Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎29v] (59/312)

is by Candahar. At the same time it is question
able whether we should not rather enrage than
awe him, and whether he might not with Russia's
help succeed in organizing a formidable opposi
tion to us against the spring. At the most we
should inflict only a serious, not a mortal, blow
on Siiere Ali , and by so doing render him an
irreconcilable enemy. On the other hand, a prompt
march on Cabul before he can have time to mature
his plans and marshal his forces could be made
by a comparatively weak column, and would pro
bably enable the diplomatists to act with effect.
The fall of Cabul, or a treaty signed under its walls,
would greatly increase our influence and lower his.
With a ruler whose authority is very slight at a
distance from the seat of Government, what is
called prestige is of vital importance.
As to ourselves, we have been grossly insulted,
while the overtures of Russia have been received
with ostentatious satisfaction, and every day that
elapses before we exact ample reparation loosens
our hold on India. We must strike a blow of
some sort at once, and in order to strike at
once we have no choice but to advance
by the Khyber Pass. The moral effect of
forcing this celebrated defile and marching
by the shortest road on the capital would be very
great. It is one of the cases in which audacity is
true wisdom. As the thunder follows close on the
heels of the lightning so ought a British ariliy
to follow close on the heels of British menace.
We simply cannot afford to delay. We may
assume that there needs be no delay in order to
consider plans and objects, for these surely were
formed wnen we sent our Envoy apparently to
provoke an insult. What those plans are no one
outside the Cabinet and the GoVeiinor-General's
Council probably knows. They are enveloped
in Asian mystery, and we may be on
the eve of a great political tour de force
for all we can tell. It may be that Lord Beacons-
eield is resolved on playing a big game, and that
he has views not only as to Candahar, but also
Hertt. On that we shall have something to say
from time to time. Our business now is with' the
first moves on the board. We have pointed out
the necessity of immediate and vigorous action,
and have shown that it must come from the direc
tion of the Khyber. Supposing that this is the route
taken, what are we to do after capturing Cabul ?
Are we to occupy it during the winter and resume
the campaign in the spring ? Ten thousand fight
ing men would form an ample garrison, not
too large, however, considering the experience of |
1841; but, in addition, we should need almost as
many to guard the long line, about 180 miles, of
communication with Peshawur. Under any circum
stances, the difficulty of feeding ten thousand
fighting men, with their numerous camp fol- '
lowers, would be serious,, for little time would be ^
left to accumulate stores. By f alling back on
I Jellalabad, on the other hand, we should bs
!; able to dispense with nearly half the force
estimated as necessary in the event of occu
pying Cabul, and there would be no serious
difficulties from a commissariat point of view.
I In the meantime we will hope that a return to a
| sounder mind on the part of the ameer will make ;
warlike operations unnecessary; and that a wiser
and more sober policy on the part of the Indian
Government will help to undo the mischief that
has been brought about by Lord Lytton'S!
theatrical schemes. Whatever we do, however,
we must do without hesitation, both for political'
and military reasons t
i jebutbr's telegram.] i
SIMLA, sept. 24»
Orders have been issued for the concentration
! of troops on the Afghan frontier, with a view
of undertaking very early ulterior operations
should circumstances render military action j
necessary.
It is understood that Sir Neville Chamber
lain's Mission has been dissolved.
Gholam Hussein Khan, the Envoy sent by the
Viceroy to Cabul with a letter from his Excel
lency to the Ameer, has been recalled.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain will resume
his command q,t Madras.
A force under General Roberts will be de
spatched to the Kuram Valley, and a column,
of 6,000 men will assemble at Mooltan. A force
of 8,000 men will be sent to Quetta.
Active military preparations are being made
at Rawul Pindee.
* Delayed in transmission.
ENGLA ND AND CABUL.
THE VICEROY AND THE
AMEER.
[BY EASTERN COMPANY'S CABLE.]
[from our special correspondent.]
SIMLA, SEPT. 25.
The Indian newspapers have just published
the Viceroy's despatches to the Ameer.
The first document, dated Aug. 14, intimates
in friendly and dignified language the intention
of the Supreme Government of India to send a
mission to Cabul, and requests the Ameer to
issue orders securing a safe conduct and proper
reception to the representatives of a friendly
Power.
The second letter, dated Aug. 23, offers con
dolences on the death of Abdulla Jan, the
Ameer's heir, and notifies that the departure of
the envoy would be postponed until the period
of mourning had expired.
To these despatches no answers whatever were
returned by the Afghan Prince.
[BY DAILY TELEGRAPH SPECIAL WIRE.]
[from our-own correspondent.]
PARIS, W ednesday N ight.
Le Tenips ot this evening agrees with Le Nord
in blaming the too considerable escort given to
Sir Neville Chamberlain. The former journal
would go even so far as to say that if Sir
Neville had presented himself before Shere Ali
simply with a walking-stick and a carpet bag,
when once his visit had been accepted, the
British Envoy would have been as strong as if he
had been at the head of two or three regiments
of cavalry, because he would have had at his back
the whole Anglo-Indian Army. His mission
could not be otherwise than perilous. He ran
risks, and braved the chance of bad faith ; but
his attempt might at least have succeeded thus,
whereas, in the other manner, it was doomed to
fail. Le Nord charges the English journals with
want of reflection and memory. When, it says,
a few years ago, the Cabinets of London and
St. Petersburg applied themselves to the
marking out of their respective spheres
of influence in Asia, they acquired the
conviction that a direct and permanent pacific
action of each of the two Powers in its
sphere was the best means of assuring the
maintenance of tranquillity in these regions.
This action, in order to be really efficacious,
ought to have had a sanction, which sanction
might have been found in the responsibility that
Russia and England would have assumed rela
tively to the correct attitude of the Asiatic
States forming each of the two spheres
of influence. Russia, says Le Nord, con
sented to assume the responsibilty which fell to
her share ; England refused. Now Afghanistan
is the most important of the States which depend
upon England. Russia not having found on
the part of the English Government with regard
to Afghanistan the guarantees of security which
she was herself disposed to give to England
relatively to the Khanates placed under her, the
only resource left to her , was to seek those
guarantees from the Afghan Ameer himself by
entering directly into relations with him. The
events of the last year in Asia, continues the
Russian organ, the defeat of the Kashgars,
the suppression of the State of Yakoob Beg,
the flight of the former Khan of Khokand, who
took refuge in Afghanistan, doubtless with the
hope of finding help to reconquer his throne—
all this constitutes a situation sufficiently pre
carious against the eventualities of which
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jo qmog aqi ui Slum!® naAv 'aptuj ja^mioa tomj ivitdsD /i
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aivsatoqAV ' 00 pub fiaui[Oii -p -gassaK o? ^[ddv—wis*
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-itpBaj tiMOiaqiui noriisodissa MaiBnjx ialad
is by Candahar. At the same time it is question
able whether we should not rather enrage than
awe him, and whether he might not with Russia's
help succeed in organizing a formidable opposi
tion to us against the spring. At the most we
should inflict only a serious, not a mortal, blow
on Siiere Au, and by so doing render him an
irrecoacilablo enemy. On the other hand, a prompt
march on Citbul before he can have time to mature
his plans and marshal his forces could be made
by a comparatively weak column, and would pro
bably enable the diplomatists to act with effect.
The fall of Cabul, or a treaty signed under its walls,
would greatly increase our influence and lower his. 1
With a ruler whose authority is very slight at a
distance from the seat of Government, what is
called prestige is of vital importance.
As to ourselves, we have been grossly insulted,
while the overtures of Russia have been received
with ostentatious satisfaction, and every day that
elapses before we exact ample reparation loosens
our hold on India. We must strike a blow of
some sort at once, and in order to strike at
once we have no choice but to advance
by the Khyber Pass. The moral effect of
forcing this celebrated defile and marching
by the shortest road on the capital would be very
great. It is one of the cases in which audacity is
true wisdom. As the thunder follows close on the
heels of the lightning so ought a British ariiiy
to follow close on the heels of British menace.
We simply cannot afford to delay. We may
assume that there needs be no delay in order to
consider plans and objects, for these surely were
formed when we sent our Envoy apparently to
provoke an insult. What those plans are no one
outside the Cabinet and the Goveiinor-Ge^eral's
Council probably knows. They are enveloped
in Asian mystery, and we may be on
the eve of a great political tour de force
for all we can tell. It may be that Lord Beacons-
field is resolved on playing a big game, and that
he has views not only as to Candahar, but also
Herat. On that we shall- have something to say
from time to time. Our business now is with" the
first moves on the board. We have pointed out
the necessity of immediate and vigorous action,
and have shown that it must come from the direc
tion of the Khyber. Supposing that this is the route
taken, what are we to do after capturing Cabul?
Are we to occupy it during the winter and resume
the campaign in the spring ? Ten thousand fight
ing men would form an ample garrison, not
too large, however, considering the experience of
1841; but, in addition, we should need almost, as '
many to guard the long line, about 180 miles, of
communication with Pesbawur. TJnder any circum
stances, the difficulty of feeding ten thousand
fighting men, with their numerous camp fol
lowers, would be serious,, for little time would be '
left to accumulate stores. By falling- back on
Jellalabad, on the other hand, we should b«
able to dispense with nearly half the force
estimated as necessary in the event of occu
pying Cabul, and there would be no serious
difficulties from a commissariat point of view.
In the meantime we will hope that a return to a
sounder mind on the part of the A meer will nml?»,
warlike operations unnecessary; and, that a wisei
and more sober policy on the part of the Indian
Government will help to undo the mischief that
has been brought about by Lord L ytton's'
theatrical schemes. Whatever we do, however,
we must do without hesitation, both for political'
and military reasons,
j LEEUTBR'S TELEGRAM.]
SIMLA, S ept. 24*
Ciders have been issued for the concentration
of troops on the Afghan frontier, with a view
of undertaking very early ulterior operations
should circumstances render military action
ENGLAND AND CABUL.
It is understood that Sir Neville Chamber
lain's Mission has been dissolved.
Gholam Hussein Khan, the Envoy sent by the
Viceroy to Cabul with a letter from his Excel
lency to the Ameer, has been recalled.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain will resume
his command ^t Madras.
A force under General Roberts will be de- j
spatched to the Kuram Valley, and a column \
of 6,000 men will assemble at Mooltan. A force
of 8,000 men will be sent to Quetta.
Active military preparations are being made '
at Rawul Pindee.
* Delayed in transmissioa.
THE VICEROY AND THE
AMEER.
[BY BASTBRN COMPANY'S CABLE.]
[from our special correspondent.]
SIMLA, sbpt. 25.
The Indian newspapers have just published
the Viceroy's despatches to the Ameer.
The first document, dated Aug. 14, intimates
in friendly and dignified language the intention
of the Supreme Government of India to send a
mission to Gabul, and requests the Ameer to
issue orders securing a safe conduct and proper
reception to the representatives of a friendly
Power.
The second lettef, dated 'Aug. 23, offers con
dolences on the death of Abdulla Jan, the
Ameer's heir, and notifies that the departure of
the envoy would be postponed until the period
of mourning had expired.
To these despatches no answers whatever were
returned by the Afghan Prince.
[BY DAILY TELEGRAPH SPECIAL WIRE.]
[from our-own correspondent.]
PARIS, W ednesday N ight.
Le Tempspt this evening agrees with LeNord
in blaming the too considerable escort given to
Sir Neville Chamberlain. The former journal
would go even so far as to say that if Sir
Neville had presented himself before Shere Ali
simply with a walking-stick and a carpet bag,
when once his visit had been accepted, the
British Envoy would have been as strong as if he
had been at the head of two or three regiments
of cavalry, because he would have had at his back
'the whole Anglo-Indian Army. His mission
could not be otherwise than perilous. He ran
risks, and braved the chance of bad faith ; but
his attempt might at least have succeeded thus,
whereas, in the other manner, it was doomed to
fail. Le Nord charges the English journals with
want of reflection and memory. When, it says,
a few years ago, the Cabinets of London and
St. Petersburg applied themselves to the
marking out of their respective spheres
of influence in Asia, they acquired the
conviction that a direct and permanent pacific
action of . each of the two Powers in its
sphere was the best means of assuring the
maintenance of tranquillity in these regions.
This action, in order to be really efficacious,
ought to have had a sanction, which sanction
might have been found in the responsibility that
Russia and England would have assumed rela
tively to the correct attitude of the Asiatic
States forming each of the two spheres
of influence. Russia, says Le Nord, con
sented to assume the responsibilty which fell to
her share ; England refused. Now Afghanistan
is the most important of the States which depend
upon England. Russia not having found on
the part of the English Government with regard
to Afghanistan the guarantees of security which
she was herself disposed to give to England
relatively to the Khanates placed under her, the
only resource left to her , was to seek those
guarantees from the Afghan Ameer himself by
entering directly into relations with him. The
events of the last year in Asia, continues the
Russian organ, the defeat of the Kashgars,
the suppression of the State of Yakoob Beg,
the flight of the former Khan of Khokand, who
took refuge in Afghanistan, doubtless with the
hope of finding help to reconquer his throne—
all this constitutes a situation sufficiently pre
carious against the eventualities of which
Russia ought to have taken precautions, and the
peaceful and friendly attitude of Afghanistan is
evidently one of the most important elements of
security. Such is the explanation which the
Nord gives of the Russian mission to Cabul. It
is but natural, it maintains, that Russia was
obliged to do for herself what England refused
to do in the interests of the security of Russia.
There is in it nothing to alarm England, and
nothing which can be the object of a misunder
standing between the two Powers.
The Journal des Debate of this evening is very
much struck by the tone of the English news
papers on the Afghanistan question. If, as is to
be hoped in the interests of humanity, the quarrel
is circumscribed between the Ameer and his
powerful neighbour, the result, thinks the above-
mentioned organ, could not be doubtful.
It does not, however, believe that the
result would be a total, or even a
pftrtfrrl, annoxrettioxx xyT AfgbaxiiBtlzv**, Tfc is xnoiro
probable, it adds, that England will content
herself with indicting a severe chastisement upon
Shere Ali, and with taking possession of the
passes which form the key to Afghanistan. If
she were actual mistress of these passes England
would morally have control of the whole coun
try, and would no longer have reason to fear
any intrigues which might agitate Cabul.
The journal seems to imagine that war
is inevitable, and expresses a strong
hbpe that if it does break out Russia
will take no part in it, and that England will
confine herself to such precautionary measures
as those above specified. Unfortunately, i'
says, when a plague is once let loose it is difficult
to assign to it a definite field of action, and in
the existing state of feeling in Russia and
England no one can foretell how far its ravages
will extend.