Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎28v] (57/312)

the route followed by our troops in 1839, but also
by reason of the lucid accounts of its difficulties and
dangers graphically related by Surgeon-Major
Bellew in his work " From the Indus to the Tigris,"
and by Captain H. Marsh in his " Ride through
Islam." Since those days the occupation of Quettah
has required that attention should be paid to the
road, and the difficulties have been, to a great extent,
obliterated. The road from Herat through Can-
dahar to Quettah is equally well known, it having
been traversed in 1877 by Colonel C. M. Macgregor,
C.S.I., and Captain R B. Lockwood, of the Bengal
Quartermaster-General's Department, officers well
qualified to make a more than ordinarily valuable
report of the route. As far, then, as Quettah we
may assume that the road is passable for artillery,
and that the measures taken for keeping open com
munication between Jacobabad and our newly ac
quired frontier cantonment leave nothing to be de
sired. Between that and Candahar, however, wa
know, from past experience as well as from the
reports of the above-named officers, that serious
obstacles do exist to impede the rapid march of
troops, the want of water being the principal draw
back. From Jacobabad through the Bolan to Quettah
is about 60 miles, while on to Candahar the dis
tance is close on 260. It is obvious, then, that
although a force may be despatched through the
Bolan to Quettah, it will be merely for the purpose
of strengthening the garrison of that place. Sir
John Keane's army took 23 days covering the
distance between it and Candahar, and the further
march to Ghuznee occupied another 24 days.
The early move of reinforcements to Quettah^ is
imperative, as the garrison there does not exceed
1,500 men. General Roberts will not only be able
to strengthen that important post, but also
to relieve the Khan of Khelat from all fear
of Afghan invasion by throwing forward a
strong detachment for the protection of his
capital. The warm welcome accorded to the
British by the Khan excited the Ameer's wrath
against him, and it would be well to prevent his
suffering any harm for having acceded to our re
quest for a cantonment in his dominions. It will
take fully six weeks even for troops at Mooltan to
reach Quettah, but that|will be quite, early enough
to enable General Roberts to secure a base of ope
rations for an advance on Candahar,
Taking into consideration the inhospitable nature 1
of the country, the very doubtful reception our
troops will meet with from the Afghans, the abso
lute necessity of providing defensible works for the
; men, with abundance of provisions, forage, and fire
wood for the armyiin winter quarters, and the
present advanced season of the year, it is a very
open matter as to whether Lord Lytton will risk an
immediate advance into Afghanistan. If troops are
massed at the entrance of the various passes we have
enumerated, Shere Ali will learn that they merely;
foreshadow a forward movement in the spring, and
there is yet hope that he may have time to reflect
on the evil consequences of his extraordinarily fana
tical conduct, and solicit a visit from the Mission
he has so gratuitously insulted.
LONDON, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1S78.
AFGHANISTAN.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—I was Commissioner of Police in Bombay all
through the mutiny, and, speaking with an intimate
knowledge of native feeling, I say that any procrastination
in meeting the insult we have received in the Kbyber Pass
will be fatal to us in India. We may put off entering
Cabul until the spring, but should at once advance on and
seize the Khyber Pass and Candahar. To procrastinate till
the spring would give Eussia time to secretly supply the
Ameer with mitrailleuses, &c., by means of which 100 men
could keep 100,000 from entering the Khyber.
Now, 6,000 men might overrun and occupy Afghanistan.
The conquest of that country would give absolute finality
to our territorial development in Asia, and secure India
from all alarms for ever. Only when we have obtained, ^
by alliance or occupation, complete military and political £5
control of Afghanistan will the people of India accept our S
rule as the fiat of fate, and only then can we begin to really ■
reduce our military expenditure within bounds. Wu ^
might do so by one half at once.
Very faithfully yonrs,
C. FORJETT, late Commissioner of Police of
Bombay.
41, Torringtcn-squnre, London, Sept. 24.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—It is certainly to be hoped that the Governor-Gene
ral and the Commander-in-Chief have been preparing for
the possible refusal of the Ameer to receive our mission.
If so, it is also to be hoped that the necessary force will be
able to be sent presently, and before thej passes become
blocked with snow.
Having had some experience of the hills in India, I think
I am right in saying that the passes into Afghanistan will
ba more open in October than they will be next April, or
even May, perhaps. In 1853 I went up into Cashmere in
the latter half of April, and I believe I and my two friends
were the first party to cross the Pir Punjab If we are to wait
till next spring before taking notice of the Ameer's insult,
the delay will be very prejudicial to our prestige, and the
Suipaaaxg soocre^sTp -pj ^naioijja i^aanbojj STJAV snxre |[Ef)]p
mojjojy eq; adojng; m uSredureo eqij hi siaojgo
UBissnjj puB qsi3[jnjQ qqoq jfq pomjojuj naoq ei^q j—'jig
'sanii HHI 50 HOiiaa anjc OJD
Our latest news from Calcutta leaves little room
»or doubt that we must expect war with Afghanis
tan. Military operations have, in fact, been
commenced already. Quettah must at least
be strengthened. Our troops are on their way t^
the frontier, and it will probably not be long
before we shall hear that they are threatening
Afghan territory, or have even entered it. The
more we learn of the circumstances under
which our Mission was turned back, the more
accessary it is shown to be that the outrage
we have received should be followed by prompt
punishment, and the less likely does it appear that
there will be any such submission and reparation
on the part of S here A li as the Indian Govern-
znent could accept. Our envoys were not only
refused a passage at the frontier line, but were
repelled, we are now told, with threats of personal
violence, which were only just not carried out. It
must have been the intention of this conduct to
make the breach between England and Afghanistan
irreparable, and such doubtless will be its effect.
The Indian Government, it would appear, is in a
position to act at once. The men and the materiel
are in readiness. Winter, indeed, is approaching,
but there may yet be time for some of the work before
ua to be done in the remaining open weeks during
which military operations will be practicable. If
we can succeed in occupying two or three
important military stations in the enemy's country
—and this at least ought to be well within our
power—we shall have gone a long way towards
finishing the war. If more yet remains to be done,
if S here A li is not content with the first stroke
he will receive, and if his attitude is unchanged in
spite of it, we can go on with the return of spring.
There will, we trust, be no reoetition nf the errors
lor whicn we paid so dearly~m cne former war.
We must not be betrayed a second time into
an undue contempt for our enemy or into an
imprudent trust in his word. There must be a
careful estimate of the resistance we may expect
to meet, and a force sufficient to bear it
down. This will be the first duty of the
responsible officers to whom the direction of the war
will be intrusted, and the nation rely upon them
not to fail in it. Our success, whatever be the cost >
must be attained decisively, if not speedily. A pro
longed war, with a series of stirring adventures,
and no clear result after them, would be only
just better than a defeat. Our invasion ■ of Af
ghanistan will be no unopposed march over. The
A meer , we may conclude, must have been well
aware of the extent of the provocation he was
giving us, and of the manner in which it would be
met on our part. He, like ourselves, must have
been making ready for war, and though he
may have no allies to help him, yet he may re
ceive a good deal of volunteered assistance. We can
be in no doubt that we shall be well able to deal
with him and with his friends, but it would be
dangerous for us to imagine that we can do so
without effort. Our blow, when it is given, must be
effectual. We cannot suffer it either to fail or to
be turned aside in half course. If we are not pre
pared to enter on war with a force sufficient to
secure our objects and to demonstrate our irresist
ible superiority, we should do better not to enter
on war at all, or to delay it until we are in better
readiness.
The letter we print this morning from our
Special Correspondent at Constantinople brings be
fore ua another phase of Eastern affairs. Our
duties in Asia Minor, peaceful as they are and are
likely to be, may prove a more abiding trouble
than our North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. question in India. In
Asia Minor we have to deal, not with an open enemy
who can be subdued by force of arms, but with a
corrupt system of misgovernment which we can
hardly hope to bring to so speedy and positive an
issue. Our Correspondent's letter puts us face to
face with the difficulties before us. It is something
to know how the matter stands and what there is
for ua to rely upon, even if the information be
that there is nothing we can rely upon at all.
This, indeed, would seem to be the conclusion
to which our Correspondent's letter points.
It is not, in the first place, from the local
Governors of Asia Minor that we are to look for a
reform of administration. They, we are told, are
bad enough in all ranks. Worse still is it to learn
that it would be of no avail if we could get rid of
the route followed by our troops in 1839, but also
by reason of the lucid accounts of its difficulties and
dangers graphically related by Surgeon-Major
Bellew in his work " From the Indus to the Tigris,"
and by Captain EL Marsh in his " Ride through
Islam." Since those days the occupation of Quettah
has required that attention should be paid to the
road, and the difficulties have been, to a great extent,
obliterated. The road from Herat through Can-
dahar to Quettah is equally well known, it having
been traversed in 1877 by Colonel C. M. Macgregor,
C.S.I., and Captain R. B. Lockwood, of the Bengal
Quartermaster-General's Department, officers well
qualified to make a more than ordinarily valuable
report of the route. As far, then, as Quettah we
may assume that the road is passable for artillery,
and that the measures taken for keeping open com
munication between Jacobabad and our newly ac
quired frontier cantonment leave nothing to be de
sired. Between that and Candahar, however, we
know, from past experience as well as from the
reports of the above-named officers, that serious
obstacles do exist to impede the rapid march oi
troops, the want of water being the principal draw
back. From Jacobabad through the Bolan to Quettah
is about 60 miles, while on to Candahar the dis
tance is close on 260. It is obvious, then, that
although a force may be despatched through the
Bolan to Quettah, it will be merely for the purpose
of strengthening the garrison of that place. Sir
John Keane's army took 23 days covering the
distance between it and Candahar, and the further
march to Ghuznee occupied another 24 days.
The early move of reinforcements to Quettah] is
imperative, as the garrison there does not exceed
1,500 men. General Roberts will not only be able
to strengthen that important post, but also
to relieve the Khan of Khelat from all fear
of Afghan invasion by throwing forward a
strong detachment for the protection of his
capital. The warm welcome accorded to the
British by the Khan excited the Ameer's wrath
against him, and it would be well to prevent his
suffering any harm for having acceded to our re
quest for a cantonment in his dominions. It will
take fully six weeks even for troops at Mooltaa to
reach Quettah, but that|will be quite, early enough
to enable General Roberts to secure a base of ope
rations for an advance on Candahar.
Taking into consideration the inhospitable nature
of the country, the very doubtful reception our
troops will meet with from the Afghans, the abso
lute necessity of providing defensible works for the
men, with abundance of provisions, forage, and fire
wood for the armyjn winter quarters, and the
present advanced season of the year, it is a very
open matter as to whether Lord Lytton will risk an
immediate advance into Afghanistan. If troops are
massed at the entrance of the various passes we have
enumerated, Shere Ali will learn that they merely,
foreshadow a forward movement in the spring, and
there is yet hope that he may have time to reflect
on the evil consequences of his extraordinarily fana
tical conduct, and solicit a visit from the Mission
he has so gratuitously insulted.
AFGHANISTAN.
LONDON, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1878.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—I was Commissioner of Police in Bombay all
through the mutiny, and, speaking with an intimate
knowledge of native feeling, I say that any procrastination
in meeting the insult we have received in the Khyber Pass
will be fatal to us in India. We may put off entering
Oabul until the spring, but should at once advance on and
seize the Khyber Pass and Candahar. To procrastinate till
the spring would give Russia time to secretly supply the
Ameer with mitrailleuses, &c., by means of which 100 men
could keep 100,000 from entering the Kbyber.
Now, 5,000 men might overrun_ and occupy Afghanistan.
The conquest of that country would give absolute finality
to our territorial development in Asia, and secure India
from all alarms for ever. Only when we have obtained,
by alliance or occupation, complete military and political
control of Afghanistan will the people of India accept our
rule as the fiat of fate, and only then can we begin to really
reduce our military expenditure within bounds. Wq
might do so by one half at once.
Very faithfully yours,
C. FORJETT, late Commissioner of Police of
Bombay.
41, Torringtcn-squnre, London, Sept. 24.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—It is certainly to be hoped that the Governor-Gene
ral and the Commander-in-Chief have been preparing for
the possible refusal of the Ameer to receive our mission.
If so, it is also to be hoped that the necessary force will be
able to be sent presently, and before thej passes become
blocked with snow.
Having had some experience of the hills in India, I think
I am right in saying that the passes into Afghanistan will
ba more open in October than they will be next April, or
even May, perhaps. In 1853 I went up into Cashmere in
the latter half of April, and I believe I and my two friends
were the first party to cross the Pir Punjal. If we are to wait
till next spring before taking notice of the Ameer's insult,
the delay will be very prejudicial to our prestige, and tba
Ameer might by that time have received [considerable help
from Russia.
The blow, to be of any use, must be " sharp and deci
sive." But even supposing that an expedition cannot be
sent until the beginning of winter, it must go all the same, i
and we must not mind the passes being rendered difficult
from snow. Yours obediently,
September 24. A RETIRED FIELD OFFICE! »
Our latest news from Calcutta leaves little room
»or doubt that we must expect war with Afghanis
tan. Military operations have, in fact, been
commenced already. Quettah must at least
be strengthened. Our troops are on their way t^"
I the frontier, and it will probably not be long
before we shall hear that they are threatening
Afghan territory, or have even entered it. The
more we learn of the circumstances under
which our Mission was turned back, the more
necessary it is shown to be that the outrage
I we have received should be followed by prompt
punishment, and the less likely does it appear that
there will be any such submission and reparation
on the part of Sheee At.t as the Indian Govern
ment could accept. Our envoys were not only
refused a passage at the frontier line, but were
repelled, we are now told, with threats of personal
violence, which were only just not carried out. It
must have been the intention of this conduct to
I make the breach between England and Afghanistan
irreparable, and such doubtless will be its effect.
The Indian Government, it would appear, is in a
position to act at once. The men and the materiel
are in readiness. Winter, indeed, is approaching,
but there may yet be time for some of the work before
us to be done in the remaining open weeks during
which military operations will be practicable. If
we can succeed in occupying two or three
important military stations in the enemy's country
—and this at least ought to be well within our
power—we shall have gone a long way towards
finishing the war. If more yet remains to be done,
if Sherb Ali is not content with the first stroke
he will receive, and if his attitude is unchanged in
spite of it, we can go on with the return of spring.
There will, we trust, be no repetition of the errors
tor whicn we paid so dearly~m cne former war.
We must not be betrayed a second time into
an undue contempt for our enemy or into an
imprudent trust in his word. There must be a
careful estimate of the resistance we may expect
to meet, and a force sufficient to bear it
down. This will be the first duty of the
responsible officers to whom the direction of the war
will be intrusted, and the nation rely upon them
not to fail in it. Our success, whatever be the cost^
must be attained decisively, if not speedily. A pro
longed war, with a series of stirring adventures,
and no clear result after them, would be only
just better than a defeat. Our invasion ■ of Af
ghanistan will be no unopposed march over. The
Ameer , we may conclude, must have been well
aware of the extent of the provocation he was
giving us, and of the manner in which it would be
met on our part. He, like ourselves, must have
been making ready for war, and though he
may have no allies to help him, yet he may re
ceive a good deal of volunteered assistance. We can
be in no doubt that we shall be well able to deal
with him and with his friends, but it would be
dangerous for us to imagine that we can do so
without effort. Our blow, when it is given, must be
effectual. We cannot suffer it either to fail or to
be turned aside in half course. If we are not pre
pared to enter on war with a force sufficient to
secure our objects and to demonstrate our irresist
ible superiority, we should do better not to enter
on war at all, or to delay it until we are in better
readiness.
The letter we print this morning from our
Special Correspondent at Constantinople brings be
fore us another phase of Eastern affairs. Our
duties in Asia Minor, peaceful as they are and are
likely to be, may prove a more abiding trouble
than our North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. question in India. In
Asia Minor we have to deal, not with an open enemy
who can be subdued by force of arms, but with a
corrupt system of misgovernment which we can
hardly hope to bring to so speedy and positive an
issue. Our Correspondent's letter puts us face to
face with the difficulties before us. It is something
to know how the matter stands and what there is
for us to rely upon, even if the information be
that there is nothing we can rely upon at all.
This, indeed, would seem to be the conclusion
to which our Correspondent's letter points.
It is not, in the first place, from the local
Governors of Asia Minor that we are to look for a
reform of administration. They, we are told, are
bad enough in all ranks. Worse still is it to learn
that it would be of no avail if we could get rid of