Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎52r] (106/312)

dreaming of what may happen, if England is preoccu
pied. The insult is as visible as it is possible for the
modern habits of publicity to make it, and if it is unavenged r
or unavenged in a great way, there will be for years a grand
loss to Lord Lytton and to Britain of consideration and
respect. Already the Anglo-Indians are burning like French
officers who have been pelted, and if their emotion, their
justifiable emotion, has no vent. Lord Lytton's moral ascend
ancy in his Viceroyalty, and with it his power to do any sort
of good, will be at an end for ever.
; It is a thoroughly bad business, and allows, we believe, of
; only two alternatives. So great and so separate is still the
position of the Indian Viceroy, so completely does he rank in
Asia as one of the great Princes of the world, that the British
Government can, by recalling him, undo much, perhaps all, of
the effect of his great blunder. The natives will understand
that he acted for himself, and will not expect from his suc-
] cessor a continuance of his policy. Shere Ali will be elate,
and perhaps lose his head, but his defiance will lose its
effect, and he himself be considered only a daring poli
tician, who discovered that he was dealing with an
individual, instead of with the irresistible Government of
; Great Britain. Shere Ali in that event will pass un
punished, but will be no stronger than before; and the insult,
i like most insults treated by the strong with calm disdain,
: will rapidly be forgotten. This is the course, we think, that
1 a calm and long-headed Administration would adopt, more
especially at a juncture when it can explain to Europe that its
1 strength is still required to watch the proceedings of Eussia
in European Turkey. But then this course will admit of no
fanfaronnade, of no speeches full of resolution, of no waving of
the banner, of no allusions to the lightning effects of the
wrath of the Empress-Queen. It will not, therefore, be
followed, and the alternative is war,—a great war, a war
ifor the annexation of a greater Bosnia, at the back of
| the world. There should be no mistake about this. There
is no third course possible. "Without war, we can inflict no
punishment whatever on Shere Ali in the least degree com
mensurate with the reputation he has acquired by bearding
us, can indeed inflict no punishment at all. He receives no
■ subsidy from us that we could stop. He has no outlying
territory on our side that we could seize. He has no trade
that he cares about with our people that we could suspend.
If we persuade Eussia to withdraw her Mission, it will make
no difference, for we have been defied, not by Eussia, but by
; the Ameer of Afghanistan, whose name is therefore already
ringing through the world. He must either be let alone, as a
■ bargee is sometimes let alone by a gentleman ; or he must be
crushed completely, and crushing him involves a most embar
rassing and a most senseless war.
That war, it is true, we can win. The popular idea of oar
great disaster in Afghanistan is, we are quite aware, a popular
error. That disaster, the result of mismanagement, was easily
avenged by General Pollock, with a much smaller force than
the one we can easily put in motion ; and we might, had we
pleased, and had not European troops been so scarce, have re
mained in Afghanistan to this hour. But it is quite as futile
to draw deductions from the victory of General Pollock,
as to draw them from the disaster of General Elphin-
stone. Shere Ali is far stronger than his father, has
far more control over his nobles, has organised his
administration far better, and has far more control over the
fierce mountain tribes upon whom our communications will
depend. The Mutiny, too, has occurred, and has altered all
Indian ideas of the necessity of being strong. It will not be
safe to enter Cabul, even if Eussia is not behind Shere Ali,
without two co7'ps cVarmee of 15,000 men each, 10,000 of
them Europeans, one corps to enter Oandahar by the Bolan,
and the other Oabul by the Koorum or Khyber. We shall have
in Oandahar to fight men better armed, better disciplined, and
1 less impressed by British power than before; while in
Afghanistan we shall have to take the capital, and Ghuznee, and
Jellalabad, and the long stretches of hilly and difficult country
} reaching away to Herat. We can do it all, no doubt, for
| civilisation is armed at last, and against the new shells, and
rocket batteries, and arms of precision individual valour and
fanaticism can make no stand. But we can now less than
ever afford to receive a check, or find ourselves brought to a
stand by some improvised Plevna in the Hills. If we lose a
battle,India will be in flame behind us from end to end. Evidence
obtained during the Mutiny showed clearly that the Sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank.
had gravely considered the propriety of joining Dost Mahommed
and conquering India, and this time we have roused the