Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎59v] (122/312)

Idted that fully 30,000 soldiers would be neces
sary. I do not pretend to estimate the aruonnt
of the force that would be required ; it must,
however, be very large ; and, having once em
barked on such an expedition, no one could say
when the force would return. The cost would,
therefore, inevitably prove enormous."
If it is decided that this enormous cost is to be i
borne by India, such is her financial condition
at the present time that, a.^ain using Lord
Lawrence's words, " A fatal blow would in all
probability be given to the already over-burdened
finances of India." The correctness of this opi
nion will scarcely be called in question by those
who have devoted any attention to Indian finance.
One of the most distmgushed of the many distin-
guised men who have been Viceroys of India—I |
refer to Lord Canning—declared that finance was
the key of our position in that country ; and if i
this is so can any circumstance excite more serious ■
apprehension than the prospect of financial em- j
barrassment so grave as that which is indicated !
by Lord Lawrence ? It is possible almost in a
single sentence to describe the present financial j
condition of India. Stationary revenue ; a steadily-
increasing expenditure ; perpetual deficits which
have to be made good by constant borrowing: all
available sources of fresh taxation so completely
exhausted, that in order during the present
year to obtain an additional revenue of 1,500,000Z.
it has been deemed necessary to levy a license tax
I of 5d. in the pound on incomes of only 4s. a week,
i and to impose on the famine-stricken people of
! Bombay and Madras an increase of 40 per cent,
in the salt duty. These extra burdens, moreover,
have been levied from the people of India in the
j face of the most emphatic declaration from two
1 successive Governors-General, that to impose
additional taxation in that country will " produce
the most serious discontent," and is a " political
danger, the magnitude of which can scarcely be
exaggerated." In the face of such facts as these
it can scarcely be necessary to say a single word
to show how different are the effects which war
expenditure may produce in England and in India.
In England if it were necessary to raise 50 or 100
millions, the additional taxation which would
be required to pay the interest on the money
which was borrowed could be obtained by adding
a single Id. to the income tax, and by increasing
to a scarcely perceptible amount the duty on tea,
spirits, or someotherarticleof general consumption.
But where is the financier who can show how two
or three millions of additional revenue can be
obtained in India without imposing on the -people
burdens which would be regarcfed by them as
intolerable ? The people of that country are so
indescribably poor, compared with the people of
England, that the only article of general consump
tion which can be taxed is salt, which has already
been taxed to the uttermost, the present Indian
salt duty being one of the heaviest imposts ever
imposed on a first necessary of life; and when the
income tax is referred to as a means of obtaining
additional revenue, it should be remembered that
independently of all the abuses connected with
the levying of such a tax in India, so striking is
the coHtrast between the wealth of England and
the poverty of India that whereas an income
tax of 6d. in the pound would yield 12,000,0007.
in England, ifc would scarcely produce 1,200,000Z.
in India.
I have mentioned these facts, not for the
purpose of advocating that India should be
freed from any burden which she ought in
i'ustice to bear. My sola object is to show
low extremely important it is that in her
present financial condition not a single shilling of
her money should be improperly or unnecessarily
spent. Conclusive reasons can, I think, be
adduced in support of the opinion that if we are
involved in a war with Afghanistan, the cost of
that war should be borne by England, and not by
India, and that, at any rate, the consent of Par
liament ought to be obtained before the members
of the Council of the Secretary of State, who
possess absolute control over the expenditure of
Indian revenues, consent to allow those revenues
to be devoted to defray the expenses connected
with the military expedition to Afghanistan. By
the ^oth section of the Government of India Act,
1858, it is provided :
Eioept for preventing or repelling actual invasion of
her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden
and urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not,
without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be
applicable to defray the expenses of any military opera
tion carried on beyond the external frontiers of such pos
sessions by her Majesty's forces charged upon such
revenues.
No one can deny that Afghanistan is " beyond
the external frontiers of her Majesty's Indian
possessions." All doubt, however, as to the inten
tion of this particular section is removed by a
reference to the discussions which took place
when the Bill was passing through Parliament.
This provision of the Act was introduced by the
late Lord Derby, who as Prime Minister had
charge of the Bill. Nothing can'be more explicit
than the following declaration, which he made in
the House of Lords on the 19th July, 1858 (vi'dt
"Hansard," vol. 217) ;
The effect of the clause would be that Indian troops,
except for the purpose of preventing anticipated invasion,
or of repelling actual invasion, should not quit their own
territory ; or, if they did, the expense should be defrayed
out of the reTcnues of this country, and not out of the
revenues of India.
Not one of those, I think, who are foremost
in demanding that prompt and complete repara
tion should be exacted for the affront which has
been offered to us by the Ameer can maintain that
any military expedition which may be sent to
, Afghanistan for this purpose will be employed
either in *' preventing anticipated invasion " or
in " repelling actual invasion."
The members of the Cabinet are at the present
time scattered far and wide. . The Secretary for
Foreign Affairs is in France, the Secretary f or
India is in the Highlands of Scotland. But as
news now each day comes from India that
military preparations on an extensive scale are
being rapidly made, I suppose we may presume
that, if the point has not already been determined,
the Cabinet will soon meet to decide the vitally im
portant financial issues involved in this Afghan
question. It should, however, be remembered
that even if they should decide that the cost
should be borne, not by England, but by India,
such a, decision will not necessarily bind the Indian
Council. If the Council should think that
India ought not to bear the charge, they not only
have the right, but they are as much boutfd, to
resist its being thrown upon her as is the House
of Commons to refuse its sanction to an improper
expenditure of English money. Instances have
already occurred of a conflict of opinion between
■ Cabinets and the Indian Council. As an example,
it may be mentioned that every member of the
Council was opposed to the scheme which amalga
mated the Indian and the English armies. I
believe I am correct in saying that it was not
obscurely hinted to the Council that, if they did not j
give their sanction to the measure, it had been de
cided by the Cabinet to introduce a Bill into
Parliament with the object of overriding them.
Under these circumstances opposition was relin
quished, and the amalgamation scheme was
passed. If, however, the Council had stood firm,
the Government might have been unable to induce
Parliament to endorse their threatened policy of
coercion. Whether .this had been so or not,
those who are bound by every obligation
to exercise the most zealous watchfulness
ot«p tho finances "i- lndi» would at
least have bad the satisfaction of knowing that
1 they resisted as long as resistance was possible
the passing of a measure which, whatever may
( have been its other consequences, has, by largely
increasing the military expenditure of India, done
more than anything else to bring her finances into
their present critical condition.
In determining whether the cost of the present
expedition to Afghanistan, and the war which
. may ensue, should be borne by England or by
India, too much importance cannot, 1
think, be attributed to a declaration
of principle which was made by the
late Lord Derby, and which seems to me to ;
supply a complete answer to the argument which
; may possibly be urged—that, as the cost of the
former Afghan war was defrayed by India when that
country was governed by the East India Com
pany, the cost of an Afghan war at the present
time should also be defrayed by India. When the
Government of India Bill was passing through
Parliament Lord Derby distinctly stated, in the
speech from which I have already quoted, that if
Indian troops were employed with Imperial objects
1 he charge should be borne by England; and if
for Indian objects, the charge should be borne by
India. It has been affirmed by the Governor-
General of India that before leaving England, he
agreed with the present Government to treat
Afghan affairs not simply as an Indian question,
but in accordance with a scheme of Imperial
policy, and this view of the matter was endorsed
last year by the Minister representing India in the
House of Commons, who, as already stated in
your columns,, declared that our frontier policy
in India is "mainly dependent for its solution on
the foreign policy of her Majesty's Government."
Under these circumstances, I believe it will be
difficult to induce either the English Parlia
ment or the English people to come to the
conclusion that it would not be as unjust
as it would be impolitic to make the Indian
people bear the cost involved in carrying out a
policy prompted by Imperial considerations. If
the majority of the English nation approve
of what is termed the Imperial policy
of the present Government, they surely
cannot wish the unrepresented people of
Ttn.din +o. Ho-a-as V ■s^prifi 1
'ioaj jo {jueraind no ofiqnd aq; cy) usdo 'wessvp 'iaqci r, JgT
eq; uo aoxaHKOO NOISSSS iXEK oqj,—'looqos auuimj
eq^muoijoeuuoo m SUSSVIO iHT Dlismd—•noiSuisnajj ' kT
j wtog 'lo o Hos p jsLi mYiix lLHV IVNOIIT JVL
•reiWSea 'gSEKra WVHNaHX "
■M'S uopucrj •looxfs-uXjjxiof 'saumr io lootroq
luioa; 'innsisoa: iltme uoi^buuojui pun st^oadsoid b jo j
•saDj psonpsj SQjn^oaT: <4 powimpu osfB om gieqotraj eouaioa
•soopd psonpjj uiwjqo Sum saeSeuBH ptre VmaSv Sniurnr
9 to > ov 'sinsuoo s^ssCum jaq 'eoiAJag s.uaanft oq; m sraamn
•qoma tjf pun gy pamrat aic sajn^osi jo sasiiioo e^wias <4 s^oij-
OATsnpxa 'OS? jo RjasuLf®! nmtroo 0M410 'aon^ua^o Mumsmm
west4opossv Suiuioooq jo snongap s^aapn^g joj saa^'o.tnaoeT au t
'-reSpa: -H T -Aaa Suu^-ia l^namlew •«
•g-a'tf - crqa •ouq^jpuapa^a ■•BotsAiyr •«
"VM 'OAapooo 'K "i •sJtuoqi,a K paqddv
_ •S-a-a Ppnc 'Ai nqo.c ia •i3o t oao -J
•mjinztmio ( Smarw -g
Istted that fully 30,000 soldiers would be neeea-
sary. I do not pretend to estimate the amount
of the force that would be required; it must,
however, be very lar^e ; and, having once em
barked on such an expedition, no one could say
when the force would recurn. The cost would,
therefore, inevitably prove enormous."
If it is decided that this enormous cost is to be
borne by India, such is her financial condition
at the present time that, acjain using Lord
Lawrence's words, " A fatal W oav would in all
probability be given to the already over-burdened
finances of India." The correctness of this opi
nion will scarcely be called in question by those
who have devoted any attention to Indian finance.
One of the most distmgushed of the many distin-
guised men who have been Viceroys of India—I
refer to Lord Canning—declared that finance was
the key of our position hi that country; and if ,
this is so can any circumstance excite more serious '
apprehension than the prospect of financial em- ;
barrassment so grave as that which is indicated I
by Lord Lawrence ? It is possible almost in a
single sentence to describe the present financial |
condition Of India. Stationary revenue ; a steadily-
increasing expenditure; perpetual deficits which
have to be made good by constant borrowing; all
available sources of fresh taxation so completely
exhausted, that in order during the present
year to obtain an additional revenue of 1,500,()00Z.
it has been deemed necessary to levy a license tax
of 5d. in the pound on incomes of only 4s. a week,
and to impose on the famine-stricken people of
Bombay and Madras an increase of 40 per cent,
in the salt duty. These extra burdens, moreover,
have been levied from the people of India in the
face ©f the most emphatic declaration from two
successive Governors-General, that to impose
additional taxation in that country will " produce
the most serious discontent," and is a "political
danger, the magnitude of which can scarcely be
exaggerated." In the fafte of such facts as these
it can scarcely be necessary to say a single word
to show how different are the effects which war
expenditure may produce in England and in Ihdia.
In England if it were necessary to raise 50 or 100
millions, the additional taxation which would
be required to pay the interest on the money
which was borrowed could be obtained by adding
a single Id. to the income tax, and by increasing
to a scarcely perceptible amount the duty on "tea,
spirits, or some other article of general consumption.
But where is Ihe financier who can show how two
or three millions of additional revenue can be ;
obtained in India without imposing on the people !
burdens which would be regarded by them as
intolerable ? The people of that country are so
indescribably poor, compared with the people of
England, that the only article of general consump
tion which can be taxed is salt, which has already
been taxed to the uttermost, the present Indian i
salt duty being one of the heaviest imposts ever 1
imposed'on a first necessary of life; and when the
income tax is referred to as a means of obtaining
additional revenue, it should be remembered that
independently of all the abuses connected with
the levying of such a tax in Itidia, so striking is
the contrast between the wealth of England and
the poverty of India that whereas an income
tax of 6d. in the pound would yield 12,000,000/'.
in England, it would scarcely produce 1,200,000^.
in India.
I have mentioned these facts, not for the
purpose of advocating that India should be
freed from any burden which she ought in
justice to bear. My sola object is to show
how extremely important it is that in her
present financial condition not a single shilling of
her money should be improperly or unnecessarily
spent. Conclusive reasons can, I think, be
adduced in support of the opinion that if we are
involved in a war with Afghardstan, the cost, of
that war should be borne by England, and not by
India, and that, at any rate, the consent of Par
liament ought to be obtained before the members
of the Council of the Secretary of State, who
possess absolute control over the expenditure of
Indian revenues, consent to allow those revenues
to be devoted to defray the expenses connected
with the military expedition to Afghanistan. By
! the £5th section of the Government of India Act,
! 1858, it is provided :
Eicept for preventing or repelling actual invasion of
her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden
and urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not,
without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be
applicable to defray the expenses of any military opera
tion carried on beyond the external frontiers of such pos
sessions by her Majesty's forces charged upon such
revenues.
No one can deny that Afghanistan is " beyond
the external frontiers of her Majesty's Indian
possessions." All doubt, however, as to the inten
tion of this particular section is removed by a
reference to the discussions which took place
when ihe Bill was passing through Parliament.
This provision of the Act was introduced by the
late Lord Derby, who as Prime Minister had
charge of the Bill. Nothing can'be more explicit
than the following declaration, which he made in
the House of Lords on the 19th July, 1858 {vide
"Hansard," vol. 217) :
The effect of the clause would bo that Indian troops*
except for the purpose of preventing anticipated invasion,
or of repelling actual invasion, should not quit their own
territory; or, if they did, the expense should be defrayed
out of the revenues of this country, and not out of the
revenues of India.
Not one of those, I think, who are foremost
in demanding that prompt and complete repara
tion should be exacted for the affront which has
been offered to ue by the Ameer can maintain that
any military expedition which may be sent to
, Afghanistan for this purpose will be employed
; either in " preventing anticipated invasion " or
in " repelling actual invasion."
The members of the Cabinet are at the present
time scattered far and wide. The Secretary for
Foreign Affairs is in France, the Secretary for
India is in the Highlands of Scotland. But as
news now each day comes from India that
military preparations on an extensive scale are
being rapidly made, I suppose we may presume
that, if the point has not already been determined,
the Cabinet will soon meet to decide the vitally im
portant financial issues involved in this Afghan
question. It should, however, be remembered
that even if they should decide that the cost
should be borne, not by England, but by India,
such a. decision will not necessarily bind the Indian
Council. If the Council should think that
India ought not to bear the charge, they not only
have the right, but they are as much bound, to
resist its being thrown upon her as is the House
of Commons to refuse its sanction to an improper
expenditure of English money. Instances have
already occurred of a confiict of opinion between
1 Cabinets and the Indian Council, As an example,
it may be mentioned that every member of the
Council was opposed to the scheme which amalga
mated the Indian and the English armies. I
believe I am correct in saying that it was not
obscurely hinted to the Council that, if they did not
give their sanction to the measure, it had been de- j
cided by the Cabinet to introduce a Bill into !
Parliament with the object of overriding them.
Under these circumstances opposition was relin
quished, and the amalgamation scheme was
passed. If, however, the Council had stood firm,
the Government might have been unable to induce
Parliament to endorse their threatened policy of
coercion. Whether .this had been so or not,
those who are bound by every obligation
to exercise the most zealoufl watchfulness
ore* th» finances India, would at
least have had the satisTaction of knowi»g that
j they resisted as long as resistance was possible
the passing of a measure which, whatever may
( have been its other consequences, has, by largely
increasing the military expenditure of India, done
more than anything else to bring her finances into
their present critical condition.
In determining whether the cost of the present
expedition to Afghanistan, and the war which
. may ensue, should be borne by England or by
India, too much importance cannot, 1
think, be attributed to a declaration
of principle which was made by the
late Lord Derby, and which seems to me to
supply a complete answer to the argument which
i may possibly be urged—that, as the cost of the
former Afghan war was defrayed by India when that
country was governed by the East India Com
pany, the cost of an Afghan war at the present
time should also be defrayed by India. When the
Government of India Bill was passing through
Parliament Lord Derby distinctly stated, in the
speech from which I have already quoted, that if
Indian troops were employed with Imperial objects
Ihe charge should be borne by England; and if
for Indian objects, the charge should be borne by
India. It has been affirmed by the Governor-
General of India that before leaving England, he
agreed with the present Government to treat
Afghan affairs not simply as an Indian question,
but in accordance with a scheme of Imperial
1 policy, and this view of the matter was endorsed
last year by the Minister representing India in the
House of Commons, who, as already stated in
your columns,, declared that our frontier policy
in India is "mainly denendent for its solution on
the foreign policy of her Majesty's Government."
Under these circumstances, I believe it will be
difficult to induce either the English Parlia
ment or the English people to come to the
conclusion that it would not be as unjust
as it would be impolitic to make the Indian
people bear the cost involved in carrying out a
policy prompted by Imperial considerations. If
the majority of the English nation approve
of what is termed the Imperial policy
of the present Government, they surely
cannot wish the unrepresented people of
India tO pay for it. If the policy of the Govern
ment is not approved of by the English people, the
remedy is in thsir own hands ; but the Indian
people have no constitutional means of displacing
a Government which burdens them with taxation
which they may regard as both unnecessary and
unjust.
I have carefully abstained from expressing any
opinion on the Indian frontier policy of the Go
vernment—a policy which many competent judges
predicted would lead to the present complications •
nor have I expressed any opinion on the circum
stances connected with the proposal to send the
mission "to Cabul, These are questions which, when
the requisite information is forthcoming, will no
doubt engage the anxious consideration of Parlia
ment and the country. At the present moment it
may be premature to express an opinion either on
the conduct of the Viceroy, or on the policy of the
Administration, but I think there ought to be no
delay in giving a calm consideration to the finan
cial issues involved iu this question, which, as I
have endeavoured to show, may become of vital
importance to the future of India.—Yours faith-
fu J^ „ , v HENEY FAWCETT,
28th September.