample military
resources to enable them promptly and severely to
punish the Ameer for his insulting attitude of dis
respect, but the significant fact is fully recognized
that the Ameer is but the puppet, while Russia
stands behind as the deus ex machind. The measures,
therefore, to be adopted in view of the Ameer's
conduct cease to bo a question of Indian policy,
but are at once resolved into a very serious
problem of English foreign politics, which can only
be dealt with in strict accordance with the settled
principles of the English Cabinet. Meanwhile, the
immediate object of the Viceroy is to endeavour to
make it clearly understood that we have no cause
of quarrel with the Afghan people, and to en
deavour to win over and secure all the border
tribes. The Khyberries have on the present occa
sion behaved well,and have shown every disposition
to remain friendly.
LONDON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1878.
It is impossible to be blind to the serious
tiature of the intelligence which reaches us from
Calcutta this morning. Sir N eville C hamber
lain's mission to Cabul has been recalled by
the V iceroy in consequence of the refusal
of the A meer's officers to allow it to pass the
frontier. The mission left Peshawur yesterday
and proceeded towards Jumrood, a point in British
territory close to the Afghan frontier. Previously
to the arrival of the mission at Jumrood,
Major C avagnari , one of its leading mem
bers, had ridden forward to Ali Musjid, a
station in Afghan territory, with an escort
of Khyberees, in order to ask for a safe pass
age from the A meer's officer. He was met at once
by a decided and unhesitating refusal, accompanied
by threats of resistance and by a display of armed
force on the surrounding heights. Three hours
were occupied in fruitless attempts at negotiation,
but, as the responsible officer of the A meer ex
pressed throughout his firm determination to resist
the passage of the mission by force. Major C avag
nari returned to Jumrood, and the mission
withdrew to Peshawur in obedience to di
rect instructions telegraphed from the V ice
roy at Simla. It would be some satisfaction, in
the face of this serious rebuff, if we were able to see
in the conduct of the A meek's officer at Ali Musjid
only the insolent and unwarranted act of a subor
dinate official. But we are, unfortunately, denied
even this satisfaction. Within the last few days
two responsible officers of the A meer, M ufti
S hah and A khor , have, it seems, been de
spatched from Cabul to Ali Musjid. It may be
presumed, therefore, that the conduct of the officer
who returned so discourteous and peremptory
an answer to Major C avagnari was sanctioned,
if not dictated, by these latest emissaries of the
A meer ; and it is, to say the least, unsatisfactory
to learn that both M ufti S hah and A rhor are
reported to be favourably disposed towards the
Russian mission to Cabul,and to have lately been in
direct communication with its chiefs.
This recall of Sir N eville C hamberlain's ^
mission almost before it had started amounts (fZ
to an affront, inflected before the eyes of all
India. Its effect will be felt in every bazaar
throughout the Peninsula, the more because two
native Princes attached to the mission were wit
nesses of the slight offered to Major C avagnari,
and were cognizant of the determined show of re
sistance with which the advance of the mission was
met. If the effect of this discourteous repulse is not
promptly effaced by a disavowal of his subordinate's
conduct on the part of the A meer himself, it may
be followed by the gravest consequences. The
purpose of the ms;ion was e.'sontially one of
peace una amity. We have no quarrel with
the A meer , but we are naturally anxious to
know whether he is ready to live with us in friend
ship and tranquillity as we are with him, or whe
ther he has already determined to cast in his lot
with a Power which, whether we will or not, we
are forced to regard as a rival quite as much as a
neighbour. If, as there is too much reason to be
lieve, the A meer's officer at Ali Musjid has acted
under direct instructions from Cabul, the question
to which Sir N kville C hamberlain was directed to
seek an answer has unexpectedly received one in the
most uncompromising form. It would still be
premature, in spite of appearances, to conclude that
this is certainly the case, and in a matter of such
grave moment it will be as well that the public
should suspend its judgment until further informa
tion is forthcoming. But, if the news which
reaches us this morning from Constantinople is
correct, we have a corroborative proof that S here
An has determined to accept the alliance of Russia
and to give the rein to his declared animosity towards
England. An envoy from Afghanistan has lately
arrived at Constantinople, and has been received
by the S ultan ; it is now reported that his
object is to induce the P orte to conclude
an alliance with Russia. The two items of
intelligence from Constantinople and Peshawur
corroborate each other, and leav e very little room
for doubting S here A li's real intentions. Thus a
question which has hitherto been chiefly an Indian
and local one becomes immediately an Imperial
one. We had hoped for the friendship of
S here A li , or, at least, for his independent
neutrality as between ourselvesgand Russia. It was
disquieting enough to a Power like ourselves with
so much at stake that he should receive an Embassy
from Russia, and we had at least a right to expect
that he would extend the same courtesy towards
ourselves. But a Prince who rejects our envoys in
no friendly fashion while ho receives those
of a powerful neighbour and rival must bo held to
have made his choice of the alliance which suits
him best, and to have given us warning that he has
done so.
In default, then, of prompt explanation and of
reparation for a grave affront we must assume that
we are now as well acquainted with S here A li's in
tentions towards ourselves as if Sir N eville C ham
berlain's mission had penetrated to Cabul and had
returned without accomplishing its purpose. We
cannot suppose that the mission was refused an
entrance on account of its size, though Lord C ar
narvon criticized it from that point of view in
his speech at Teveraall on Saturday. " It was too
" large for a mission," be said, repeating an objec
tion already made byMr. G ladstone , " and too small
'' for an army." For the latter it was manifestly
never meant, and as to its size as a mission, we
may recall that the successful mission of
Major S andeman despatched by Lord N orth-
brook to Khelat in the autumn of 1875 was ac
companied by an escort of 1,000 men. We may
fairly assume that if S here A li had been disposed
to receive Sir N eville C hamberlain he would have
made no objection to the escort which it was
thought expedient to send. What we have now
seriously but calmly and temperately to consider is
the policy of Russia in Central Asia, and especially
t in Afghanistan, as disclosed by recent events. Lord ,
B eaconsfield lately said, and said with truth, that j
I there is room enough in Asia both for England and j
Russia, but the remark cannot be taken to mean that :
we shouldviewtheestablishmentof Russian influence
in Afghanistan with indifference. It is a long time
since Russia was made perfectly aware of our views
on that subject. In spite of Lord C arnarvon's
protest we should certainly be jealous of the influ
ence and intrigues of Russia in Afghanistan. Af
ghanistan is separated from India by an impene
trable screen of mountains, and we cannot allow
these to be a veil for the intrigues of a Power which
would at once become, in that position, a means of
exciting dangerous hopes in the Court of
every disaffected feudatory and in every popu
lous centre throughout Hindostan. Lord C ar
narvon's alternative that we should meet Russia
in fair field in Europe seems almost to imply that
we wish or have a right to pick a quarrel. But
it is not the case that we have any desire to meet
Russia in any field at all. There is room in the
world, and even in Asia, for both, and Sir
N eville C hamberlain was certainly not despatched
to Afghanistan in order to enable England to pick
a quarrel with Russia. But, however peaceful our
wishes and intentions may be, it is impossible for
us not to bo aware that matters in India are very
serious when S here A li rejects our advances with
scarcely disguised hostility at the very time that
an Embassy from Russia is welcomed with marked
respect at Cabul.
About this item
- Content
Press cuttings from British and Indian Newspapers regarding the Afghan War (today known as the 2nd Afghan-Anglo War), negotiations in Cabul [Kabul], the British Government's policy with regards to the Indian Frontier, and the movements of the Russians during the war.
The cuttings have been taken from a number of newspapers including the Pall Mall Budget , The Pall Mall Gazette , The Globe , The Times , The Pioneer Mail , The Standard , The Daily News , The Daily Telegraph , The Evening Standard , The Saturday Review , The Spectator , The Morning Post and The World .
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (150 folios)
- Arrangement
The cuttings have been arranged in the scrapbook in chronological order and the pages of the book have been tied into three bundles ff 1-46, ff 47-96 and ff 97-142
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: This file has been foliated in the top right hand front corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of each folio with a pencil number enclosed in a circle.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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- Reference
- Mss Eur F126/24
- Title
- Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan
- Pages
- 3r, 6r:6v, 7r, 11v:12r, 14v:15r, 20r:21r, 27v:29r, 41r:41v, 42v:43r, 49r:49v, 53r:54r, 63r, 63v:65r, 68v:69v, 78r:79r, 81r:82v, 87r:89r, 96v:98r, 104r:105r, 108r:108v, 114r:116v, 122v, 123v, 125r:125v, 130r:132r, 138r:138v, 140v:142v, 143r:145r, 148v
- Author
- The Times
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- Public Domain
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